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IHTAODUCTION 
Out of th• state•nts and events aade durina the war years and 1-dl­
ately thereafter, one fact clearly ••ra•• \8lil1pinaed. Opportunis• and the 
will to politieal power doainate the thouaht and actions of the aianu of 
the Communist world. Usina the Marxian line, with it• typical coo fusion, 
and prolllses of the better life, such leaden as Stalin, Tito, and ao.ulka 
strove to i11poa• their will• upOG the peoples of Sutem Europe ad ended 
in conflict with one another, 
llPJ>•ar to have 1erved only as by-motiva­
tional forc.s, taliaa a far aecoad to the lustful peed tor power. One is 
tempted to uke the too , ... ral 1tate•nt 'that ewry thina vu det•�•d on 
the political-opportm11tic plane incl\adln1 the action of the 1upposedly 
"icleallatic" Amricaa. It was looaevelt who inatiaated the liberal ideals 
found in the Atlantic Oaarter but wllo ude the followin1 i11posin1 nun on 
the fut,un of Polach "Al far u Poland 11 conoemed. the i9'>ortant 1:hin1 
is to ••t it up in a way that will aaintain the peace of the world. ul Roose­
wlt postponed mcl procrastinated on the Pol1ah question larply because of 
do_.tic politic.a md the clNin to placate the wishes of Stalin.2 And it wu 
Roalewlt'• c:oe1patoiy at Quebec. WlnstOll Quarcbill, who atte1pted. llld 
lquoted in Gadd.11 Sa1 th, AMrl can Dil loaa� �nn1 the S.cond World 
War 1941-1945 (New York: John Wiley and �ona, R7), p.62. 
2Gaddia lllltll take1 notice of thia 1• .!!?!!•, pp. 70-78. 
1 
2 
possibly aore sucusafully than iaagined, to al'bitrarily divide 5�ope between 
Eut ad West.1 
lut pe1'hapa Roosevelt ad Olurchill and even Stalin, Gomlka, and Tito 
were motivated by their 1d4tall no utter how ulterior they •ay seem. Granted, 
thi1 is possible. The ••• employed, howewr, have a tenancy to blur, if 
not buiy, �se lntan1i1'le hypothffet. The Ji ants paid lip service to their 
icleau while th• ct.terllinina actiona were on a quite different level. The 
Ruaslan writer Chemyahewky, speakina throuah his hero Dtlitry Seraeich., e1plains 
it aptly 1n the followln11 
The practlc8ble an.cl cold •• aft therefore right in sayina that un is 
aovenecl excl•lvely by aelf .. lnt•nstT 
They an rlpt. What an called elevated ••nti•nts, ideal aspirations, 
·-all that, in th• punl comae of affaln, ls a1oltahly null, and 11 
•clips•cl by incli vi dual interest; r••e veiy senti•nta are nothln1 but 
1elf�tnt•nt1t ci.ui, mden� • .  
Lenin mad St�ia b•• ooncrioniNtecl • iia• ••• •1plored. l•n they at l••t 
.Uvated by an ideal factoc, or a• till• projected utopia abiply act • a 
ratl.onallua1 Cllp&city in order to 1actlfy aay &CU• pe1petraced in th• nae 
\. 
:fll ••lf-int•n•tf Aaain Dllltiy •••: 
Were they dn- of lowf.... What could you ••ct1' ca a aatnia· 
li•t think of anythln.1 but ht.1 lnten1tsf Our hero, then, th�•t of 
int•n•t• 101•11 • la1teed of cffri.1•ln1 lofty •• poetic •n-, he wu 
lbsol'bed by such cln.. of low • ue ln ha� vi th th• poss nature 
ef uterialiaa.S 
Pet'bapa the equivocal Lenin wu ript, at leut in thla cue, when h• statff 
at th• Ninth Party Conan•• that ''Politics is the aost conC9fttrated ••n•sion 
of econoaics.11 Polltica, th• desire to dolllnate, 11 the detenr:ln-tn1 stnicture 
an which all id.eoloaies, all ideals within tile 1upHStnactun-, aft contrive4. 
lPor the COllpl•t• di1cus1loo betWMn Cbunhill and Stalin ln which Eutem 
Europe was "divided" into "aph•n• of inflimace" ••• Win.ton Olurch111, Trim1Rh 
and Tr!l!cly (Cubri.dae: Houpton Mifflin COllpmay, 1953), pp.227-228. 
2N. G. Cheraysbevsky, What 11 To Be Done? (New Yorlt: Rando• Holille, 1161), 
p.81. 
ltbid., p.114. 
-
The insistence ao 1tron1.11 •1phulnd by Lenin in Materialls• and B!Ririco­
ai ticiaa on the political nleY1nc.e of ewn th• aost technical phlloaopblc 
docirinH led owr th• ye an to a real lawnion of fmction•. Now 1 t wu 
the .. correct" politics whic:b detezainecl phi 1Nophy rath•1' thu the "coJ"ftctn 
phllotophy det•nin1aa poU.tia.l tut lt wu neither odd nor peculiar that 
such a reversal took place. It wu 1i11ply llON expe'Client. 110n opportune. 
Lenin'• view of the natlanal q••tlon aay throw so. llaht oa dd• ad m the 
tactics used by his ••lf-tppOi�t•d 1ucee11or1 to be 411cua1ed lateT. 
Self-detenination for Lenin wu 1i11ply a tactical step. In his •pe•ch 
on the national ct••t1on at wn en May 12, 1917, Lenin said that "In Russia we 
.. t stre11 the ri&ht of separation for the sd>jective nations, while in Poland 
we Miit stress the riaht of 1uch nad.� to unite. n2 
Of cwne, Stalin at no ti• loat slpt of political.at.• when deGldina 
Soviet 1tratear. A true Clauawitaima at any co.t, eva if lt ••t eo111pro1aise 
of his supposed" pals, Stalin practiced the fonaula that war is only the con-
. , tinoation of pol�tics by other Mani. The Pl'US•ian General Karl von Clausewit1 
put it 11ptly when he stated that ''The smordlnatlon of the political point of 
' 
view to the llilita.ry would be unreuon1'bl• , for policy has created war; policy 
..... 
ls tbe intelliaent faculty, war only the ln1trumnt, and in th• reverse. uS 
Stalin's attitude 11 succinctly expreaaed in a conversation held with Milovan 
Djilu: 
This war is not u in the put; wh�ver occupies a territory also 
impo••• on it his own 1ocial aystea. &veiyone hpo••• hi• own ayatea 
aa far u the U'llY has power to do. It cmmot be otherwiseo4 
lJ. H. "Phllcwophy in Polmd,•• ll•t•m Buryee, IX, vi, p.1-4. 
2a..en1n. '"I'll• ap .. ch on the National Question.'·' May 12, 1117, in Collected 
lme, V ,  p.JOI. 
Sxarl von Clauaewi t1, 0n ••r, Modern Libr -ay ed. (Hw York: Randoa House)., 
pp.16-17 .. 
4Mi lovan Oji las, CmyenasSMJ wit;h sialin (London, 1962) • p .105 . 
That W .. tem fonlp policy• ••peel ally that of th• AMrioDS • wu 
sterile in contrast .toes not nMd to b• cli1eut1ecl hne. Let it only be add 
that •••tern policy revolved aroun4 and wu ttl'lGtly subordinated to lll ttary 
conaict.rationa. Wrltln1 with CGildtematlon to a trl•i\d ln Septell>er of 1944. 
Secntary of the Navy J-• Porreatal phraaed it this w.ayz 
Whenever any American •uaaests that we act in accord.nee with the 
nMda or on ••CNl'l ty he· 11 11pt to be cal led a 1od-clamed f ucls t or 
b1perl.ali1t, whll• lf �el• Joe •uaae•ts that he n"da th• Baltic Province•, 
half of Poland,, au of h•sarabia ad .access to the tc.clltenaean, all hands 
•ire• that he la a ftne, frank, candid ad a-orally dellahtfUl fellelft!' who 
i• Ye'fY euy to deal with because he i• 10 •1plid.t la what he vmta.l 
.. 
Thb and th• pr&(iic:e of postp*1tn1 all Ul\IH not directly related �o the 
aillta"Y defeat of the AJd.1 wen certaiuly two halves of the , .. waln\rt. 2 
Na'ti.�:ftln in Eaten Europe poaea a ao...,hat different prablo• end ca 
DOt be ad hoc 1'.9l•1ated to the 1phere of Iii.tty lde�l• and aoala. Con��JY. to . ' 
tia. tttatMnt ai-veD aationall•• by Marx and
_
,. .. in the Co-11t Ma1life1to 
(the, tnat.�ationali1a .. a 'VUtipal n-.ln about to be nleaatecl to the 
hl1torical put for pd) nationallaa 11 one of th• dowinant forces in th•t 
area and ln .�• world. Bertrand lqlf• ••1• that oa• of the ''h�atoric �tea•• 
in ttl•· gowtll. of nationa11•• i• 1948- 3 Tb• year si1nlfiu, uon1 .o��J. thinp, 
tile Tl,�-�nfora aplit. Uov sianiftcant wu the role play•4 by n•��ali•• 
lD precipl�at.in1 ad aai.nt.ainia1 the rift Meween th• Union of Soviet Socialist 
a.p•Uoa and YvaoalariaT The nal 1plit occurnd �•t•••n Stalin 111d th• 
1tl1h•:r party offid.ala of Yuaoelaria led by Tito. S.•n in this light. 9ation­
ali•• · f..S.1. into th twillabt alone vi th. icltolop.. 1114 other like 1�11.. What .. . 
lwalter Milli•. ed., The Pon.ital Diaries (Hew York: Mikina, 1951) , p . 14. 
2Por a COllpl•te dl1cm11on ••• Walter Lafeber, Amrir•· lul•J.' md the 
Cold War • . ll•S-1"6 (Nw York: John Wiley md Sons, 11g7 , pp.!Y-'3 • 'ftie 
so-ealtia "tVo halves of the aw walnut" wen the T:ruaan Doctrine and the 
Manhall Pla. 
laertru Wolfe, Marxi•• (Ul s.: The Dell Pml.i1hin1 Company, 1965) , p.11. 
s 
doet shine out 1mt brightly 1• the dil••• confronted b-y th• Yuaoslav 
Comun isu. They .. t cbooa• either aowreipty or party dlsdpline at the 
hands of Stalin. Th• Co-.a iat leaden of YQ1otlavia and th• other Eutern 
Eunpean coootri•• were trained in the school of international C-.un isa but 
achieved po1itiou of power u the rulers of their nspect!ve coun tries. 
In cnentina their own power positions, 10• of the• tended to lc:t.ntify thea­
••1 ns with the ralaon d • etat of their napectl w countries. Tile Soviet 
Union, however, c:ontin•d to look upon th• u "blrelln11 or ldeolopcal 
vu1al1. nl Th•• eentri.fuaal tendend•• CGllbined with iacreutn1 pOit-War, 
But-lest tension• ;wen all th• naoaa needecl to found the Colll.nfona in 
Septnber, 194 7, Md to precipi tat• the Soviet-Yu1ot lav rift th• next year. 
Th• aplit lt•elf •1-..d a truly "national0 •tivation later on ln the 
heat of the fnrf ancl bee•• "National to...Jll•a'' in order to aet the backinc 
of the Yutoslav intelll1ent1ta and aaa•••· 
Throuahout blatory Poli1h aatlonali1•, u well be •••n later, bu 
alway1 been a prenqu11it• to popular backln1 froa the people. At this point 
let it only be obaerY•d that the 1pllt1 between the Polish Co9nmi1t1 and 
Social11ts, their aucceaaea and their failure•, have always been tied to their 
view• on tht• point of natiouali••· Plleuclsltl u early u 1903 realized thl• 
when he stated that: "A aocialiat in Polud 9U9t first strive to achieve th• 
lndependenc:e of hi• hOM11D4 u a 1tate. for thi• ia essential to th• victory 
of the sodaliet let.a. u2 Gcmulka tippean to be followtn1 not oaly the advice 
of Pllludaki but also that of Lnin's enmentecl lbove in 1917 an the national 
ct••tlon when he eaid in 1941 ta.i t "Tb• first coacem of the Poli1h Socialist i'· . 
ls ... 1 L. Sharp, "eo...ani•t Re1i•1 in Eastern Europe.'' Poreip 
Policy Reports, Xxvt, p.181. 
2Q1aotecl ba Kao1jakob Stehle, 'nle In"!J?!ndent Satellite: Society and 
Politics in Poland since 1945 (N.W Yori:: Prederick .X. Pruaer, 1965) , p.20. 
6 
Party and the Polish Work�r's Party 11 for th• independence of Poland and 
overythina ebe i•. aubordinat•d to this. nl 
The Comnfona wu aet up ia Septellber of 1�47 t o  contend also with 
1uch "nationalist deviation." 'lbia typo of use of nationalia• among East 
Buropean Co•mlist le�n becaM a misu.e when tho woTld situation and 
tbe wishes and tactics of Moscow chanaed. And naw Moscow wu ruled by the 
iron lo1ic of tho polari&ation of pOlitions and the .,nolithic (dualistic) 
Yi• of the world. 'lbe reinstitution of a at.rict Democratic Centralis• 
within the 1ntemational COlmUDiat pu.ty ••t, of course, the aW>ordination 
of all power in the Bast European Co•uniat parties to that of Stalin's, the 
occupier of the apex. 
· Nationalis• wi 11 be viewed u an 1·11portant ll0Yin1 force.. However, in 
the hands of the Comaunists, it can only be looked upon u a tool to attain 
1nd aaintain their power. A rudi•ntary tool it wu, one which could just 
u easily be tossed ulde to take ita "rl1htful" place as a •re oddity in 
biatoiy books. But. ironically enouah. perhaps it wu the Marxist Stalin hi11-
self who 1ave a new leue on the life of national�•• in Butem Europe. 
The Polish-American historian Oscar Malecki says that "The rise of nationalisa 
ln liutem Burope was and sti 11 is aainly a reaction a1ainst suffering, suffer­
ing from foreian aggression or at le .. t penetration and f!'Ol't foreien doaination 
. .  
or even oppression and persecution., • •  u2 
A great di.Ghotoay easted between the political state•nts of S�alin. 
Gomalka, and Tito and their actions. Public state•n.ta by the lbove were 
r. 
constantly infmu with profe1aion1 of ideals and proaises to both foreign 
l1bi4. 
-
2c1car Haleck1, "Nationalis• in Eut ·Central Burope," Journal of 
Intema�ion�. M«ff",. 11. p.J2. 
7 
ad clomatic •1--ta. However, their tec:arrina diaailll.lar aotiou and 
secret cornaponance betray th• f\lndmental aotlvatla1 policy ln their 
proaru, the will to po11tlcal pow••· The followlna atate•at of Stalin 
• Soviet fonian pollcy prlneipl•• enumrated in bls address of Noveaber 
6, 1141, to which Tito met Gmulka •an•d ls an exapl• of such a 1nj)lic 
atate•nt which .. , be CClllpared to their actlcma ia the crude arna of 
polltlcal opportunlaa ad will to power: 
h haw ·not an4 CID DOC ban any 1udl war ai• u that of 
i11posin1 our will and our nai• upon the Slavonic and other enslaved 
Dattoa1 of luope, who an e1pectt•1 our help. 
Our ai• 11 to help these nations in the •tl'Ulll• for liberation 
uey an. ••lint •aalut Kitl•r' • tyr-y aacl then to leaw it to th•• 
quit• freely to arranae their liftl on their lands .. they think fit. 
Tbere ... t at• no l1ttel'fennce wllau .. wr la tit• 1nt•"1•1 affain of 
other nations . 1 
Inter-conflicta ..,n1 this mbove-aantioned trio were daapened dUTin1 
the war years by the comon 1oal of ailituy success a1a1nst the Nuis and, 
1-diately after, by the atte..,ts to 10Ud1.fy political power on the ho. 
front aaainst the host of real and iusin•d enellies now ready to block any 
such atte111>ts. In th• 1prin1 ad •�r of 19C8, however. th• seel'ling 
cohesion betw .. n the Soviet Union md her new satellite states was releaated 
to the hiatorical put. 
In April 1948 Andrija tt.bran1 and Stnten Zhujovic, •llb•rs of the C.n­
tral COllllittH of the Comw\ist Party of Yupslavia with hip positions in the 
Govern•nt, were e1pelled from the Yueoslav eo-.ntst Party and 1\i>seqvently 
arrested. Th• cliffennces between the Yuplav Party and its affiliate the 
Comunist Party of th• Soviet Union now ••rpd into open colbat. Two even ta 
occurred in January of that year which urt the �in1 of thi•, th• decisive 
phuo , in the conflict. The Soviet Union vetoed the plan for the Balkan 
1Yu,oslma, Mlnl1tant•o taoatr•lh poetova. Malt• look {leofndt 
1951). p.12. 
a 
Coafederation which bad bMn Tlto'1 fond .. t fonip policy aoal, Md Hebrang, 
who can )oastbly be but clusift ed u a Yu1oslav *-cavlte. wu cleW>ted �. 
his post u chainan of th• State Pl11Mtn1 Co-111lon to an lnf•rlor post (Min­
ister of Li&ht Industry). ff11 foner pOlt wnt to a loyal Tltoite,. Boris 114rich. 
It wu at this tl• that tile dispute b•c- a utter of life and ct.ath for the 
ttp leadenhip of ti.. party. Hnnn1 bad bun •• of Ti�o'1 bitterest riYals 
wltllin the party. The fonet secretuy of �· Croatia Co...Ust Party alon1 
wltk Zhujmc. Mlnl1 t er of Pinace. po1ed tlae lnltial threats to the power 
welded by Tito ucl his coheru. If Tito wen to survive a purp by Stalin, 
be .. t erradlcate all thnau to Ilia p•itlon withio Ids own party. He .. t 
parp hi• awn party of "devi.Uoai1t1" ad "fenlp aaents. •• 
Tito, bnkoY!cla, Djilu, acl lardelj nulaed in power md t1'• two 
clla1e11ten laded ia jail. Tia• aucl .. of political power ln Yuplavla 1n 
19'1 coulated of f• -··but ihe•• wen all loaa tl• friend• and collebora• 
ten of Tito. Mmy of tile yom .. r .- had literally been .. _.. . by Tito. 'ftl• 
poll tburo of the party eaul•ted of Tl to J two 1ecretan... of the central 009-
111.ttee, Al•mdel' Rakovld\ (also llllni•�•r of Propaamuta) mad Moa ha Pij•; 
llo1oj• NHhkov1ah, Prelll•I' of S.lblaJ lclwal'd l.mt.lj, Minl1t•r of Porelp 
Alfaln and Dep1lty Pl'l• Nlni1teri Borl1 'li-9r1ch, 0.ail'Ull of th• State Pl11nnin1 
Coml•tion; IT• Cioalmjek, futun Ml1l11ter of War; ad Pranz Lesto1hek, Mlni•· 
hr of Heavy Ind•tzy. the politburo wu nationally well-balaced, thenby 
Mintalnln1 llffCled intemal pariy 1tabllity UGftl the diven• •l••nts . It 
c .. lstecl of two Cnata. thrH Seas, 'three Slovene•, and one Monteneartn (Djilu) . 
All of the illpOrtmat local offlolals had been h•d picked by Tito md thus 
I 
al10 stood ·loyally behbd hi• wllethft' for pen•al aft.ctlon or ••lf int•re•t. 
In June 1141 tb• nwne o� the 1ltuatlon which occurnd in April_. 1941 
1n the C.tnl Colllllttee of the Caw.ist Puty of Yu.-1aYia .-hen two •• 
ben. Hebra1 and Zhujovic, oppoaed Tito'• cleftance of th• Soviet Union but 
found themelve1 in a llin<>Tity and were eJCpelled, occurred in Poland. Here 
9 
Goaulka defied the aanoli thic views now bolaa vocalized &oa Moaeow. But 
Goaulka's support wu far fl'Oll u extensive. He could rely upon the ,,..port 
of the ''aatlvea0 ·and •088 of hi• Mos�·traine4 colleaps who bad become even 
:t 
llOl'e closely ·atfiliat•d with the Polish h o•land . but tbe uMulcovitea" wltbla 
the party had alway1 been ·••ldoa aore than cool. It wu this inner pal"tf ten­
sion that e.natecl th• aeed for 1oae sort oL C011proml1e on ttae lipor.tant iasues 
factn1 the country, especially collectivi1ation, durin1 the y·eara 1945-1948. 
In 1948 tb• Muscoritu blew witll the hush ·w inds troa the .. t and GOltUlka was 
owted. The pri•l'Y •tlve for thla move by th• Mulc:oritu wa political 
aa4 physical auJ'Yl.val. Pol11h Comuni1ts, unlike thier YuJOllav brothors • could 
not face the towerln1 coll01ua frn th• eut ·with my hope of 1�va1. �� \D'S•.-
• i .• • e . � . . � · ·, ; 
t.hls political e1peclienq wu 1tnn1thned in mmy b1 penonal resen,ment •cl 
rival� wl th G--1.ka ad ht1 aroup. PnaenU:-b of Gomlka' 1 now overt atti· 
tude aaa1n1t th• •croaobnt of Soviet domnation (l11p•rl•li••) can be '"" u 
euly u Sep�•••r 1947 at the foundin1 of the Coanfon. 11>.• Cold.nfora wu 
the Soviet n1pen1e to th• challeqe pn•ente4 by th• phu• of dlvenity cn•ted 
ill th• aut•m lunpea countrlu by auch Comt11l1t leaden u Gnulka Md Tito. 
In 1946 intemal eacl extenal dewlap.nu called tor an·accelerated revol•l.oa• 
ary ·pace. By 1941 ta.ls fieJd.bllity end d.ivenlty in Soviet poll�•• had 1tven 
• � l, 
Wflf aaatn to ·the dlohotoalc 1-.• of the world. 'nie 1M>t1n force of Soviet . 
fon1p po lier la th la mv• and la other Soviet font. en policy moves dl• CNttaed 
in dais p.,.r can be deaipated, as one historian has put it, u the "Gre at­
Power Dynalllo." 'ftle Coalnfora vu ••t up to coordinate ·the activities of th• 
•ariOUI C�t• t partiea m4 chua -un ideolopcal •olldarlty. ldeolopcal 
unity ancl poHtle&l · • emeru:• ven •rely two at.du of the •-·Soviet coin. 
11'• foundi�a -una wu ironically •ouah beld in •·outh--•••t•m Polatl. It 
w• attendN l)y npreaent·atlvn of the CGauaiat parde1, of the Soviet u.ton. 
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•l� eut Buropean states, and Italy. 'the host Gomulka vu the only penon 
present opposed to th• Cold.nfon•s oi:eatlon. At. this ti• the Cold.nfona wu 
• welcOM develop•nt foT the Yugoslav Coauni1ts. Do••tic policies could 
now become less blurred encl then would be no MN dependnce on other poli�i"' 
oa1 1roup•, eto. lut by early. 1941 the controwrsy had bep between Yupal avia 
acl th• Soviet Union which 1e4 to tha •"f)ulslon of Ti �o fl'01I the Collinfon in 
June of that year. 
Gomullla, ·who firaly believed in tla• ript of Coaaist eountrl•• to. 
follow:·'�etr own •• to soCiall••·· �- courq .... ly ad presumptuously ....... ' 
. (Gollulka had oven1tf.•tecl hi• power to vin friends and influence· people at .. 
his provocative atol'llllna ••••i-on at the June 3, 1948 plenua) expretaed hla 
Yi•••" At th• June s. ·1941, PoUsh Workers·' Party (Polska Partia RoO,otftte&a• 
·ppa) · C�tr.al co-.it• ·-ti-ng, Goaulla •uaa•sted a· policy, of conciliation 
tawardS lua•lavla ad a ;l;ldependent rouw· fer Pollah Coauni•• based on th• . . ·· .. 
pot•Cll•. of· Poll•h · natleal independence and aovenipty. -Ooaulka •:iimt cm ... ·� ' 
.to: at��Cize· th• Polub·· Coas.mi1t Party'• Luullbur1lat attitude on ·th• n•tioaal 
. l•••. · Be p\"ai•H � PoH.ab ·Sod all.at Party CP.tJ!l! �.Putia ·Socle.11•,trcana- · 
.... . . . ,,,,:; 
rPi., -for-11lt•
, 
tlradl'Uonal· ·�•rt· of Poli1h indepel)denc:e and ldvocat�, -�• · mian 
of th•>'PR •4 ·th• PPS wt th out '-'her purges• Tb• pal for which G�lk-a -
was al�n1· h•· ·hi••lf •1pl'Ma..S succinctly: "Both" for the PPS and for tho PPR 
·' . 
the 1ndep�n�ce of Poland la a aupn• conalderation, to vhtch ell otnen .are 
•-.Ol'dina�e4�nl. 
G·oailka received a mud reception from �e ••ting, and for. th°' lint 
" 
t.i• there w•re heud ao• deunds for hl• roalgnation. At least ··�� M11ben 
of the �tral Cellllllttee followed. Go•lka in supportina bla dan�." vi••. 
... • 9 : .�\ �  � -� �¥ �'.� . . . lfc. ·. l. D1iewuowaki. 0Gomalka and Pollah Natl anal Co-.nis•: A Brief 
Historieal Sletch." v.elHI,· of C!!!!l!••, YI, i·, p.•4, quotb'I �· Otoe• 
Wan•, Sept-Oct 194 • 
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But Gnulka wu isolated widaln th• nucl•• of party power. Mot.hlaa wu dcme 
at this plenum a it• ...., •• wne obYiOU9ly taken 'by supri.ae a\ both the tone . 
Ind content or th•�-· of their leader. However, later .. t1n1 separately, 
I> 
refused, instead uth1 to ,. oa sick lene. Durint th• follawf.na •�r a 
ftpt took place for th• contnl of the party. 
At th•·July plen .. of the Cntnl ComlttM• wlthout the. S.cntuy 
General of the party pnaent, the declaraUoa of th• Coainfo1'11 publishu on 
June 28, 1948, cron.temla1 Tito •cl oallln1 fa th•· iatenslficaU• of col· 
l•ctln1atlon, •• fonally 1pproved. Th• PPR Central CoaittM alto attacked 
caactllati•i•U -4 �nat.aiat.1. A apMch t.y Hlluy MlDe. cn_
tt�secl lndl ... 
Yldaall1tlc •• capitalbtic •tlaCHla in apieultun, aclvocatecl not. �11ectivl1atlon 
but producen' cooperati wt• and ..._.. th• n•l pad.• of Gaulka. 
Gomlka m4 Ma fri•Dda, h••ver, had bMD pl'Opa1atin1 their views thn'ugh 
both penuuiOil ad aptatlon. Oa Auplt 16, Gomulka cut short hls vacation 
to ,.._., without 1ppnval by the Politbunau, hi• duti• u Secretal')' &.neral 
of the Party. ltepeated .. tt.•1• of th• Politbunau failed to convince GOllUlka 
that Ile ahould nc:mt frOll hla J .. view• •d confH• to a pRp�and. catalop 
I �· 
of el'l"Ol'I . Gomlta wa then ampeadecl froa hi• cluti•. HI wu deprived b'• . 
all •upport md lsola'9cl vlthla the Central Comlttee. 
11l• Aupat plenm of the Catral eo..ltt .. of th• Workers' Party which 
•t at Wan• oa Ataauat 31 th�h Septelber J. 11•1, wu for educational pur­
,_.. . Th• p1'la&ry topic vu nauonal deviation in party leadenhip, tu 
ao•cu, and tbe vaya to owrce. it. lol••l• Bierut accmed Gomulka of Yio. 
laUna the prlactpl .. of Maniat party or1ani1atlon, of falU.aa into the error 
of rlpi'"nationalltt deviation, and ot a lukwara 11pproach to collectlvl1ation. 
Gomalka had 1n inadequate undent•din1 of the role of th• Soviet Union •d 
12 
th• a>SU ad had fallecl to follow tile "correct" ro8d by oppo1in1 tla• foraation 
of iM Colllnfon •d by 1dt1�uent critidsa of the Coalafon"• attltu4e toward 
Y111oelavia. Purtbezmre. •ar• llerut, 
Com• lie1l•, while declarilll in hls letter to the July Plenua 
of the Central Collllltt .. his 1aree1111nt with th• position of the Polit­
burew. and Isla acceptace of th• cleolarati• of the Pl••· did not 
hesitate at th• •- ti•, both before and clurlnl' hls leaw, to conduct 
conv.n•uou vltll hi• collequn la th• .Polltt»unu IDd with othen in 
which he aired 1enti•nt1 drutically oppoeed to th• declaration. He 
que1tloned tu re1oluticm of the Coldafon concenln1 the •thod 
of 1ociall1t recon1truction of qrlculture, and eftll repTOached our 
clel•1•t•• to th• COlllnt.n aayina they h .. DO n1ht to vote for that 
part of th• re1olution of th• Com.nfora. 'n.• for ... of reaction at 
hw •cl •n• atan trumpett.111 •wt ·•·MW bnecll la ti\• •.ocntic­
anti-i11per1al11t CUIP, and attempted to: 1et Co11rade Wletl9W alon19ide 
Ti to u a hero of aa.Jlanal Co•• •l1a. l 
Stalin !led no tloubta lbout the outcom of hi• cllsput• wlth Yuaoslavia. 
Tito'• 1ucces1ful cleftmce of hit autltortty·tttus c- u a ••v.n thock. Stalin 
� .... 
now: racllcally tlalatene• up bl• wh•l• policy tawar41 s .. t•rn Europe. �Acaelera� 
tioa o.f tile llGDOllthic ata,. occarnd between l'ebruuy and Decelll>er 1948 whell 
. the Sociali•t ·Patl• in a..ta. Hm1ary, CuchG*,lovaltia, ad Poland· were 
tlbaon.d into .a.. Ca mist partl•• of their rupecti ft countriea. Durin1 
J anuuy, 1Nt, tha• cowrtri" and the Soviet Union ••t up th• Council for 
Mutual Bc•a.lc M1i1tmce (Coecoa) ·u a fon of retort to th• Marshall Plan. 
la lNt Stalisa puqed the Co11  •lat parti•• of Butem l!urape, puttlna on trial 
a DUlber of le.U.q ca-mists, laclucllza1 lajll ln Hm1ary alHl ltHtov in Bulaaria. 
Goll.alka'• cue CID but be uncleatood ln the lipt of th• llbow. tmtil 
the •-r of 1941 Gomalka had ••rwcl Soviet pmpOl•I in Polad well. He llad 
ben the drivtn1 force ad ld»'l'iomt ln the i11poettton of th• Colmlnl•t np• 
• Pol•d. Kl• •111P&tla1 wlt1' tM ncalcitrmt Tito oould not be tolttated •ti 
Illa n90l'al b•- lMritllble. Tbe Poll1b Reed to Soclalt.•• vu now national 
cle'llattoa. 
lquoted in Ada a. Ulu, 't'ftut Crisis in th• Polish Co-..ni1t Party," 
Review of Politlcs, XII, pp.84-85. 
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Dnin1 th• Aua-t JI ... ..,tellber J .. ting of �ta• PP• Central COii-
111.ttM, G.ulka waa to neat, ht• �ollcw.n wn to be demotecl, mcl an 
tippe•nn• of Lenlnlat 1elf-crlticf.•• and 1olidarity wa to be stap4. 
Goaulk•'• 1trcm1 will power ftOW ""orarily save way, He pleaded IUilty 
to "l'ishti'lt•natianallat" •vtaticm J. he s aid he had ben """I on •any 'l11ue1 
lncludlll  eolleotlvlaatlon end Yuaoela'ria; ad h• '�tted bis di1truat of 
the Soviet Union clurin1 the "ar •d his vtlHnp .. 1 to caprold.•• with nactlon. 
But GoaaUta ·wu not •ttt•d for the tole of 1elf-crtttc. ·One historian poinu 
�-" .. 
out that "Hit confes1ton1 wen a ttra,. illxttan of ••1f-cri.t1d•• md self­
juatlfication . .. 1 In fact, Gomlk.a aide thl"M att•111>t• at recantation before 
ht• c01trade1 were 1 a tis tled. He nev.r did renounce th• di f lerence betwHn 
Poland and the Sovl•t Union ad .the Poli1h road to Comuni1• entirely. 
ll•rut wu now given th• new position. of Oaairaan of the Pal'.tY while 
Gomlka wu dropped frOll the position of Secntary-General of the PPRo 
i::·. · 
Pour of G-.alka'·• followers wen reduced froa full to altemate •llben of 
the C.ntral Comlttee and 8ienkow1ki wu e11pelled. Go.alka did ntain for 
• ti• his nOlllnal •llbenhip in th• Central Co..tttM and hie posts u Deputy . . 
Pnlller and Minl•t•r tor the Recovered Tern tori et. Hi• accusers were forced 
to llOve vlth 90Cleration u his deposition literally shook the party to the 
core and because of bis popularity and influence with th• aaasn .• 
8y late 1949 ewnts toot place which ?.vealed the radical nature of 
the ••1es taklna place and the extent to which the Soviet Union wu behind 
the•. loth th• PPR end the PPS were pU1'19d. nae PPR •JP•lled so,ooo •men 
md the PPS lOlt ao ,000. In Dec.mer 194' these two wen tu.ed to ton the 
. ·• 
Pollsh �ited Wmen' Party (Polska. Zjednoc.sona Parti,a RobotnJcsa.-PZPR). 
. I 
lat chard lliacocks, Poland: lriclp for the M>zssf (London-New York­
Toroato. Oxfori Uni veni ty Pn11 , US&!J, p .141. 
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lien& wu Oaairaa of th• party,, •d Joseph Cynnkiewt.cs vu Mde aecntary­
,.ural althoup ualated by two Noecow•tl"daed 1ecr1tariH, Z•Ml&lti •d 
Z .. nwalti. 11\e Pl'Olr• of the party wu laid d:,.,.. tn n, ldeoloalc�l Declua­
tlon of tlae PIPR p•H•lled ln Howe Drop of Jan-Peb lt49. Tbl• WU in pat 
�-"to Gom11ta•1 stand• of 2 yean prior. 'nae new emph·u�s wu now on 
the SoYiet laloat 
Th• c&U1e of cou ollclatina Poled'• tnMpendenCll and her aareb towards 
aociali•• is lnclia1olwly linked with th• •t.ruul• for p•ace c•duct•d 
WH!er th• leaclenblp of t9'• loYi•t uatn. Ivery ten8ftcy al•d at 
loosenin1 colllboration with th• Soviet �ian endanpn the v•� foWl­
daUon of the People• 1 De.oency lw Po lad lftcl .. .  • �· ind9pendeftce of 
the countzy. 1 .,, 
Durin1 the· autum of 1949, •rked chanpa took place in both the organi­
sation md the c�d of the Poliah armd forces. Th• role the Soviets 
played wu quite evident. Vice-Mlni1ter of Defense Narim Spychabki wu 
replaced by Odalb. In Hovelll>er Stalin, ostensibly at the request of Bierut, 
aade .available to Poland an• of his senior alli tary co•11nden, Manhall 
Rokossowky. lokosaovaky vu of Polish origin but had become vety unpop\llar 
in Polmict due to his pu11 ft role durin1 the Wanw uprising and hi• appoint­
•nt u colm8ftor of the Soviet force• in Poland. Roko1sov1ky now bee&M 
Mlniater of Defenae and Q,,..ander-in-0.lef of the Polish ADI/ in place of 
. ' 
General Zyalenki who went into ntin•nt. Rokossovsky vu alto now a ••-
ber of the Central Com ttM md Poli tbunau. Al10 in Novelll>er the attacb 
on Goatllta and bis 1upporten wen ren .. d. Goaalka wu di11d.1sed fro� his 
po.ti u o.puty Prl .. Nlniater and Minlat•r for the Recov.nd Terrlte>l"ies mid 
&iWA a llinor 1ppolnt9Ht a Second Vice-M11'11ter of the SupnM Control Coa­
al11ion. At the Central eo..lttM of th• United Wonen' Party Metina held 
an Novelll>er lS, Gcmulka, Sphchalall, mid lli11ko wen expelled troa the Central 
libld • •  p.1.tl. 
-
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Comltt•• and tonltlden to partidpate la th• tiature ia ay foni of party 
I 
wol'k. Poland'• 8tallai1t period now officially bepu . Polttiully, diplo-
utioally·,, ad econoalcally that COUftti:y t>•e- t!tbserri.ent to tbe Soviet 
lkaion. All that wu heard w·u the adulation and echotn1 of Stalin. The 
Yuaoalav road now departs radically froa that of the Poltah·. 
In his atte11pt1 to i9'>ot• • .on ripcl mnoUtliic nal•ntatlon upo� 
his satellites,. s1:.11n drow. two of hta faithful tools, Tito and �lka, 
. ' 
into opposition. lb• forar .... el� t.o n .tatn .men� for. hi••lf'ad 
b,1  state while the · 1att.er wu sent into poll ti cal •x$l• ad hi• state con-
-· . 
tin��io� ._iouow th• Stalinist line. 
. r 
lhy th.ls div.raence in th• ... raence of c..un1aa in th•.•• two statesT 
Wby Ti to and autonmv ad not Gomulkat What were the '4�1 tary, po ll_tlcal • .. , . 
. a,oclal, psycholopoal, md historical reuoaa for this difference an.cl this 
11.t»aequent �verpnce! 
·Wbl,le diaeutaina th• cue of Yuaoslavla, nphuls will be ;iac:.u on the 
powth and tactlca ••d by the victorious Parti1.-is ancl their nlatlonihlp to 
th• Soviet \ml.on cullllnatlng in the Soviet-Yugoslav di.apute md sp11 t •. The 
Yuaa.lav Govem.int in BXS.le and oppotlna political aro�s will be considered 
only in pu1in1 a their i11po�an•, th• polltlcal power they �•re· able to 
earcise., wu sUnlounted with the rl•• of Tito's Partisan .ove�t. 
I-n the anal)'ai1 of Polmnd, a di.fferent relatiorisbip will be stressed. 
During th• war politic.al power, the bactina of the •1�rity of the i>•ople, was 
definitely in th• hands of the Hom An/f in Poland and its political voice, 
the Polish Govem•at in Idle loc.ated in London. 'nl• Co..anlat Party enjoyed 
11.ttl• lf ay populal' support. The Comunist victory he" wu unufactured . 
troll afar throuch Soviet apportuni••• takin1 th• fon of lll ltazy ad peU.ti­
cal 1uppn11loa. Th•nfon, e111phui1 will be placed OD the ••• e11ployed 
1� 
by the Russian C�1t1 and their puppet Pole• to extra� political power 
fro•· th• Govem•nt· in ED.le durlna the war. ad the •thods uaed to bury all 
opposition in the 1-tate after th• Comunist· "victory" in 1945. 
SOCIALISM IN mE BALIAHS 
AND 'nlE THIRD INTBRNATIONAL 
There lt no dod>t that aa the Gel'Uft antes withdrew in the autua 
of 1944 the. CG 1Mi1ts wen tile wt powerful ainsle political· fora reaalnina 
in th• Sa.tan Penalnsula·. Haw dld thi• situation com lboutT Were th•. Com· 
..Utts •rely •n 1Mll1'1l than their GppOnentt u exploit1n1 the warti• 
titaatlont AnHet69 to a ... qautton• can be aad• •re dl1cemable by 1tudy­
ln1 th• history of th• COlmunlst llOV9111ftt in the lalklmt in aeneral and. in 
Yqoslavia ln partleular. 
The foniation of Marxiat. 1oclall1t partl•• in ti\• Balkans proper cue 
in rapid succession dmin1 a 1in1le generation : the lu11arian Social Demo­
cratic Party vu or1ani1ed in latl, the Ruaanlat& in 119S, the Serbl1n in 1903, 
ad the Greek ln 1909; a sodallat party wu botn in Turkey in 1909. Socialist 
partiea were "tab ltshed in the lalkan portions of the HabsbU'l'I *1 re in the 
·� 
•- period: Croatia la 1194, Slovenia in 1196, ·Dalatla l.n 1905, and Bosnia 
in 1109: in the north a Hun1arlan aocialiat party was created in 1890, a year 
ati.r t ts counterpart ir.a Austria. Th••• Ba11t1n· partl•• were 11 ttle ..,,.. than 
Uny, cliscridant md pow•rl••• ·tntell•c.tual aroups ,  but their for11at10n did 
indicate that a ••11 but enerptic sepent of the intellipntsia vu •••king 
an alternative to the exiatlna political sy•t••· 
Little ot·1.,ortance affected the aake up of th••• poups until th• spring 
of unt. At thl• tl• a event occurred which radically changed both ·the phl lo­
aaphy and the tnedoml of thH• aroupa • 
. 
In March of 1919 the Pint Conan•• of the Third Intemational •t in 
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Noa cow. Intemal 41••1'tlen ad th• pnaeace of the el t• al'ldu pnven ted 
th• attendance of ... , npnsentatlws to this. th• Plat con,.. •. , &t a ...... 
for cens l1ted only of Rulli• lohhevUte an4 aaall Comualat 1nup1 ho• nuby 
couatri••. Anplla lale•ova, the ftnt Mental')' of th• Ceuaral•• lntena• 
tlnal, polata out dlat mat of th• dt,l•1ates ''lta4 been laend pl:alted by tile lusa1• 
eeatl'&l ·comltt• fnm ao-calletl Colllftmi1t parti• in tu•• ••ll•r natiou vbich 
bu formerly C011p1'11ed the lustlu e11plre • • • or tb.,, wen war prisoners or 
fonlp .radical• vho happ9n•4 to b• in R••l a at th• ti•• ,J At thl1 pola� • 
l1partial obtener voaltl certainly· haw labeled tla• 'ftllZ'd. tnternatieftal a 11saall 
sectarian body" when c ... alff to th• hne Conference of th• Second lntemaUonal 
wldcla- convened • Mnaary J of th• ... yen ••which this, tb• Pint Con· 
an-11, ltlb•ll•d "apportuai1t." .'Dl• C.'"8• produce• two •Jn polltlc:al don-
. ••ta both of which were primrily written by Lenin. 
The lol1herib ua--4 that the proletari• rewolµtion in Russia vu 
•nly tile flnt pJaue of a aeuTal revolution which woul� 1oon apre·acl to 
the mon ad•aced W••••Jr'f' s_..,,.� aatl�• � They npecially felt that Gemay 
waa .ripe for �'9t such ea occunance. '!\..,,.knew, too, that th• revoluti�• 
in the •ntem Europe• nations would ceJ'Uinly nll•v• th• .pn11un of tbe 
White ualea, bee-• th• l11p9rial11u �141 not. •fiord to ftat-t th• war aaain•t 
Comilllis• on two fronts. ""-• th ... n•olwlon• were aot fortbCOllln1. th• 'lblrd 
latenational wu fo.-4 to coordiaai. tit• a�l vi tl•• of I'ntenational Co-..n ita .• 
Zinoviev wrot• on J.uly 24 /1 ltJO, la his th•• to the Seeo1ttl Coa1ne• that 
"the lai.rnatioaal .. , be 
fennt countrt .. .  •.� 
0Withln 10 y.an," writff Stefm T. Pos1ony •. uti. Celdn�m ... to 
lJ•e Dear-, eel., The Coe·�a lnternaitonal 1919-1943 Do�ta Vol. 1 
(Loftdon: Oxford Q:al vent ty Pt"esl • 0) , p, 6 � ' 
21b1cl • •  p.127. 
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deaenerate into a •n tool of Russian political veltare."l The reuans for 
this transition wen nuerous : the RSFSR wu still the only Co-.nist nation; 
tbe location ol the headquarters for the Coalnteln wu well suited to cloe• 
Russian scrutiny ( th• Cord.ntem was almost wholly funded by the Sovi•t Govern-
•nt ; the prospects for other reYOlutions of tlae proletariat wen di-1n1; 
41.sapee•nts on revolutionuy doctrine and •tl".•t•I)" nl't frequent betw"a 
daleaat!ons: and the principal function of the Comint•m wu no loapr that 
I 
of world r�volutlon. but more ,,f a defense of the RSPSll lroa counterrevolution 
and foretan interventi·on 1o · that "•ociallaa in one countl')',. could 'be realised. 
By 1920 the Cold.n�el"ft was bett•� establlabed laJ'l•l1 because of tb• Red 
anlu 1·uoce•1" over tll• White armies and tore1p intemntlon. '11\e Colllntem 
was now becoaln1 truly i1ttemationa1 and' wu beainni.111 to aupercede tll• Second 
Intenatlcmal , 
The Second C·onpus of the Collliatem. vu held from July 19 to Aupt 7. 
1920. The h1port•t doc:umnt of ttae Secaad Conpesa was that known u ·th• 
••21 Co�ditiou•" ·which had to be accepted by ay party that wu 'Co--.11t in 
orientation •d wu desirou of beln1 adalt� to ·the 'fttirtl International. 
The ·"21 Conditions ." put before the Colllntern by IAnln • ' clearly · reve•led Lenin' 1 
priut'Y · purpose of di•posing of· all MeuhevUt· 01:1eu . So• of · th• .conditions 
whi ch •ach patty · hld, to ·"11f111 wen: to haft the bulc principle of . .. 4 .. cra­
tlc · centralis11" and l!Ules simllar tO'�,th�• of the atStJi to adhere to t.ll declsiou 
of the Comlnt•n. or nth•r the dadsions of the Moscaw eumtive- ''whi:ch are 
bindin1. on •ll · parti•• i" ;:••to cl• unc:onditimal . auppon to my Soviet Republic 
-0,t. 
la lts . . strua1l• &gainst counter··nYolutionaiy forces; .. to. perloctlcally. pura• 
•lll>•n, in _ot'MT to insure strict adbonnce to th• polidff of th•· BucutlYe 
Comlllttee ' and� ti•ally .. to renounce refonl•• and denOUllce 1..,.rt •. 11... Th• . 
latef1n T. P••OllY , ''fte c..iaten 'I Clala to Muxl•t Lest tlllh)' • n .froa ;J Cotllaten u HSttorical Hlpllptl , !a1ay1 • Recoll�ctlona • DommntJ , 4td. , 
orei A. fifadtkovitch and lrmk.e Lasitch CN• York 2 Prupr, 1966). , p . 14. 
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u21 Conditions" were meant to cleanse the party of al l opposition to Moscow. 
The twenty· first eou4ltion nellJtelled from th• party • • •  tho1e 11111bers - . ..  who 
nject in p·rindpl• the condit1cm and th..,1• put forward by th• Coauntst 
Int•mational • • • • ul 
ln anat eonuast was the aoal of the Iatemati.oual Comunist llOft•Dt 
u 1tated in the S•cond Con,reu of tho Collintem which was to "rouse · Ciaa  
th• muses of the backward nations a strivina for independent po litical thousht 
. 
and independent political activity." 
A transition 1• seen in the policy ot the Third Congress held in June, 
1921. It wu no lon.,ger the 111tri>ers of the right vina which received the brunt 
ot th• Col'd.ntem 'a attack; it wu now the action minded leftists of Cenaany , 
Italy. and Ht.m&U)' who ttere 1'1ppCSedly negatively .intluend.�g the Cold.ntem • s 
objectives . The Comunlat party must, durlns this ,.nod of preparation ,  while 
d111a-ntly maintainina an as:arusive attitude , lbataln ft"Oll the me of ara md 
.;.. 
acts of ssbota1� save in the most extTCa drewwtanas . Once again •4',rence 
to Russian Soviet doctrine was a basic principle. HoweveT, their offtcial posi· 
tion. on the i�t•mational· revolutim of the proletariat wu drastically chanpd. 
c ., 
n1e e �ectation of imediate world revolution had new been '�ound to be an t llu� 
sicn. StaUn•s ''soci alls• in one country" had now l'eplaced Trotsky 's concept 
of "permanent revolution." 'th• last Congre•s of the Third International wu 
held in 1935. The Comlntem tenlnated its tonal exi•tence in 1t43, u will 
be seen ,. tor reasons of forei gn  policy. 
The constitution of the Comwntst Intemation•l state• in part that the 
Coalntern "fllflti tor the establisb119tlt of a world Union of Sodalist Soviet 
Republics .. "2 lhe .union thus far· ls wited undel" the tutelep and dictate• of 
lpor th• C011pl•t• text ••• .Dear•·· ep. clt • •  pp.166-172. 
2Bul1 D11rt111hyn , USSR A Cftu�l•• Hi•�!!'l (New York : Olarl•·• Scribner ' •  
Soos , 1965) • p.,JS2. . 
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Mo. cw  �d the Q>SU. 
The CPSU waa llOJ'e than th• taere standard bearer of the Couunist Party 
of Yuaoslavia (CPY) and the CoJD11Unist Party of Pnland (CPP) . 1bo CPSU.· ac:tina 
thioup the Comat•m, imposecl 1u will upon th• CPY and the CPP. 1be nlation­
&hip can perhapa be Wac described. o oao of 41.ctated •aulatlon llld denepation. 
It la under thia apec:tn of th• Third International an4 the dictates •f MHcow 
+· 
tllat �· histoq of tlle two parties takes shape. 
CX>MtUUST PARTY OP YUOOSLAVIA: THE BBGtNHINGS 
The l'ir�t World t;a.r terminated th• activiti•s of the soclal democratic 
partios in the Habsburg Empire. · lklder tl� soeiallst leader lol"ae 1 t was ded.dec:l 
that revolution wu impoasible bocause of the limited nud>er and educational 
level of th� prolotal'iat in South-nut md Eutem Europ��,. It was thus th• 
·-�y of socialist• to fw:thor the revolution by concentratina on the establish­
unt of de110CHC¥ and -reform at hoae .  lorac v u  in favor of collah0Jatin1 
with other poll tical aroups in the newly fomed "Peop le ' s Counaib . •·• 1)1,.s 
• J '  
. , ,. 
path wu takon not only because of the.•aknessN of the party· but also because 
of the opposition to Rmsian Bolahevisa. The collaboracion with bourgeoisie 
parti•s blocked any seli:>lmu:e of unity within the socialist aroups , as youns 
Comunists and doctrinaire Marxists of the pZ'ewar days Ckclined to follow 
... 
auch an heretical road. A · �onferonce was held in Zapeb on 8 Octob•r 1918 
between th• socialists in Croatia and their Bosnian and Slovene coarades in 
order to present 10• vistaa• of unity , · Ho ·ape•nt wu reached. . 'Ml.• Croate.s 
and Slovene• joined th• newly fono4 Yu101lav Gevem11nt in Oct•er, and in· 
Doce••r �orac beua a .S.ni.st•·w ia tlJ• newly formed 1ovem1MN1t .  
·rhe enelliea ef lorac · now aathe�d in the Serb Social Desaocratlc P·arty 
in order to oppC>le lorac and tile aow�t. They opposed 'h• ncon11�ructton 
•;,.t • .  
of th• Second International whoso leaden they accused of betrayal , _ -.d in 
its stead they demanded a Third International founded upon the prindple of 
11unc:o13promlsina class struaale . � In January 1919 this party took th• initiative 
in fond.n1. one workers ' party for th• whole of Yupslaria. Only · tboae who 
opposed "ain11t•r1•1i••" uacl the SeCODCl· International would b• allowecl to attend 
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2.l 
this uni fl ca ti on con1r.1s • The conar.sa w as  be ld with the full approval 
· Of the Social Deaocrat1c Party of aosnia and the left-wing socialists in 
Zaarob . Of course. the conditions imposed upon A.ttendenoe further widened th• 
aap clivlcllna Marzista in Y"&oslavia and all but Md• h1poesiblo a sinale oraani-
zation. 
' 
In April UH9 .. deleaat•� fro11 various socialist oraan1iatlon1 convenecl 
in lelgrade in a n@w Kingdoa of Serbs . Croats . and Slovenes and !ormeJ the 
Socialist itorkets ' Party of Yuaoalavia (Comrwnista) . Differences within th• 
new party were overaha4owed by tb• rJe1in to uint&in party unity and to oppose 
the "ainiateriallaa" of �one' s  1ociallsi.. aad the Second International. The 
new party proc�a1111d lU adherence to the nurcl International and elected a 
central and an eucuti v• coal tt••. The leadin1 aellbers of th• executive of 
th• SWPY ¢: )  \ION the three Seib• P. Pilipovic (1179-1953) , s. Markov!� (1811· 
1939) • and z .  Topalovie (1886- ) • 
The Second Conar•st of the nw party was held in Juno, 1920, at Vukovar. 
It W&$ at this ti• that the party took on the fora of a deftnit• Com111UDist 
party. l t$ title was now chanaecl to th• Comunist Party of Yuios lavia (CPY) . 
The atatutes end oraaiiation of th• party were changed to confora wtth the 
l 
Russian pat·�rn .. and it wua stated that the party would strive for a YlolS:oslaY 
Soviet Rep\i>llc which would join in a Balkan Soviet Pede1·atloa u4 •vntually 
in a universal Co•Wlia;t union. Th• party acbd.tted that they were not in a 
position to seize pow•r but that they would ''prevent the consolld'!tica of th• 
wu;table atate of affairs" then ezistina in Yuaoalavia. 'nils could best be 
done by oppoaine the rec:oveiy of the Yuaos lav eCOnCJllY . 
TI1e wave of Comunisa in poat-wu Yuios lavia reac:Attd it £enith with 
th• General Strlk• of July 20. lPlg. Two Iii.nor autinies alto occurred at 
this ti• in the Tuao1 lav Anry in an attnpt to 1etse power. Both were put 
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down within 24 hours . 
TI1us by tho bepnning of Juno. 1!>19, Yugos lnvia possessed two Marxiat 
pllrties : th• Socialist Workors ' Party of Yuaoal:s.via (ColmUnists) which joined 
the Cold.ntem and which would presently chanp 1 ts title to the Coalauni•t 
Party of Yu1oslavia. and the Social DeJaOcratlc Party of Yuao1lavia which fol· 
lowed cl�sely the pattem set by the $oct al democratic parties in Western and 
Central Burope . 
In ncvember. 1920_ elections wore held for tho Constituent Assembly. 
'nlete elections havo boen considored by most to represent the freest election• 
held in Yugoslavia during the inter-w ar poriod. The election5 were a aaj or 
victory for the Communists. The Comunists polled a l.arae nwrl>ett of votes 
and became tho thircl strongest party by winnina S8 of 419 seats •l Only the 
Comunists mid Democrats were able to win seau in every province of YlJ&Ollavia. 
The Comnmlsts were fourth in the percentaie ot votes cast. They polled 12.4 
percent to the O.OOcrats 19. � pe-r�ent , the Jtad1 ca ls 17. 7 1)ercent, and Radie' s 
HRSS 14.  3 percent. J:orac' s Social Democrats were left far behind. 
'The are11.test successes of the party canm. ironically e.nough , in the tw9 
lcRSt industriali�ed provincoa of the new st ate . 11\e discontented natiOllalities 
were providing a truitf\11 fie ld for Comwli1t work . The Comnuniata won 40 per­
cent of the votes in the territo%)' "Which before 1912 hac.t formed Montenearo and 
which l1ad chara.cteristically boon pro-Russian. The industrial workina class 
wus nonexis tent here. In the otber disatfocted and 110st backward �ealon , Mac.-
donia , the Comwiists won 33 percent ot the seats . The people of these two 
reaion� simply voted for the m03t radical party available. Co11111unism meant 
nothina to them. It mil(ht be ad�cl that �lonten•aro furnished Tito with a 
disproportionate number of his aenerals and party leaden. 
These victories have been attributed to the 1uperiol' state of the party 
lAdam B .  Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge : Harvard University 
Press , 1952) p . 9 .  
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..... .. u. OWi' lU riYW ... 1930 - to th• •t.llty of tM Co•••l•h 
•• ••lolt the •sl•llia 4taooateat • 
.-.ver, ta the tu Mlt ••••cl mad iadultrialt.Hd ..... wh4tn aatlon­
all•• .,.. ai.o • 1.,.�., facior, la Cnatla •• Slowala, tbe Co 1mlau 
•• h_.111 .,. ....  1'e Yietny la tlae otJaer ae• of the .. •••• co.14 
aoi ate •aplcd te4I "--• t11e puiy •• .,,...,, _.a-1et•1 • 1..-•• •taaa•· 
Uae bl'OUlht 11>..a "'9 a foalaa power. 
Oa 2t ......  ltJO, aoon after a. op•l•1 el th• rAastttuent AH•1Y• 
tlw eo-l•t• caH-4 fn a ..-ni atnu Md pNtat .. t1a11 to thvat the 
19111fna1nt•• at� to 1tt1p a ooal atrlk• la a.ua Md 8iow.ta. Oa tlae •­
Ur th co.Utt• ....,..... et Demcnta _. bdlcals , ..... • •a.e knawn .. 
a tlae Obaa•a• 1'e .. UM, _, otMr tbia .. , tll••ol-4 all (o-ilt ftlMI· 
•Ml4'ft1 •cl pl'Oblblted _, tne el 1eMnl 1irln. __. Yiol••, md pnplfada 
aaU...t th• aownmnt. ,,_ party l•ICl•nll p fall•• t• -.lat oftectiwly 
•lala lecl _, of ta.. ,..  .... Co tats into h•ty a.- of tenon••· �1• 
led to an e.- ... """ mtt.·Co-mut pleoe ef 1-P.1lattan, U• L9r fn 
U.. Pl'Ot•cti• of 09 State. 
Th• leaal •w .... l• of th• pare, •lm \>•1• in late lll20 _. wtd.ch 
GUlllbated la -..• 1111 witta t"9 dla•luU• of Uie eo-m•t pany •d 
all of it• lea.i oramaatlou lecl to a rmp.lcl •cHM ln th• popularity of 
tlM party � late lt21 . 1 Thi• wu the naul t Mt mly of tlut auppJU•l• of 
the party but abo of tbe party ll• I teelf. Tia• puty •• now in fut •• 
In aw a 1ectt• of tH Ca-l•t lateftatl•al ... GUI • all• for• In 
Ylfloalav life. 
Th• party •• al•o etnck win cUssentl• --• it• om r•b. ft• 
flnt purse el tbe party toek place after tile S.C8H Coapu•. At thl• ti• 
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a unifesto wu issued by a aro� of centrists vho protested the complianee 
of the party with th• "21 Condition•" of th• co.dntern. '11\• centrists , amon1 
other thinrs , did not wish to fall in Un• with the deaand that every Co• 
llUftiat pa1'ty 1ublllt to the Coaintem. They dealnd eutono.y for every constituent 
•lllber of the 1hird lnt•mat1onal. (Tito' s  nvolt 28 years later echoes this 
clala.) Tile slpen of th• aanife1to were excluded fr. the party in Decellber 
of 1920. 'Ibis act npresents the ftnt and ded.stw step in the process of 
subordination of the party to the lnterMtl of an outside power. A.a seen , hoa 
th11 ti• en the party wu to add to 1 ts proclautiou th• n•• 0A Section of 
the Collaunlst International . "  Th• party ylelded � the dictates of Moseow. 
Its first standard vu to be ••11pluy in its allepence to M09cow. 
In 1923 the party created a le1al front known u th• Independent Workers ' 
Party of Yugoalaria. However, ln th• 192S eleciiont the party captured only 
18 ,000 votes , a dl'Op of more than 90 percent froa the pnviout achieve•nt 
of the Collmuni1t1 at the poll• � The party had quickly lost it• a�ort. 'nle 
party'• 1trua1ln over th• next 5 yean involved a relatively ••all n\llber of 
people and were carried on laqely with th• police. Both the COllintem ad 
th• Yuaoslav Comuni1t1 realised the alpificanc:e of th• defeat suffered. 
Various solutiant wen tried throuahout the 1120 ' 1 ,  all of which fai led to 
produce th• desired results. 
'n\ese probl- contributed to the d1vl1lcn 'of the Cl'Y into Left and IU.pt­
wina factions whic:h were to shake the very foundations �f th• YUBotlav Co�unist 
aove•nt throuahout th• 1920 '• ·  Th• Ri1ht-wln1, under the leadenhlp of Matkovic 
and Milojkovic. harbored MenahevUt views . 11\e faction WU skeptical mboot the 
feasibility of further i l legal aptation. Instead, e11phuis was to be plac.d 
on a aodic\m of aal tatian carried out throuah l•a•l oraanlzations . I t  hoped 
for a change in the government and a subsequent lifting of the ban on the CPY, 
ltbid • • p . 9 .  
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ud it adwcatecl a heavy concentration oa trade union won. It 1natly dl1-
tru1ted the nationalist•. ••p•clally Radie'• HASS acl the ati-Serb nationallsts. 
The Left-wina faction diffend radically f1• the Ript-win1 • . It ••h•· 
aiae4 lll•aal act1 of terroriaa alona with the exploitation of th• natifllllaliat 
situation. The latter was uaed to 1uch ua •xt•nt that the party threatened 
to diainte1rate iato u aany "radical" aowmnt1 u thez:e wen nauoaali ties 
in Yuaoalavia. Th• put)''• exnpl•l'Y alleaience to Moscow was thua tinpd with 
• ever i11penclin1 aplit on tile ia1ue of natlcmali••· Ul• atat•• that "Th• 
1tory of Yugo.lavia la one lon1 story of a clash of Nationaliau . ul The lAlt­
wlna reflected thi1 club clurlna this period. In order to becae a dominant 
force in Yugoslav politics, th• Com\miau had to adapt a viable posltioo on 
this i111portant queation of nationallaa. 
'lbe YU1os lav poll ce,  interventions from Noa cow ,  the above di veqencea , 
and th• acee>11panyia1 1trua1l•1 for contnl of th• party apparatua all threatened 
th• 11 fe of the pU'ty. 
In 1925 the diapute was 1ettled by Stalin'• crl tid•• ancl clenunciatioa 
of Markov which led to the Coaintem'1 colllna out ln favor of th• Left-wine 
faction. The party wu rul•d fl'Oll lbroad. 
The Third Conan•• of the CPY was held in Vienna in 1926. 1he party 
could now, because of Stalin'• cbatl•••Dt ot Markovic,  for th• tint ti• 
present th• spectacle of Staliniat cohesion mnd unity oo the nationality que•-
tlon. Soon after, however, sectarian ati:tf• qain broke out. Ulu observes 
that "In order to beco• unified, an ideoloalcal 11e>ve•nt h• to cease belna 
a party and to beco• an any. Tuaoalav Comunl1t1 coulcl not u yet settle 
clown to th• latter condition."2 
lAd .. 8 .  UlD, Titoiaa and the Colllnfon (Cubrid1e : Harvard Univenlty 
Prest, 19S2) , p.7. 
2Ibld. , p.  lJ. 
-
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Another UUH of P&l'tF •trite nich b•1• to ni•• it• heed clnin1 th• 
periocl 1923 •o ltlO wu tH P-S• •••• ta the Soviet C:0-1.et Party. Ca-
.. tau who hacl la tile put enjoyed the 909t ccmtacts with ''hentlca1° comuni1t1 , 
tint the TroUkyit•• •• th• th• foll••n of ttaOYlev a4 l*hari.n, naw ai.o 
lott favor wi tll tile l• ... n of tla• UBSR ad of th• 1'1lird lntenational. 
Witla all patta. blocked by tlae pwmmat i• the political 1plleN, th• 
en ebos• to ••rt it• ..... 1 .. la tla• nalll of tnde unioai••· a, late 1921 
tla• 1overnmat ane its pend.11ion to c..untst trade Wli•l•t• to fon «"• 
lac&ep.ndettt Tnde Ullom .  'nl•• •ima epenly dl1pl117•• .iM ••*•••••• of th• 
CPY end tu _,.,uluttJ -• tlut •Olten . Tile mlou HYH ••tri "°" 
tll• 30,00G •llb•n -· tlaelr fold •41 fallM to rally _, eppreci9ble ••· 
peri. 1 Moet of their •••rs were, in fact, employed in U'tl•an work1hop1 
rather· th• in ioNtrial plmu. Tb• party alto failed to attract youn1 
wonen ancl appnsd.cea. Olaly •o• 1 ,000 out of over 200 ,000 join•d tile 
J.eaal wol'ken' youth or1mt1at1m rwa by the Cowmmtsta . IY• AYatmcrdc 
d.t .. th• followln1 t•l• to slaop th• lmpot•cy of Co• •l•t tl'ede unionists 
d..taa tile 1120' • =  
• 
1S>Jo 
1921 
1922 
11JS 
1924' 
1125 
1926 
19J7 
1928 
Source : 
TABLB 1 
•1 op iOiiiiw� Diis 
LOST THJOUGt STRilBS 
11,000,600 
llS,716 
416,S92 
151,'°0 
76 ,SS7 
110,600 
157,485 
28, llS 
117 ,471 
: tlffi&i'oif * 
INSURED WORORS 
369,648 
4JS,2U 
453,515 
441 ,416 
461 ,573 
41J,101 
564,.l49 
Ivan Avakmovlc ,  Hiatoi} of the Comtmi•t Putr of Yt1Qalavia 
(Aberdeen : Abel"Mft ua wnlty '"• ' ,  1064), p .  It. . 
lPor a cowplete table of Comnmist trade unian •llb•nhlp '" Avatu.ovlc, 
Op.cit . ' p . 117. 
I 
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AYakmodc •ar• that a CoWlist lll1tori• Uat.ts that only a lltnority of 
dlu• •trikn wen ors•t&e4 by th• ee...11t1. Th• rualacler an clustfted 
u being 111pontaneo\la. 0 
ly 1928 th• p� bad only J,000 •••n . It ha.cl ••1't•d little lnflu­
•• in Yuam lav political life betwffft 1922 md 1921. In this •- year, 
J .  lroa-Ttto of the Left-vln1, secretary of th• •tal worken end leather 
woken union la Cl'oatla, .,.,. ht• ri.1• to pl"Olllnence. Duri1'1 the period 
1926 to 1928, tb• Zapeb lr•cll of the CIY, led by Tito, ..,,.aled to the Collin­
tffn to take the CPY ia had ad to en4 the factional strife. Thia ac:t created 
. .  
a 10ocl l11pnaal0ft la Mo9cow nen they •• in Tito on• who 1i11ply wated to 
foUow orden . Tia• ec.laten now 1ntennec1 a1aln la O'l'der to noraanl ae th• 
CPY. 
Th• nw nol'111'11atioa of th• party be.- in late 1921 wu brought to 
m al>rupt halt when ,  on 6 J•uuy 1121 , th• shell of coutitutlonali•• in 
Yuplavia co11.,.ed with tbe proclaution by «lna Alexander of the 1mpen1lon 
of tb• VldoY4-l Constitution mid th• parll ... nt, the cil11olvtlon of all poll· 
tlcal partl••· md th• bepnaina of a penoaal dictatorial nai•· Only a 
.ocllOUll of parli ... ,ari•• nmined. The new pvemaent, presided over b; 
General P .  Zivltovlc, b-•• all 1 .. al eo..mt1t n•1p11p9n, periodleall, ancl 
dl11olftd the ln..,_...t Tnde �-- . 
The C�l•U nacted in th• only possible way be declarin1 that the 
cmly poaalble solution to the workin1·clas1 problea wu th• an:'d 1truule 
aaaiut th• bouqeolale aoveruent .  Tb• need to pnpan and actual ly •n1ap 
la a cl vil war now fl aun• prominently in uny Cwiat party docaenta fro11 
th• end of 1921 to 1934. The new policy also fell in line with 1lailar die-
tat•• froll th• Colllnte�. 
At the Pounh Party Con1n11 , party functlonarl•• were li�tl• 110n tba 
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Soviet �aeai.. 'lhe, tan1.-.1s, followina the . dlctat•s .of the Int•rnational. 
aarpcl �h• rank and ft 1• to -.ol'k . taward . t�• C.Ollp let.e di.sin tearat�� of i!Q&o­
•lav:ia.. '111• party ,adopted th•· •loaan "1elf-clet•nd.nation until •••••lon·" at 
th• req•at ot the Colllntem. . The popularity of the party did no� 1111prove with 
thi• n• show of party.. pa4eur and autonOll)' .. 
In .1932. M. ao.•tc wu ·�•ot•cl tb•·�.,new party .ie•r to replace ,.avrak. 
A11on1 the rt•c.-n ei.ctecl to. � new central co111it.tee wu one Jos. Tito. 
f arty fortune. now beaan to rise i A nUlllbe.r . Gf factors. can be ct tetl :for this 
nvt.v•l · The policy of atmd lnaurnotl0a .was abudo11ed, and · a nubei- o f Coa• 
IRllli•�• .W.o had "'8 uiuted ln the early years of Alexander'• · reip· were 
released ·fr,oa prl•on� th•· .h•lpin11 to fi ll the now all but ·clepleted· party fold. 
The released prisonen peatly lnQeaed the efficlency ef the party. Yuaoslav 
pri1ons di� not �reat political pr.lsonen along th9 , .... atanctardt .followed 
for normal oon-Yict• • ft• uny concea1ion1 1tven to the prisoners enabled 
the Co�ifts to turn the penitentiaries lnto what Tito called •••cbools of 
Nars1.••Len�n1••t" 
'lhe E'A--'•'• "" now .able t.o lncreaa• their 1trenath in the. tnde 
union field • . lut •wn llCllW p1"0pe11 wu not fat 1nd often lltlblo to ·1etback1. 
A�akmmic · say• tllat the total n-..1' of wozkln1 day1 lost thl'oqh strik•• ln 
the 11.JO • •· do" not even .appnach .those lost in the 1120 • 1 . .:the· followtn1 table 
11 o.ltedby Avakumovtc, Op.cit . ,  p. 103. 
4 F f '" ' [ d Jl I 1 'j I [ n 
YBAR 
1929 
1930 
1931 
19J2 I 
19S3 
1934 
1935 . 
1936 
1937 
TAIL! 2 
iii1ia rm a 1 u 1 • : : · 
TffRO(J(ll STRllBS -
, I ii,H7 
48,528 
14,204 
4,076 
13.IS7 
40,523 
265,860 
1 ,355,952 
911.071 . 
Sl 
Th• S.venth Conpea1 of th• 1Mri Iatematlonal w .. 'held iJI A\llUSt ,  1935. 
Th• pollcy ... •• bepn of Wl"tpplna lurope1n Covm••• in democratic and peace-
' 
10Yin1 c.loth•• . ft• CPY 1-dlately retreated froa it• policy of "•elf·detend.na-
In 1tJ7 Goftlc •cl the Central C.-.ttee of th• CPY wu called to No1cow. 
Gont.c v• ...... ked u an •••" and th• puty pur19d. Tb• oaly party leader 
net to be owtecl wu th• •• Moscow nYOy an4 nwly clalpatecl S.cntuy·Gen•ral 
of � Ca LI mt.at Party of Yu,oelavia, Joa• lroa-n.to. ft• n• Central eo ... 
Id.tie. npudiate4 the policy of the party an 1eparatloa in order to follow the 
l•M ••t by the Coldaten to counter th• Ii•• 8Dd threat ROW poaed by Hitler. 
Thu yeu IW'b tlae be,tmdnJ ., the 10.called popular hult tactics .  
The pep\Jlar frcat tacti• ••• by Tito tawlftd att911pt1 to reach 1ome 
type of a1ree•••t ·•ith o�r political or11A11atloaa to ouat th• Stojad1novtc 
mists •t with botb 1ucoe11H ad 
fall .... . 
ly 1917, u •""• tile 45 year old Tito heltl the le..tina p09ition in the 
Yuc•lav .Ca• ml1t Party. Only people with unblnlshed Stallnl1t records were 
_. beln1 1ppot.ated to fonipa posts . Tito wu a perfect model. He hu nterecl 
tit• party • a. b•l• of bla 1tq ucl lndoctri1a•tl• ia the SoYiet lmlGD ancl 
tU.d aot haw a lodal Dnowatie bacltpoun4 : he had bMn bra.aaht up a Croat 
la the old AU1tro-Hun1art• B•ire ,  wu c.,tund u m AmtN-HunaarS.an •oldter 
by t.be Rulaians la World War I ,  mcl had wltneased md then joined th• lolshnU: 
lnoluUm. He wu, above all. not an intellectual. He wu of pea•t •• 
wontaa clu1 orialu •d backpomd. In 1121 b• had 1ppHled to the cOlllntern 
to take th• party flnly ln hmd. In Stalin'• er•• h• wu th• ideal type of 
C0tn uml1t l•aar th• si tuaUon call•d for ln 19S7. 
Tito llml4lately set to work to rejuveaate the all but d111Hllnated 
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party ranks. U.ine clmdestlne •thoct., Ti�o acc:o11pli1h•d in a s)Aort period 
,• 
what his aucceason had never been able to do: The •battered or1ani1attmal 
atnctun vu rebuilt and operatina illeaally within Yugoslavia and, mon 
important , Tito had •uped U(µidation by the police, a coatinual plap 
to the party prior to 1957. How•ve•, lt 11U1t .be •tn•••d that the party wu 
still nu.noally iuipt.ftcant and uninfiuntial MIODI the ... .. at the ti•. 
But, hoe 1917 to 1141. Tito ad bi• lieuteaantt acquire4 a .. set •ore valuabl• 
fft th• C-.mlata thm popular support, caclfts, bocH. .. of ••ri•nced and well· · 
traa•d fol lowers.. Tb• party vu no lon .. r apli t into a .... rous facti.CJU and 
aroap1 end eould eotat a.ona itt •upporten poup1 at every level of Yuaos.lav 
•od•ty· and tn •wry aatl•aU.ty wllo could be nlled upon to aupply an elite 
for a nvolutloaary 110W•nt wh•n· tit• need ataht ul••·· 
'lbe C�1t1 e1plolted ibe �' 'l'Uenoent qalnat th• policy of 
th• n1l• 1nd poted. • defend9n of de90a'acy and of th• •ti·Ad• 1ntl•nt 
1,n Yug�lavia. taa•ll ltJt they coul.4 play the nl• of ennt .. of Pasci1ia and 
frlnda of the lovtet Unlon11 ally Prance. �n1 thla period th• party•• 
inll•11ce apnad to •b• latellectual1 and tbe atudents. Th• party wu beCOlllng 
•• of youn1 -· ID fact, •tudnta pl"ovicled the Mjority of party .. ..,.rs mtll 
lt.a. Moat of th• olcl•lJne Carrn -tata bad DOW been purp4. Gerltl�,  Mulorich, 
Manat . Mar,tlnovlch. •d CVljlch ball 1>"9 exclw:IH fl'Oll th• party by llJ9. The 
party wu ••11 •-rlcally but yo.mi. 1tron1, m4 lll itmt. ly this ti• many 
ftt•nn• of the lntenational lrt1adea of the Sp�•h Civil War ffn nturning 
to YUfOllavla, tin• pro.tdtna the party with •.-rlanced ft&bt•n ad c:oaanden . 
Yet pal'ty thoupt md action Nll&lned ad>ael'Yient tor tl!ae dlctat .. of Motcw. 
COIMlfIST PARTY OP POLAND: nm IEGINNINm 
The ltot'Y of Polmd'1 Coaunllt Party 1bowe IUCh th• •- influence 
of the <7SU and Colllntern 11 th•t of the CPT. In tact , all tlae Co.mnist 
partie1 of E•hrn !urvp·e were modelled afte1' tile All-Onion f.o-.dat Party 
(loleherik) of the USSR. 11\e "21 Condltlou" of the Colllntem•1 Seeon4 Con· 
ere•• b•ld in 1'20 •JPlld.tly laid th• rulu which alt other parties mmt 
follow. n .. e ,  of course, not only included desaocraUc centrali•• (intra-
party clictatonhlp) but also lmpmltlon of polldee frm 111>1.'0ad (Moscow) . 
1be hl1to1')' of the party nulna unclear ml•• one ex.in•• the con­
trowny which develop9(f between Rosa LUM""1rg and Lenin. Lenin advocated 
a aMll, well-diacipll•d elltl1h vanpaJ'd who would lead the �letarlat 
to revoluttonuy 1uece11 . LUINLUTC bitterly attacked Lenin's conception of 
I 
a party heade� by a 1eldenhlp lnwsted with absolute powers . Lenin ' s  atti· 
tllde njectina the idea t!lat th• proletariat �ld be a actin and consdous 
•aent o� revolvtlonay che1 .. ah• conde••d u "'bouraoota" ,  and bis small 
•llt11h nn1taard sh• brlllde4 • "conaptratorial ." Lenin '• What t1 to be danef 
vae nitt• aaalnst the MenlheYilt• and the laa of Lmnbura. Luxelburg 
. ' 
belleftd that a nvolutlonny party .. t be a vanauard for th• pl'Oletariat 
Ind cntrally or1•11ed. ttowewr. 1111- central c:omittee wt be 1d>Jected to 
• eff•ctiw c1'lt!clta ancl eonuol tiy th• party ...,•nbip . Lenin's th•Ol'Y 
of de8ocratlc C91ltraU.•• did not ftt data cr.ltertum. Pollawlng Man' s  ideu 
mn •.Plioltly, Lu.1lnars •tatff that nwlattenuy aove•nts emnot b• _..,.. 
fectme• but .. t pow wader tbe rtpt M1torlcal ccHitims. levolutiOftaiy 
..v.-t• arl•• cmly spontaneoutly. Lenln .and the lolshnik• branded th••• 
S3 
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"deviatima" u 01.uaellburgiaa.0 In thl1 hiatoric�l diaput, lAnin penoni-
tied th• .centraliat mtd ev.ntually th• dlotatorlal tendenoy w�i l• Luxetibur1 (. 
npruented th• ane dellOonUc bent. AllOftl th• Co...Ustt of Poland Lu�a­
bural•• bee- known .. Left-win1 deviationi••· 
The �o-c�le4 %'1!W!•O!YM• or riptlat deviation acquind l ts n ... frOll 
a certain Zal ... ki who fo�t qalut the lbttract COM�ll tan prqsru of 
,. . 
W.llburg "'d for da• eoope"tlOD betwMn th• two wlnp of the Marxist 110ve­
wii . Zal..,�ki fomd bitter enellle• in Lu•llhur1 and the S0Sial9a, De!IOkracja 
lrol .. twa Pol1lr.ie1Q, 1, Ll!!f.l (Social D•nsocracy of the Unadom of Poland and 
&.lthu.nia-SDDlL} . 'lhe Na'l'xist SDIPlL �d the Polish Socialist Party .(PPS) 
split in 1193 O¥er ti.. aaticmal pnbl••· Th• SDIPU • •  followtn1 Lux•lt>urg 's 
theory of the "�1•ic incorporatioa0 of the Conan•• Kinpoa of Poland into 
tb• lutailD 1tate, llldttecl tbei1' activities to the Rusalan-controllod part 
of th• QO\IDtzy. · Bllphui• wu plaaed on the elos• collaboration betwffn the 
Pollah md Ruisi• Co-.mlats. 1'hl• went h•d in hmd with a rejection of 
Pol.ad'• independence u a goal. ill ih• atruaal• with th• Tsarist ngi•. 
Th• PPS-Lett who bad parud hom th• PPS became of i t1 deli re to cooper­
ate to •- • ...,., with the Rµaalan •o�aH.at llDW•nt and the Russian autbori­
u .. 4-a�nd ,, cm the other hand, an all-Pollsh dlaracter which would transcend 
th• partlt1.oa trantl•�· Th• SDIPiL were ltlbelled tniton . The PPS-Loft would 
stop at nothina short of full political lndepe�dence and 1ewnnce of all ti•• 
with th• Russim E111p�n, b• it Co--Uat or Taarlst , vhll• th.SOcial Democrat• 
wen ••ti•fi•d tllat with th• tr11Mforution of the Rutalan 1tat• i�to a coutl­
tutional aonarchy the cultural autoncmy of Poland would be sati1fied. 
The SDIPU .., of course, owrlooked the deep•rooted natlonalt.atlc sentimnu 
inarained tn the PoUah aaa•••· Moet Pol•• upirecl to nothln1 lu1 than re1a1n· 
ital their cmplet• frMcto. f'roll their fonlp auten . 'nae Pol11h people did 
uot joil\ the nau of the SDlPiL ancl th• party wu 1natly weakened. 
The ree•rance of' aa independent Poli•ll 1tate under Pil•""-*lti in 
Nowllber of 1911 oau,ht both Coe•anl1t aroupt by ampri•• • N. Dllewanowski 
1ay1 that "It wu like th• 1\ldden appearanc. of soae one whose death and funeral 
they had announced several time with Jo, ud rellef. 1 The leaden of the SDIPlL 
thoupt that the very 1clea of a Poliah rebirth vu utopian 1nd undasirable. 
And for th• l•aden of the PPS-IAft it vu painful bocauae they had finally 
st11>111sed thelr -.ulvocal p0titl01l by givina up th• pre,ra of.political ind•-
pendeuce of the c:ouatry as no loaaer pncticable. There was now 1i ttle for 
either 1roup to cho•• f!'Oll. tmder the mirth of th•lr own state and th• 
specter of the lolthevik Revolution, the two radical Marxist aroups -..t •rs• 
�lr force• and illitat• their Rmsla broehen . 'Ibey .. t eollaborate with 
tU Red A.rrff . 
In Deoed»er, 11·11 , a Unity Conare11 of the PPS-Left aad th• SDICPiL wa 
held in Wan•. It · wa qned tbat tJae· parties should •rae •d fora the 
Car.mist .-Orken • Party of Poland (CIPP) • (In 1925 the party chanpd its 
n- to the Co-..da t  Pu-ty of Polend, CPP.) Tho PPS-IAft accepted the pro­
ar• of ·th• SDKPiL (the pi'olJ'• of the Bo1•hevib) and •raed into the CWPP. 
Dd.ew•owakl pws • exmllent exapl• ln m eplp• produced· ln the Marxist 
,1Y , • 
cil'4� of .wan., at the ti• vhlch clearly 1--n.lff th• ·maracten in the 
•rser: 
. The Manlat · drcl.. of Wan aw pl'Odueed an epiaraa constncted in rather 
bomp!>ia t•l'N : the •raer of the SDIPiL and the PPS-Lett wu a 'Man�r .. raleon' between a peor )'VUDI Mn of good falll ly with a rich 
1lri o CIOUbtfUI Teputation. 2 
Dnewaowakl poinU out that the poor youn1 un of good fad. ly alludes to the 
lM. IC. Dd.wenowtki, '"nl• Foundation of the eo-m11t Party of Poland," 
�ric• 11•'11• .... B•� .EU!9!•• Re'riew,, XI , p . 116 • 
. 
ZJblcl. 
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Social Oe.ocrau scenty followin1 but con1iaiont Marxist int.mat1ona11sa, 
while the rich atrl of domtful reputation allude• to th• social patriotic 
put of the PPS-Left •d tu scepti�am c:ancernin1 the possJ.bility of a radi­
..1 
cal nvolation .  
The new party· took frost the SDIPiL both tendeac:le1 to devi atlonlsa: 
th• Lu.xellbur11st devi ation fl'Gll th• left and the rl1ht 4eviation or tbe 
Z•lw11czyina fro• the rlpt. loth "deviations" were sUJhtly leas dicta­
torial than the 1tyl• of th•t r Bolshevik brot�fn . Both accepted alliance 
with the ltusslan 8c$pal Oeaoc:ratic Workers ' Party (lolshevlk) only on tho 
'basis of interaal autonomy . ••• both •JqJr••••d the nativo mstTUSt to that 
forelp bol'ft puty. The r1aht deviation vu born �f national motivations : 
the desire to flnd a "Pollsh road to 1oclal1•••" and the left deviation was 
born of a desire ·to uintain , evu in th• aiclst of viQl.at \lpbeaval , 10• 
sellblence of "prol•tarlan democracy , "  Power au•t be k9'Pt in th• hands of th• 
Polish party . The h�atoiy ot th• Co..unist Part)! of Poland ls l ara�.ly a story 
of ·th• flaht of Moacow a1aln1t th•• two "here1·t•• ·" 
The CPP wu ortataally loo1t•4 •on u one of the be1t sections of the 
International. And yet the party raever elai•d 11e>re than 20 ,000 •Jlbers ln 
it• eattre .tl1toJ')' . 1  Within ti.. trade unions it wu only a weak ainorlty 
o011p·ared to th• . co·l1011sal fol lowin1 of the Social O.aocrat1 . The peuant1 
wen lndlffenat to U• pal"ty , th• bovpol• wen ho1tlle, •d all clu1e1 
wen repelled becaua• of tMir lona hi1tory of anti-Ru.1lm natianali••· 
'"''' pn•ented the Commslsb boa becoatng a an•t force in the politics 
of Polmut. Wankt-Wuaa•ski , a poll ti cal •ll11n to Mo.cow, 1.a up the 
cmae1 of th• parties defeat : 
lout11w1kl , "Droaa walkl UP," Nawe Dro1i , (Nov-Dec, 1941) , p . 148, 
ctuoted in Hi1cock1, Op.�t . , p . 1 73. 
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H• who do.a •• yet utulentmd th• ca\Jles of our m11tak• does not 
unde�tad the na� of our defeat ln 1919-1918, u well as our defeat 
durlug th• Pollah-S�iet Wn of 1920, end, consequently , would not com.­
pnhend wby the COJlliUnlst Party .ot Poland lost then the ltl'Ul11• wlth 
the PPS and �· !f 1Wl•1•. Th• po as ant aasses and the wsu of petty 
bourpoiaie (u well u a larp part, even the aajority, of th• worken) , 
.dtcf aot follow dae pnletarlm nvolut1on, did Dot follow �h• Co.-mlst 
Party of Polmcl, became t.�ey •• ln our party th• opponent of the lnde­
pen.tence of Poland. '11l•y followe4 the PPS, th• !Yavolfti• and the others , 
the partlu wbtc:b prolll.a•d led to the peuanu and louifi£ uncler th• 
hanner of the Poliah state • • • •  1 
Ne•41ess to s ay ,  th• party 1n l ts later history learn•d 1 ts lesions. These 
mlstakes and failures left a deep 1l&r1c upon the younpr aetnben of the party 
and largely accoWtt for th• aararian policy of the Polish Worton ' Party of 
1944 and 1945 • well as tbe Ratlona11st1c prQP&aanda preached by the puty . . 
durlna the early stares of Coamunist rule in Poland. Theo·J'•tical purity would 
now take a far ••c:ond to the p•aQtlcat galnt to b• •ade 1ty th• ••loitation 
of Poliah nationalisa. Opportunl•• and the w111 to political power wer. of a 
1111c:h ·anater priority than e1 ther Ma�xtsa or nationalism. 
In Januuy of 1919 the 1ov.imaent lsaued a de� requf,rina all oraanl• 
za�ions and associations to reaister with the authorities. 'ftle party l•ad•n 
ct.cUned , feel1n1 that cioaplianoe would •• recoanttion of the new a tate . 
Th• .PPS-Left, althoup the lar,er aroup in the newly toned OIPP . had 
accept�d th< pro11'• of th• SDIP1 L at the �1 ty ConaWtss . The prorraa 
included the cbjecti� of social nvolution throu&h proletarillll dictatcnhlp 
on Bohh•vik liDH •d tbe L'1Dll>ur,�1t njeetioo of lmd ndiatri.butlon. The 
party opposed the now Pollsb state on the groundt th.at it was a seai-feudal md 
1ffll-bourgeot1 structure. 'rt\• state ntallated by treatina th• party u a 
aubversiw oraani1atlon, which •ant th• curtailment of all oorul political 
acti�tl .. .  
The CWPP and lat•r th• a»P were table to take part in tile Ute of th• 
lz Pola W-alkt (Proa the Fleld of Battle) , Noa. 5·6 (Moscow, 193S) ,p . 40, 
quoted in b1lewanow1ki , Op. cit • •  p.122. . 
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country by two •an•·: parll-ntary deputies joined its rm.ks after beina 
elected as representatives of oth•r political parties ,  and a,:� .politieal 
parties wt th siatlar proarus tool part in th• electl-ou ad won seats (Union 
of Town and Countl'Y Proletariat. etc.) Throvatt tho• •ans the puty was 
llbl• to nceive 128,000 votes in the elections to tho &eja in Novellber 19ZZ, 
tncl durini; the lut relati�oly heo elections in uns. · before Pilsudski 
exerted his influence . the party receiwd o�•r 306 ,000 votes. Howev.r, tbll 
coa:pares with the .on than 1 ,2JO ,000 vote1 rec.i ved by the thrM pa.rtlet 
affiliatod to the Labour and Socialist Internatloaal : the Polish Socialist 
Party · (PPS) • the Dund, and the Independent Socialist Party. Furthet'llOre , 
many of tbose who vote<l for these left-win1 OTiani iatlons nllied to the CPP 
were not ·conrincea Co-.lats ad ld.aht have voted so out of d11ll lu.sion.ent 
with other p�artiea and with the parU.-.ntary proce11 � As ttattd. the parties 
•lli>enhip n.ever reached more than 20.000. There were many reuons for this. 
Amon& them are the ati-Ruaaian feelinp and deeply held patriotic sen.ti.nu 
of th• PoU.sh 118Sles. Put Russian policies of ·i..,erialb• •d conquest 
appeanu to be contin� in the a�tions of Lenin Md the Colll9Uniata. In 
tho Pol11h-Russ11111 War ·of 1920, LoniD had set \4l in the Polisla cl ty of Bialy•tot 
a Provi•ionai Revolutionuy COmttce for Poland u a kind of puppot CoJJamist 
aown1ment which areatly at1tap1i&ed the natlonal11tic 1entimnts of the Poles. 
Co�is11 bee ... usociated with an wpatrlotlc and pro-Soy('et 11e>ve•nt. •· 
Othewise, the atnn� of Poli1h Cathollci1a, the preponderac:e of the Peasantry• 
and; of course. tho state of i lle:allty of th• party contributed to. the roj•ation 
of the CPP, Other reucas whi-ch n1tricted the parti•• appeal were the Halted 
si-a• of the induatrial · proletarla• withla Poland, ud its nletiw quietude . 
Molt of its ,rievanoes were snatly llO<lilied by the hiah standard of social 
l•111lation passed by the new statet 8 hour day, faetory inspection, and, later, 
a C011prehenslve •• propuslve systea of 1od.al insurance. 
'nle Unity Coarn•• failed to quell mch of th• disaeat aon1 its •• 
b•n. Like all parties• th• CPP wu tom by internal controversy. · Tb• rlpt 
wins, led by Adolf Wank ! ,  M. Walecki , an4 Ven lostraewa, wu in CCJnfiict 
with the left, lecl by Julien Lenski , L•• Purun , ad Henryk lalnski. Wankl 
took over leadership of the party but ...  the arave 11lltake of 1idin1 wltll 
Trot1ky in hl• atrua1le1 with th• tr:luavirate of Stalin, ZlnoYiev aad lamenev. 
I' 
With Trotsky ' s  fall went the riaht , end the Moscow Executive placed the Lenski 
SJ'Oup in COlllWlcl. And yet only 2 years later J.enaki CDe lato conflict With 
Moscow ad waa tai•elf •epa.ed in July, 1925, bein1 nplaced by the Wanlti 
,roup .  
But Wanti w u  soon. to succt.1111> to failure also. Th• event wu Pi lsuclstl ' s  
coup d ' etat a1U.nat the Witos govem•nt. Piblidt�1 vat a ncopd1•d hero of 
the repmlic whose coup d' etat. wu 1upport.ed by the Social Deaocrats and the 
tr.a \.D\lons . Pilsudski received thell' support not only in order to pnvnt 
a "Pascist" coup cl' etat fro• th• Riaf\t, but also out of a areat naard and 
loyalty to Pilsudski who wu re1artled u a "un of the left." The Co.ami1ts 
were faced with the decision of atte111>tin1 to e1p1oit an i_.diate revolutiaaary 
1ituatlon or of backin1 PlllUdski . A1ain the odiua of Mescow fell upon the f' 
party'• shoulden . By the early spring of 1926 , Zinoviev had announc:.d th• 
p-owth of a revolutionaiy situation in Polad wh�cb .. t be exploited by the. 
party . At a .•etln1 of the nlarpd Bucutl ve of the Co-.nist Intemational 
he •aid: "If there is a countiy where a revolutienuy situation lligbt crystal· 
li1e ln a relatively short ti•, it 11 Poland. "1 However, the situation as 
Wank! •• lt was aot 10 favorable. A Co.unlit risln1 siwlt11neously qain1t 
lsee Dearas , Op. cit . ,  p .  332 . 
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both the Witos rep. .. and Pilaudski would fail completely th111 opening the way 
to Puci••· In th• end 1 t w .... ded.ded that bouqeois democracy '81der Piltudski 
wu a lesser evil than • "fu c:ist cliGtatorshlp" under Witoa • . 11\e party, there­
fore .  joined wiih the socialist party i.n a 1•neral atrik• a1ain1t the lfitos forces 
which ultiaately cteci•d the usm in favor of Pibuaki . Comm ist1 fovaht 
side by side with Social Oellocrats ad Pi laud.ski ' •  t roops aaain1t the llilitary 
forces of Witas. In a fw tlays Pila\lldski held poiqr. Hiscocta writes of this 
/, 
•"9ht that: 
In aay 1926 they •ade the araw error of aupporU.n1 Pllaudski '• coup d'etat 
and thus added to tho odiw. of treason, which wu already attached to 
th•• in the eyes of 110lt of their fellowcomtryMn. It at once affected 
their reputation with the Coaintern ad with a ainori ty of Polish Marxists . 1 
Pilsudski d.issappointed the eo .. unists by rejectin1 any compromise with the left 
in strengthenin1 the Seja. Th• Marshal was deterained to set """ a regime of 
pe-r1onal power. The aovemaent now aoved towaTd a 1ead-Pasc.i1t ldlitary dictator-
ship. 
Soon after this failure of the party, Stalin conct.med the party ' s  tactics 
as "a very soriom error. II The question of the coi.p or th• 0aistak• of May' It 
u it wu called, shattered the party . One aroup extolled the belief that Waraki 
had erred in May of 1926 while the other believed that he bad actually acted 
correctly.  A split of the move•nt into two parties was stopped, however, by 
.( .. 1r'.· , .. !'.... '. � . 
strona . action by Mos cow .  Bukharin stated at the Sixth Congress of the Colllmnist 
Intemati13nal that "if we had no't inte?".eded there would be two parties in the 
'" 
. . 
Polish aove•nt tod.ay. 112 Wanki was •••lled fro• the party's Central Co.Uttee 
. .  
and Dhd try Manui ltky and Otto Kwsinen, two representati vet of the Moscow 
luiscoc:ks, Op. cit . , P •  74. 
2see Depa . Op. cit . ,  p .  446. 
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Executive, were aent to Wan• to 1vpenis• the party in Poland. Yet dl11ent 
uong the party •••n 11 ... red beneath th• Moscc:iw cala. 
Al. can be teen, the 0-P, altho•h pro-Soviet at it• foundina and lnter­
natlonali1t in lt• tbinkln1. felt no need for doctrinal confol'llity with th• 
Soviets and, in fact , th• ort1la1 of the party represent jutt tuch tendencies. 
Th• party retained auch of the pl'lcle and yeamln1 for indepenct.nce which had 
been voiced in Rosa Luuabura'• clala that the SDDiL wu both ••nior to ancl 
aon advanced than th• R•sian Soclal-Deaoc:ratic Party. The party thus not 
only differed on several k., potnta with th• luaalau but alao 1apported Trotaky 
when th• contnveny be1an between hi• and Stalin. In the autumn of 1923 the 
party '• Central C�ttee prot.ttecl (alona with the Prencb Comunist Party) Stalin' s  
brutal attacks against Tro�ky . Stalin did not forai v• eul ly. Luxelllburaisa 
thus took on the added odiua of beina th• Polish brand of Ta-ot1kyi1•. All through 
the twenties Moscow atu.pted to brin1 th• party under tow . At th• Pifth ·Con­
area• of the Coaintern in 1914. a precedent wu established when the whole Central 
Cmmttee of th• a>P wu replaced by one llOH con1enlal to the desires of Moscow. 
And aaain in 1125 th• Central Co-1 tt•• was s�oned to Moscow and disaiaaed. 
ly 1932 Stalin'• control over the party ••••d to be COllpl•te. But now 
a wina of the party which wu led by haa� :Deutscher and which counted about 
a third of all party aelDen uona its follc:iwers(it was especially strong in 
the Warsaw and Loda areu)raised its head to oppose Moscow'• policy toward the 
Geraui Social Oeaocrau inthe face of the Nan aenaq and to advocate a united 
front of left-wina parties ad trade mions qainst Pilsudakl and Puciaa. They 
libeled Stallnisa as a cS.generate fon of Comunisa. And yet they fai led to 
hold topther u a 1roup. Deutacher ad his supporters were accused of Trotskyis• 
and expelled fr• the party in 1932. 
In 1937-l�JI, at th• heiaht of the Stalinist purses . a tragic event occurred 
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to th• party and to iu •lli>•n . At this ti• a larp nmber of the a>P ulli>er­
ship was in the Soviet Union either on party buain••• Ol" u nf\Ja••• froa the 
Pollah police . Many othen wen e1pecially 1ummned to Moscow. On Stalin ' s  
orden the party w .. :j>uqed of "Trotakyist police 1pie1 ancl apnt.1 provocaten . "  
TbOU1ands wen arnated and el ther eucuted or deported to prison cups. Al1101t 
all of the party leeden, both ri1ht and left win111 i•cluclin1 Wan11W1ki (Warsld ) ,  
Les1csyn1ki (Leuki ) ,  ad loatn•• md sewral hundred other key ••n wen liqui­
dated. Gowlka eac11pecl the purp by beina in the 1afe1t plaa at th• .,..nt, in 
prison in Poland, The party wu finally quietly dlasolved by Collint•rn decne 
in May of 1938. 
TITO AND nm CPY RISB 10 PROMINliNCB 
Jotip aro.,.T1to wu a Croat •t•l·worker of ·peasant stock. He wu mobili sed 
by the Austrian Antf durlna the Pint World War and •••t to ·the eutem front 
where he wu captund by th• Rusians ad then converted to C�unlaa clurina 
th• nvolution. The convert had ·•110 acted aa an offi cial of the Coaintem for 
a period in Moscow prior to hi• •turn to Yuaoslavia in 1958 to take control of 
the party . 
The .,..Rt IH•d acl•antageoua to the new party leader. Yugos layia had 
I 
suffered ft.nt from a ahu parli aaentarisa and then frOll open dictatorship. 
With the as1u1inaUoa of Una Al•un4tl' an4 th• 1pproach of war. both Coa11 ml1ts 
and 1Fasti1t1 •• tbelr chances , Out of thia chaos aDd the eveT 1-anent esplo•ion 
I 
of nationall•• in th9 state JNW two predollin•t •ff81ftts, one Co1111Uni1t and · 
one aationalist. 
Colonel Nihailovic: ,  a S.sb offi cer of the old Yu1os lav Anq . fonned a 
resistance aov.•nt which beaan to l' .. ist th• ijaa.is well \afore the Gentan 
invasion of 1Ws1ia md befon th• C:O..uniats be1an th•ir fiJht. Mihailovic 
and his Chetnika, as tl\ey were called, resisted flnt and yet fought at a dis­
advantage . For the Chetniks not only fou1ht against the Axis but also to 
restore the olcl and discredited centralistic ad dtctatorl al real•. Mihailovic 
and the Comw1i1t-1 wen allies for a ti•• but polittc·a1, ideological llild tac­
tical d.isaarHMnta proved insumountable. After the German invuion of th• 
Soviet Union, the two nsistance wove•nta not only fought a1ainst the Germans 
but also qaln1t each other. 
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While the Cl•tnika fo.ht to restore the old regi•, the Comunisu ,  
led by Tito, pt'(fe•••4 to. be fighting for· the establishment of a new and 
democratic Y':1P5l•ri• OJ!lanit.ed on a federal and a multinational buis with 
comp let.e equall ty tif ,u its national and regional uni ts . But the voioing 
of these- edlfyin1 pbru•• did not blind the Partiamu, as the . C011J1unlst resisters 
became known, to ·the political ,slpific.ance of: the ilf)•t.uling deback lo . 11ie 
Partisans med th� resistance to 1.et power into tho1r own hands . The use of 
patriotic slo1an1 in ti• of dire national need, Tito; Go111dta. and Stalin were 
to learn, could· 1am•r nch more suppol't than any social revolutionary s logan 
in time of peace.. At th.is ti• .the ce.unlsts . hoped· that liberation would 
brlna Co•W1i1t clictatonbip or at leut a areater re>le played by the party in 
the aovemMnt than previous ly. Par froa playina the great patriots as they 
professed, the C-.uni•t• wn actually 1triYin1 to l>rin1 power into their own 
fint -duty u e1peunclacl by Tito at the Pifth Party Ccmgn•• whtdl •t in secret 
a-t %aareb an Octobe-r ef 1940 wu t• ,�., Yug011 lav1a out of the "i111p•'ri•·li•t" 
war at all coats. Tito, of course, wu •nly . following th• Coaintem line. 
On Aprt.-1 6 ,  1941 ,  Geraany attacked Yugoal&ri·•· A ••cret directive drtnm up by 
Tito for the party oraanlsation 1howa Tito and the Co .. unl1t1 � to eJ1ploit 
any opportunity to fu.rther their awn came in the countty .  1be directive is 
as follow• t 
1 .  Th• Y1i11otlav COW1unist Party 11 now in a position ·to take an acti•• 
part in the overthrow of the preaent 110Darchical re1i11e, and to this 
end will render assistance to all ele•nta , n1ardles1 of ·their ideo .. , 
101ical outlook and character, which are bent on the , ... purpose. 
Yu101.1avta, aust lint be di1solftd into iu ••veral component parts, ancl 
the party will then be Ible to pursue its work within each of the• in 
accordance with the directives already issued. 
2 .  Party -.b•n who aay be called � to the any willhave the following 
tuk1 to ·perfona; flatly·, di1or1w1• the reaist•ce of the Yu1oslav 
•1111 by cnatina confusion uona•t officers and Hn so that defeat appears 
to be the result of the incompe�eace of th• officers' cozps whose authority 
wi l l  be �strayed once and for all; ••condly, collect all araa and war 
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ectuipMnt wb1ch uy be thrown •ay in panic and convey them to safe 
hiding places for later use ; thirdly , collect infomatlon reaardine the 
indiVidual offlczan and •n who do not b•lona to aur aovement but Who 
may be of Ule tq us ii:i the event of the USSR entering the war. 
In the perforaance of these tuks. ful l use should be made of our 
mderaround oraani &ations on the ho• front who wi 11 work according to 
the .... plan. 
3. Render any usistanc. necessary to the Ustase, Macedonian, Albanian 
and other aatlCJDalist or1ani 1ation1, in so far u they aay contribute 
towards th• speedy overthTOW of th• present regime. Help should also 
be 1lve• to the Noatene1rin Separatists if they adopt an anti-royalist 
line in Montene1'1'e. 
4. Geraay will ,,.•dily crush Yugoslavian reaistuce and·, with the 
help of Italy, introdu� the Uttue real• in Croatia and possibly 
similar separatist re1i•• ellewhere. Steps nat therefor be taken to 
infiltrate our own people into the new adainistrations for intelligence 
and other purposes .1 
The countJY wu divided mon1 Ge:naany and her satelltt .. , Italy, Hunaary, 
and Bul1aria, with Croatia indepen4ent. But the real cantnl rested with -th• 
Germans . 
· The �mists haw lona bou ted that they took up uu in defense of 
Yuaoslavia before the Geraan attack on the Soviet Union . And it is true that 
the Cmmuni1t party did not directly collaborate with th• Genaans or their 
pupp•U after the invuion of Yugoslavia. However, parqraph 2 of the above 
directive calll upon Co•natists to ndi1organi1e the nsi1tanc:e of tho Yusoslav 
Anr.y'1 :ln the face of the Geraans , and parqr1ph l calls for Co•unltt1 to 
"render all usiatance to all ele.enU" in order to overtlrraw the present 
': .... 
reai• •  The Com.mists sllbotapd the puppet rep•• ("infi ltrate our own 
people into the &eW adllinistra'tlons for intelligence and other pul'poses") ; 
but th� only th'IW thelr all into the struagl• after the USSR wu 'attacked. 
' 
They •n·ly obstructed, aabotqed, and infiltrated the puppet rep•• in Yugo-
1laYia as they bad don• with ewry 1ovem•nt in Yuao91avia since thtil stat•'• 
inception. 
The ·Yugoslav Comlunist resistance 110ve1Mnt vu ce>11posed of a po�ulli of 
lQuot•d in St")'hen Cllssold, WM.t
,lrind: Art Account of M&nhal Tito•s· 
Rise to Power (Nev York : Philosophlca1 U6rary .  1956), p .21. 
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social classes. The Comuniat prot.saional revolutionary in the Balkans , as 
elsewhere,_ was a cai.eaory outside social classes. . However, . i t  CaJ> be said 
that workers played little part. �n the llOYeMnt ex�ept for those who first 
took the field in J.t•l . The great aajority of nsistance soldiers were pea­
sants. Clissold •tat .. thati 
The 1reat aajoriq of •llben of �· llcneMlltl • • •  wen persons of 
no fiacl political ,ict.u , who aay lMlv• p.>tM for one party or another in 
prewar electiau 1nat had ne.wr eurds•d any political influence. Now 
· thr�h �· Llberati.�>n Pronu they wen broua,ht into po.U.,clcal life for 
the first ti•. lut ttlelr political ener1i•1 were su�l:eaafully canau·sed 
by the Cmmunlst party ' s  cadres . l . 
In Yugoslavia the COlllUllist-led re1isters were also nationally diverse. 
After the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Comunists had proclai•d the 
slogan of the unity of all peoples of Yugoalavia qainst the invaders and 
their puppets . whether the�• were S.rbian, Croatian ,  Slovene, or Macedonian. 
By thit ti• the people had sickened ot the national hatreds which had run 
rqpant for to aany yean across the state. They •• in the Comrunist move-
ment and their pro1r• salvation from their pliaht . Th• national policy of 
th• CPY, based on the Soviet doctrine of nationalities, wu a aajor cause in 
the success of the Coaunlsts . 
The Germen invasion of the Soviet Union brought fre1h Coaintem instruc­
tions ·to the unresisting ColaR.mists . The raclical change in policy appeared 
in the followlna M•••ee to the party : 
It is absolutely essential that you should take all .. uures to support 
and al leviate th• 1trua1le of the Soviet people. You auat start a 
11e>vement with the 1 loaa of a uniteci national front, indeecl of a united 
intenatioaa1 front, to · fiaht the German and Italian Pud.st bandits. 2 
All ... r .. ncy se11ion of the Y•oslav Com"*liat Centl'&l C<uaittee 'ook place 
i_.diately . It wu decided at this tiae, at the nquest of the above •1sa1• .• 
libicl • •  p.215. 
-
2q...oted in. Stephen Clbaold. A Short Hia�o;ry 9,f Yuaoslavia (Camriclg• e 
Cubrida• University Press , 1966) , p . 213. 
' 
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to take 1n active rol• in the resistance by proceetlin1 with a pnoral uprisine. 
The followlna proclaaatioo was drmm up md circulated throup th• party ' s  secret 
channels : 
Proletari.ana froa· all parts of Yuaoslavia .: .. to axu: Rally round 
your vangua!'d. the Comtunist Party of Yugos lavi a .  Pulfi ll your pro­
letarim duty without fear or falteri.ag. Make nady for the final 
fateful stnagl� . You can not stand idly by whilst the precious blood 
of th• heroic people of Sori.et Rua.ta 11 ala•4. Nebllise ell your· strength 
to prevent our country from beln1 turned into a base to supply the Fascist 
hordu who haw •leuhed theiT turf on th• Soriet ua101a. our dear aod.allst 
Patherland. our hope , the beacon to which the eyes of your folk throughout 
th• woTld are tl&ftlad ia lonatn1 • • • •  1 . 
Now, for the f1nt ti• in 1 u history , the 1 .. cliate ai• •d endeavors of the 
CPY were at one with tboae of the people• of Yu101 lavla. - Th• confueion b•tween 
C�i•• and patrioti•• to th• homland fi•appeared. Th• Comunlsts of Yuro-
s laria could now flpt for Comamil• uncler the baner of patriotls• to their 
own countty. 1be two were now U•k•d la tile YV10Sln Co•uni1t Party to one 
destiny, the party•s . To my Y-usos lav Comuni1t1 , Comaunisa and patriotic 
Yugoslav nationali•• woulcl •rae into on• inseparable cause. Th• Coaunist 
leaden saw th•••lws as both Smet D4 Yusoslo patriots . Lope preseated 
the• no prcibl... Apd well it dicl not at the .,..nt. However. �he seeds of 
later cnfiiet with Moacow wen b•l•1 aown. 
Th• CPY vu numrically too weat to cany th• burden e>f the nvolt alone. 
In Tito'• Prop-9•• 19port to the Colllntem of Ava•t 15, 1941., the strenath 
for the party wu 1iven u follows a 
Pull Party Me••n -- l l , 179J 
Meabers of the eo-uni•t Youth · - 14,873; 
"Syapathiaen" -- 200 ,ooo·2 
Tbe latter ftaun Tito said vu Oll f a 1neral eatiute but ult llipt be con­
ftdeatly expeeted to increue�ttJ 
!quoted in Stephen Clisaold, W)lirlwincl, Op •. cit • •  pp . 30-Jl . 
2tb!d. , P •  J4 .  -
3Jbid. 
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Tito ' s  confidenc. wu based on a nUllber of positive factors which wen 
now on hi• side. First, and most i11portant, the imtediate al1111 of the party 
were now at one with the 1oala of the auaea . Second, Russian entry into the 
war had psycholoaically find th• traditional pro-Russian 1y11pathy of the Yuao­
slav pe .. antry. 1hlrd, th• C#Y , unlike any other party in th• atate, had 20 
yean •J1P9rienc. in clmdntiae aptation to their credit .  Fourth, the CPY 
had m efficient appal'atus built around a close-knit, clisci.plined leadenhlp . 
No other party CC>Ul41 count ao web in their favor durina th• forthl!Ond.na 1truagle. 
Wl th the invuion of the Soviet Union by Genumy, Moscow had dn•1T•ted 
socialist revolution to a far second behlncl an all out curpaign for survival 
qainst the Puci1t1 . A ••rmdJ• to Tito •Jlhoru the Coaunist leader to 
"re•li>er that at thla stap what you an concet'IMd with is liberation fro11 
Fucist oppression and not aoeiallst nvol\ltlon. nl Tito repeated this to his 
c011rade1 in an order . of th• 4ay: 
The political Un• of the Partlaa Detach•nts lays dow that there 
must be a National Liberation Anti-Pudst Pront of al l peoples of Yugo­
slavia n1ardle11 of party or nllpon. In fon:ina Partisan Detach.ents 
lt is e1sential not to he narl'OW•llinded but to give wide scope to initia­
tlw and ute1pl'i•• of ewty kin4. 2 
Such a clear-cut prost'• of acticm involYin1 all the people• of Yuaos tavia 
aaainat the forei an  oppressors vu quit• in hanony with the popular mood. Mos­
cow demanded unlimited · aamfic•. aa4 the popl• were eaaer to comply. In 
CCllltrut the Chetniks of MihailoYle had tendnated aost of their auerl lla war-
fare , fee line that lt wu criainal folly to .rUlt reprisals on the au1es vhlch 
in this ·cue laid ao1t heaYily in th• 1CJWU mad dti• fros which the Chetnik• 
found their support. The ' Co miace had no acnapln llbout th• reprisals , u 
th .. e destroyed their capi taliatie eneaies . 
1<luoted in Stephen Clissold. A Short History of Yugos lavi a, p . 216. 
2tbld. 
-· 
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Unlllli.ted 1acri.flce was an exacting dell8nd but also a splendid oppor­
tunity to convert a minority 1roup lacking popular support and aspirations into 
the spearhead of a popular national resistance •oVftlent. CUssold s ays that: 
For the next 1 years thct two currents of patriotic fervour and loyalty 
to • CNecl of social revolution directed froa Molcow aerged their impe­
tus and eventually carried the Colll!Rmists to victory at the head of a 
atate reeon1titut•d on MarJdst lines. 1 · · 
ly late 19-'l the p•triotlc fervour carri•4 by the party had· •nau.Ifed the .uses . 
A new ·folk poetry· refl•ctln1 tho new 1'9vo1utlenuy-patrioti c spirit was on the 
lips o-f the pegple. ·Tb• content vu new ad nvolutionuy yet the mold was 
tradition al '  
!'If.hither has wy sweetheart fledf 0 
''To the BobhevUt.s,"' they said. 
Three 1.ona Nntht and aore had put 
Sin ca I • • ., ••••theart lu�. 
So I asked th• Mountain sprite : 
"Hut thou •••n ., heart 's cl4JUghtT0 
"Yesterday ,'' he answer gave. 
"I beheld . thr:: sweetb•art brave . 
On the slopea ' of Dunai.tor 
1'1left thy swfftheart 1>11ave I 9 aw 
'Monist th• Bolsheviks so bold. 
And I aarvel le4 lo behold 
How each eweetly 1ene4 t.h• other 
Like to sister or to brother, 
How before a silent crowd 
Lenin 's words ••re. nad aloud, 
How thy· swee�beaTt up and spoke 
ncast away · thy tyrat ' •  yok• t "  
Mow there 1Ust>ened ovel'head 
H._.r, si.ckl•• star blood-red, 
How, the warriors ' Call\' above • 
Gleamed tb• n ... of Molotov. 
Stalin' s  words I too did see: 
"Now .the • l•••• shall �11 be frffl� 
Then. whe.n briptly d-.med the day 
11�oa the '90\lftt I specl way. 
Bade the Bolshevik ad1e1,1 · · 
Stalin'• wanior,.wm•n tl'U9•"2 
libt4 .. .  p.2i3. 
- � -
�·ed in 5tephe'n Clissold, Wh!rlwind, p .  80 •. 
·. 
so 
This patriotic fervour did 11ot cloud th• eyes of the party lewrs to 
th• expedient use of . their ... uury allies with en eye to thei r  demise oa 
so• fut-.n day. Ultlaate political power wu their v.ltiute concern, M.y 
tactics cou.ld be ••4 to add.eve thla end. Here again the party •rely fol­
lowed tbe aeneral 4lGtates laye4 down by Mo1cow. An •XUl'l• of audl covert 
d•lieity 11 Tito's aecnt dispatch of April 8, 194'2, to th• Co--.nist leaders 
1n Croatia warn.ins th•• to be on their auarcl aga1n1t th• British, who bad iln.11 
far aided the n1i1t1na auch aon than the Sovieta i 
In plill.1·lic, the allian• between tlM Soviet ""1on, Britain ud the ·United 
States .ust continue to be 1tns1ed, an4 the latt.er two Powen are to be 
depicted u our allies. But th•il' •1•nU an4 pau iuide our ceuntsy 
aist be. eppoaed, jmt a we oppose the bench•& of tbe invaders ancl the 
•n•lliu of the people who an out to Cl'Ulh our strual• for national 
liberatlon . 1 . 
The s aile ••••ie at.1ht have been ••nt in early 1941 but with the 1ub1titution 
of the Soviet Union a the enemy encl invader. 
n.e· Comnmi1tt wished to ditpe ll all fears of the populac. and the alUe1 
of any ulterior future r.volutionary chana•• which 1"11ht be planned. Tb.is wu 
in accord with nto•1 dispatch of April 8 and Mo&cow'1 policy of stressing the 
allim� w!dt the alll•• for l ts -political end ailituy advantages while apposina 
thne su. alliea covertly. The so-cal led lit.ac or no-funda•ntal-change Mani-
t .. 'to wu th• result of the first ae•1ion of the en.mist proviaional le1islative 
bod)r: known as the Ant1-Pasci1t CoWicil for the Natlanal Liberation ot Yugoslavia 
(AVNQJ) which wa fol"Md Nowllber 1942 in lihac, losnla. It wu MUlt �o 111u.-
mari 1e the ahas of the Partlsat\ IM>YeM.nt and waa calculated to allay th• fears 
of �· -al liie1 ... The unlfesto was bl'Oadcast over a .seCNt radio station which 
the Soviet Gowm.nt had readily put at th• dlsp�•l of the Partisans . . It 
ran u fol lows : 
ltbid • •  p . 17 . 
,.-
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In view of the calumies and s lander which the invaders , the Ustue 
and the Otetniks of Draza Mlhai lovic have been spreading mbout the National 
Liberation MoveMnt and its aim, it is dee•d necessal'Y to issue the 
following stateaent --
The Yugoslav N•tional Liberation Move•nt is cmposed of all true 
patriots irrespective of political or religious convictions or of national 
ori1in. Its·� aiu are as fol lows : 
1 .  The liberation of the CO\Dltl'Y fro• the invaders and the achievement 
of independence ad true deaoc:ratic rights for all the peoples of Yugos lavia. 
2 . The inviolability of private property and the providing of evel'Y possi­
bi lity for individual initiative in industiy , trade and agriculture. 
3 .  No radical chmges whatsoever in the social life and activities of 
the people except for the replace11111t of r:eactionaJ'Y villaae authorities 
and gendanes who aay have gone over to the service of the invaders by 
popularly elected representatives truly de11ecratic and popular in character. 
All the llOSt important questions of social life ad State organisation wi l l  
be settled by the people the .. elves thr�h representatives who will be 
properly elected by the people after the end of the war. 
4 .  The National Libaration Move•nt which is fighting for the freedom of 
the people and for their social md democratic riaht• renounces any kind 
of coercion or lawlessness . 
5 .  Officers who join the National Liberation Arrq are usured of their 
rank and a position C01181nsurate with their abilities. 
6. The Naticnal Liberaticn Move•nt fully recognizes the national rights 
of Croatia, Slovenia, Setbia, Macedonia, and all other regions. It is a 
11oveaent which is u auch Croatian as it is Slovene and Serbian. It 
guarantees that the national riahts of all peoples of Yugos lavia will 
be preserved. I 
The proaru wu both inspiring and reassuring. Tito offered not only democratic 
ri&hts , the capitalistic virtues of individual initiative and private pTOperty , 
md representative govem•nt, but also held out to the allies an existent 
free territory within Hitler's European fortress. Tito appeared to be a true 
resistance leader who held the key to the Yugoslav naticnal problem. The Coa-
intern-trained conspirator had now apparently aiven up the radical policies of 
social and economic revoluticn through violence and coercion. He offered brother­
hood and democracy. Little wonder that individuals from all cluses , creeds . 
nationalities , and political persuuions rallied to his banner. 
Tito' s  publicly proposed goals and •thods are YeJ'Y edifying, but his 
actual plus (Moscow ' s ) ,  do not appear quite 10 glorious. The Cold.nten ' s  
l� • •  pp. 114-115. 
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•ain directives to the Yugoslav Comuni1t Party, the "1ospel" of the party and 
Tito, were well laid and meter way prior to the Bihac Manifesto. A anat con-
tru� is evident between the Manifesto and the "Directive for Puture Work" 
dated May 9 ,  1941, and containina the 1eal of the Executive Comittee of the 
Coaintern. The directive is a blueprint for the sovietlzation df Yugos lavia. 
The dlrecti ve in part reads as fol lows : 1 
1 .  The ti• hu co• when deci1i ve new steps mat be taken along the path 
to world revolution. The obstacles to be overco• are sti 1 1  fo1'11idable 
and call for a new tactical flexibility which must be carefully worked 
out and boldly practised along the following line : 
a. The Co..unist world revolution •ust be presented u a series of 
•asures to achieve ' true democracy , '  and all political and llilitary 
leaders of the Co1111Unl1t Move .. nt llUlt depict their activity in this 
llaht . Up to 30 percent of Party .. llbers uy co• out into the open as 
' front-line fiaht•rs for democracy • in the eyes of the au•••· 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
e. Once power has been seized by the Party, foreign policy wi 11 be 
laid down by the diploaatic representatives of the USSR, who will receive 
the necessary directives from the Coalntern • • • •  
f. 1 ... diately after seizing power, the Central Colndttee will set 
up a new govem .. nt. This body shall be representative of the broad aasses 
of the people and preserve every 11ppearance of de•ocracy • • • •  
I• Opponents of the new adllinlstration, especially tho1e who sti 11 
enjoy so• prestige uongst the people and those whose participation in 
th• revolution u.y have given th•• access to the secret records of the 
Co•wist Move•nt , should be re11e>ved as soon as possible, but in "de110-
cratic" fuhion: by being broupt to trial before a regular court or 
a People's Court. 'nle latter should co11pri1e one known .. llber of the 
Party and two secret •llben or reliable 1y11pathisen • • • •  
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
4. Traitors to the Party are to be liquidated without trial once a ful l 
report confiraing their treachery hu been Imai tted to the Party organi­
zation to which they belong • • • •  
S.  • • •  Consider8ble difficulties uy be encountered in the 11pprehension 
and destruction of intemal opponents and class enellies. No ti• should 
be lost, however, in placing the• wder restraint and placing foraal 
chars•• against th•• to justify their detention in the eyes of the de110-
cratic world. 2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Tl to was to "present" the "11ppearance" of a de110cratic leader offering democra-
tic riahts (Bihac Manifesto) while covertly preparing for the destruction of his 
lPor a COllpl•t• text see Annex, Doament Number 1 .  
2tbid. , pp .239-241. 
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enellles and these ripts. This "tactical. flexibi lity" would lead to the sei zure 
of power 1nd the tr1n1foraatlon of the Yuaos lav state. Of ccxane , the Soviet 
t.nion would detenlne all forel1n policy and continue to 1lve advice in the 
do•stlc area. These stat-nts clearly reveal th• underlyln1 dlscrepency and 
duplicity between public state•nts issued by the Comunlsts and their secret 
col'l'espondence and covert activity. 
In Novellber of 1943 the Com1cil of National Liberation held its second 
session, thi1 ti• in Jaj ce ,  Bosnia. The principle purpose of this second ses­
sion was stated by Tito: 
Today the ti• hu co• to create an executl ve oraan in the fon of a 
provisional aoveruent cap8ble of concluctin1 all of the affairs which 
a real national aovern•nt .. t direct. l 
The Jajce Declaration of Novellber 29 thus ·Set up a provisional aovern•nt , the 
Comlttee of National Liberation. It also denO\mced the 1ov•rn991lt ln •xi. le, 
forbade the Kina to retum until "the people had decided ," and announced that 
Yu101lavia would be reor1ani1e� u a federal republic. The fonal resolution• 
are contained in the follawina declaration : 
!. That the Antl-Pasclst Comcil of National Llberatian ot Yuaoslavia 
be constituted as the supre• le1islative �d executive representative 
body cf Yu1oslavia u the supre• repreaentative of the sovereipty 
of the peoples of the state of Yuaos lavla u a whole, and that a National 
Comlttee of Liberation of Yuaoalavia be ••tablishecl as an or1an with 
all of the features of a national aovernmnt, throuab which the Anti­
fascist Council of National Liberation of Yuaoalavla will realise its 
executive functions ; · 
2 .  That the traitorous • aovern•nt • in exi 1• be deprl ved of all rlaht1 
as the leaal aovem•nt of Yu1oslavia,· particularly of the riaht to repn­
aent the peoples of Yugoslavia anywhere or before anyone ; 
3. That all internal treaties and obligations concluded abroad in the 
n- of Yuaoslavia by the • aov•rn•nt• in exile be reviewed with a view 
to their invalidation or renewal or 11pproval , •d that al 1 internal 
treaties and obli1ations which the so-called ' aovern•nt• in exile aay 
eventually conclude -'>road in the future ncei ve no recoani ti on ;  
1Nichael B .  Petrovi ch ,  "Th• Central Govem•nt of Yuaoslavia," Political 
Science Quarterl�, LXI I ,  p . 506, quotina Tito, "DevelopMnt of the Liberal 
Struule of the eopl" of Y•oslavia in conMctlon vi th International Events ." 
Sec�d Session of the Anti-Puci1t CoUnci l of National Liberation of Yugos lavia 
(Zaareb . 1945) , p. 13. 
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4.  That Yugos lavia b e  established on a democrati c federal principle 
as a state of equal peoples ; 
s. Thft all these re1olution1 be f'.01'11\llated in separate decisions by 
AVNOJ . 
This resolution indicates that as the Partisans becaae settled their program 
became increasingly more radical. By this time, of course, the aoveaent held 
considerable areas in which a basic civil ullinlstration had to be set up and 
supplies organized both for the any and civi lian population. Because of the 
position taken by the Comtmists on the national question, they were able to 
pro�re valuable recruits from the local population .  Local persons o f  abi lity 
were recruited for the new adainistrative tasks thus releasing a great new 
source of energy and talent, especially among the mountaineers of Bosnia and 
Montenegro who had never before held responsibility. These people were , of 
course ,  now finily tied to the Co-..nist cause. The platform of "national 
' 
equality" and of •:the right to self-determination includin1 that of separation" 
was decisive in securing support for the Partisan cause. 'Mlese principles 
were also set forth at Jajce in the proclaation of the federal principle 
which ensured "full equality to the nations of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Mace-
donia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina," and that the "national mnorities 
of Yueos lavia wil l  be secured all their rights ." In accordance with this fed-
eral organization of Yugoslavi a "organs of the people's authorities have been 
established in different lands of Yugoslavia in the fona of National Liberation . 
Com! ttees. and Provincial Anti-Fascist Councils of National Liberation. n2 
The principle of "self-determination includ.ing that of separation" was forced 
upon the Yµgoslav Communists by the Collinte� but was never seriously entertained. 
The former principle was bplemented in the future govemll81lt but was probably 
the result only of a co9llOl\sense appraisal of Yugoslav 1'9alitles , to its success 
ltbid. , pp.506-507, quotin1 "Declaration of the Second Session of the 
Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugos lavia (29-XI- 1943) , Offi cial 
Gazette , No. l ,  Peb 1 ,  1945. 
2
Joseph Prankel , "Fedet'alis11 in Yugoslavia," A•rican Political Science 
Review, Xt.IX. p .420. 
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rather than to its "correctness . "  
Th e  AVNOJ now conferred the title of Marshal upon Tito and, on Novemer 
30, 1943, the Presidium appointed a National Comli.ttee to act as the executive 
arm of AVNOJ . Ti to was made acting Prellier and acting minister of defense .  
'Ihree vice-presidents an d  thirteen acting ainisters were also appointed. 
From Novellber �g , 1943, until the adoption of the Constitution of the 
Federal People ' s  Republic of Yuaos lavia on January 31, 1946, all territory lib­
erated by the Partisans was govemed by the new provisional govem•nt. 
An analysis of the war shows that Yugoslav Co•unist resistance began in 
Serbia and in Montenegro after the Gel'll8Jl invasion of the Soviet Union. The 
Partisans were driven out of Serbia at the end of 1941 and reorganized their 
forces in the aountains of Bosnia during 1942. Meanwhile Mihailovic had been 
appointed Minister of War of the Yugoslav govermaent in exile. The government 
held allegiance from the Serbian national forces throuahout the country which 
were being drawn into close mi litary coll11boration with the Italians and some­
ti•s the Geraan occupational forces . In the spring of 1943, Mihailovic's men 
I 
took part in the operation qainst the Comunist force or Partisans. The Com-
IRDlists , however, survived the heavy enemy attacks in the spring and S\lllller of 
1943. Co•\D\ist propaganda now called the Serb nationalists , or O\etniks, quis­
lings , an4 with mch justification. At the ti• of the Italian surrender, the 
Partisans held considerab le territory. This proved to be a tuming point in 
the struggle. They were now able to acquire large stocks of weapons with which 
to continue the struagle. During the following year the Geraan forces often 
attacked the Partisans and inflicted heavy losses , but they were never able to 
attempt their co11plete destruction . 
On J\D\e 16, 1944, an agn ... nt wu reached between Marshal Ti to and the 
Premier of the Royal Govemment in Exile, Dr. Ivan Sw>uic. The agreement 
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considerably strengthened Tito' s  position. Tito agreed to postpone the question 
of the future of the monarchy tmtil the end of the war in exchange for Subasic's 
proaise to organize a cabinet which would cooperate with tho National COllllittee. 1 
Subuic consented to the agreeaent at the request of the British. The British 
had, by early 1944. tel'lllnated all aid to Mihailovic in favor of the forces of 
Tito. A letter fro• Winston Churchhill to Tito sent on 8 January 1944 states 
that "I a resolved that the British govemaent will give no further lli li tary 
support to Mihailovic 'and will only 1ive help to you • • • •  "2 The letter further 
says that "It is 111 110St earnest desire to 1ive you all aid in human power by 
••• supplies , by air support and by eo1111andos • • • •  " The British request to 
SW>asic was thus in line with the current ailltary policies of that state. 
On Novemer 1 ,  1944, a second Tito-Subasic agreement was concluded in 
the newly liberated YU1oslav capital of Belarade. This a1ne•nt provided for 
a coalition govern .. nt pending the election of a constituent assembly which 
would determine Yugoslavia's future form of govern•nt.  
King Peter II  now i11ued a decree fraa London transferring his royal , 
powers to a regency pending the final decision on the aonarchy to be made by 
the future constituent assembly. 
The talks between Subasic and Tito skidded to a halt as no satisfactory 
agree•nt on the details of the coalition could be reached. However, reco•­
•ndations were soon forthcoaing fro• the Big Three at Yalta which settled the 
controversy. The "recomendation" to Tito and Subuic stated that "the agree•nt 
between thea should be put into effect i-diately and that a new govemMnt 
lFor the text see Michael B .  Petrovich, Op.cit • •  p.508. 
2stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee
! 
Roosevelt and Truman, 
1941-Ui4S· {LOndon: Lawrence and Wishart, 1958), p. l8 • 
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should be formed on the basis of that agree•nt. ul 
Both Subasic and Tito now sli>llitted the resignationa of their govern-
ments to three regents appointed by King Peter. The regents appointed a new 
counci 1 of ainisters which was headed by Ti to md consisted of 28 llinisters , 
23 of whoa were Partisans. 
Th• National Liberation Move•nt now found itself in an extn•ly strong 
position. They had alaost total control over the only legal govem•nt of 
Yugoslavia. The Yalta "rec�ndation" wu never ccmpletely carried out relating 
to the total m•ber of non-Partism representatives in the new govem•nt. How-
ever, a sienificant nuD>er of non-co .. unists were allowed to join thus serving 
u a testi110nial of the 1tren1th of the Partisans. Sli>uic, Milm Grol, md 
other non-Colllllftist representatives fro• the Yugoslav Govem•nt in Bxll• joined 
the Tito govemaent but were veritable prisoners in their own llinistries. 
The new govel'lment pused a 1111 on Auaust 21,  1945, known u The L• on 
the Constituent Assellbly, which included the following provisions on the forth­
coming election of a Constituent Assellbly : 
That the peoples of new Yuaoslavia llight •lq>ress their soverei1n 
will re1ardin1 the buic question of fora of govem•nt, they will elect 
at free elections , by direct and secret .ballot, representatives to a 
Constituent Assellbly, the supre• representative body of De11e>cratic, 
Federal Yuaoslavia. The Constituent Alseilbly will establish the Consti· 
tution of New Yu1oelavia, l•• in ccnnection with the Constitution , md 
decisions on all business concluded by the Anti-Fucist Council of National 
Liberation of Yu101lavia and its Presidium or the National Provisional 
Parliaaent of De110cratic, Federal Yuaoslavia.2 
The elections themelves were carried out amidst a widespread fear created 
by the govem•nt '• Popular Front. This , coupled with a sense of defeatis• 
and fat alls a en1endered by the war, alon1 with a deepening disappoint•nt of 
lMichael B. Petrovich , Op. cit. , p.509, quoting Joint Coamunique on Cri•a 
Conference, Pebrul.%y 12, 1945. 
2tbid. , quotina Official Gaiette, No.594, August 24, 1945. 
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the West, clouded the election horizon. Many were now dependent upon the 
aovernment for their livelihood while others admired the exploits of Tito 
and his solidarity with the USSR. 
1be oppo1ition partie1, laraely because· of disunit� and the realiiation 
that they would fail in the impending elections tmder the present adverse cir­
cumtances , decided to abstain fro• the elections. Vice-Preld.er Milan Grol 
resianed from the clblnet on August 18. This abstention and the resignation 
of Poreian Minister Ivan Subasic who had been held inc011aUDicado since early 
September, prior to the Novellber u .  1945 , elections wen aade to druatise 
Belp-acle's dictatorial excesses and stimulate lut-llinute allied intervention 
on their behalf. No allied help wu forth COiiing. 
The elections were held on Noveli>er 11, 1945 , but the �nal resulU did 
not appear until NoveJlber 24. Of the registered 8.383,455 voters , 88.43 
percent cast ballots . No opposition •llbers were present at the counting of 
/ 
these votes of which the Popular Pront received approxiutely 90 percent. 
'Mle Coutituent Assellbly convened in Belgrade on Novelllber 29 and declared : 
I .  Democratic Pederal Yugoslavia is -proclaiaed a people.!s repUblic under 
the n .. of the Pederal People 's  �epublic of Yugoslavia. 
The Pecleral People' s  Republic of Yugoslavia i• a federal people'•  
state repmlica in fora, a c�i ty of  equal peoples who have freely 
expressed their will  to reaain mited within Yugoslavia. 
I I .  With this re1olution the monarchy in Yugoslavia is finally dis­
established in the nae of all the peoples of Yugoslavia, while Peter II 
Karadjordjevic with the whole Karadjordje dynasty i1 diyested of all 
ripts appertaining to him and the Karadjordje dynasty. 
A nmber of reasons can be cited for the Co1111R.1Dist victory in Yugoslavia. 
'nle pre-War governments in Yugoslavia did not reflect the popular wishes of the 
Yuaoslav people. Parli .. ntaris• had been a fai lure, and the dictatorial 
policies of the royalist govern•nt were detested. The Chetnik leader Mihailovic 
l� • •  p.518, quoting Politika, Novelli>er 30, 1945, p . 1 .  
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fought for the restoration of these pre-War principles. Furthermore, Mihailovic 
wu a Serb leading a purely Serbian movement in a state boiling with nationalism. 
In contrast ,  the Coamunist oraanization included cells in every subdivision of 
Yuaoslavia. By 1943 they were attracting followers from all over the co\D\try. 
The only qualification for •nbership was usefullness . The leadership of the 
Coma.mist move•nt was also far better. The a-Y wu the only Communist party 
in Eastem Europe prepared when the war came to engage in lli litary �erations . 
This was , of course, a result of their policy set as far back as 1938 of laying 
the fo\D\dations for the armed struggle against their own state. A number of 
veterans of the Spanish Civil War and several recruited career officers of the 
Yugoslav army, including Tito's Chief of Staff General Arso Jovanovich , bolstered 
the quality of JRilitary leadership. Perhaps the Historian Adu Ulam best cites 
tho reuons for Tito's success : 
The success of Ti to was due to an unusually fortuitous anangement of 
events and personalities . All Yugoslavia was divided and seemingly 
incapable of regeneration. Whatever else the Partisans were, they exem­
plified energy and purpose. Durina the war they acted, talked, and so•­
times even thouaht as free revolutionaries rather ·than as servants of an 
. alien aovom•nt. It was no accident that they attracted so many of the 
yo\D\1 uona the former ruUna class of their country. Tito's versatile 
secretary, Olaa Ninchich, was the daughter of a minister of the Yugoslav 
aoveruent-in-exlle. Drazha Mihailovich 's tragedy is underlined when it 
is reflected that his own children left hi• during the war to join the 
Partisans . In contrast to the continuous wrangling which went on amng 
the Oletniks , excellent 110rale pervaded Ti to' s headquarters . 1 
Furthermore , as the struaale increased, the social consequences of the war bec­
more important and aave to the Coma\D\ists further advantaaes . 
The guerril la warfare carried on by the CoJIJl\D\ists, as seen , led to repri­
sals which fell most heavily on the town and co\D\tried propertied. This , of 
course, weakened the Couaunists' .future rtvals and drove many into collaboration 
with the invaders or quislings in order to •rely maintain soae selllhlence of 
1 . Adam B. Ulam, 0p. cit. ,  p .36 .  
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law and order. The Communists welcomed this as they could later argue that 
the ruling and a large part of the middle class were helping the enemy. The 
Communists could thus attack the bourgeoisie and the rich peasants in the name 
of patriotic fervor. In Croatia and Slovenia the pre-War democrati c  parties 
gave so• support to the Geram or Croatia fascists who they believed would 
be a less serious .. nace after the allies defeated them than the Coanunists . 
11\e Communists could thus carry on a ci vi 1 war here in the naM of patriotis11 
also. 
The midergr«md cells of the Co-.mists also pTOved to be extnmely 
iq>ortant in the party ' s  success during the war and after. The ce 111 served 
u the nucleus for the Partis an llOVement, thus gl ving the Co-.ilsts control 
and direction in accord with their own intentions ad aspirations. With the 
gradual expansion of liberated territory, these cells laid the foundations for 
their own preconceived future Yugoslav govem•nt .  
The physical condition o f  Yugoslavia also favored the gueri lla tactics 
carried an by Tito. The invaders controlled the aaln cities , rai lroads , and 
part of the plains , whi le the resisters held the mountains and raided the enemy 
garrisons and lines of Cmimmlication. 
And, finally , the intematianal situation at the end of the war was also 
favorable to the Yugoslav C01111UDist1. 111• Yalta decisions actually strengthened 
the cau.e of Tito. 
t«>S<X>W AND mE CPP RISE TO PROMINENCE 
The dissolution of the CPP in 1938 is to this day shrouded in 111 tery 
and the sW>ject of mch controversy. The only official announcement by the 
Soviets c- in 1939 at the Eipteenth a»su Conan•• where Manui lsJcy , speaking 
in justification of the act, stated: 
In order to split the Comunist 110W•nt� th• Pucist and the Trotskyite 
spies attempted to fora artificial ' factions• and ' groups ' in some of the 
Collll.lllist parties and stir up a factional 1trus1le. . . .  (The party that 
wu) moat contudnated by hostile ele .. nts was the Comaunist Party of 
Poland where aaents of Polish Pucis• managed to 1aln positions of leader­
shipo These scoundrels tried to pt the party to support Pil1udski 's 
Pucist group in May 1926. When th\s fai lecl they feigned repentence 
for their 'May error, •  llade a show of self-crlticlsa and �eceived the 
Coaintern . . . .  The C01111mi1t parties • • •  hav• investigated their lead­
in1 workers and removed those whose political honesty was questionable. 
'nley have cli11olved illeaal organisations which were particularly con­
tulnated, and have begun to fora new ones in their place. 1 
The CPP wu thus full of hostile, sW>venlve ele•nts but , nevertheless , was 
able to aake one last effort , the effort to dissolve itself. New and sounder 
./ 
'"' 
or1ani1ations were then prepared for the future. Other reasons have been ·�-
auted for the dissolution of the CPP. The,.. historian Korl>onski examines the 
IM. l. Dziewanowski, "Stalin and the Polish Coamnists," Survey, No. 35, 
(Jan-Mar) , p.63, quotlna World News and Views, 6 April 1939 , p.!482. 
Stalin ' •  speech durin1 the Gnat Purge of 1934-1938 "On Inadequacies of Party 
Work and Meuures for Liquidating Trotskyist and Other Dom le-Dealers" given 
before the P lenum of the Central Comitt•e of the a>su on March 3, 1937 and 
1ppearin1 in Pravda, March 29, 1937, should be COllp&red to the above and the 
reasons atven by Stalin for the precipi tation of the Yuaoslav ... sovtet split in 
1941: Cotn'ade1 : PTO• the reports and discussions of the• heard at this Plenum 
it 11 obvious that we have to deal vi th the following three buic facu . In 
the first place, the wnckin& and cliversionary-spyin1 worlt of aaents of foreign 
states , uon1 who• a rather active role hu been played by the Trotskyite1, 
hu touched to one clepee or another all or al1101t all of our oraani1ations , 
adllinistrative and party u well u econollic. In the second place, agents of 
foreian states , includln1 Trotskyite1 , have penetrated not only into the lower 
or1ani1at1Gll , but even into certain responsible posu.. In the third place, 
certain of our leading co11rades, at the center u well u in the provinces, 
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followin1: first, the elildnation of the C'P as a pos1ibl• cbstacl• to the 
conte11plated Sovet-Genm r9roch•nt ; second, Trotlkyit• influences in the 
<PP ; third, intemal aplitl encl quarrels within the party ; and fourth, the 
a>P ' •  participation and behaYlor in th• Spanish CiYll War. Korbonski says 
that none of th••• are caaYlncin1 u reuona for th• party ' •  d111olution. The 
•- nuona , he 1ay1 , would have 1pplied to a nUllber of other C:O-..nist partl$! : 
Czechoslovakia, Genany, act Yuaoelavia. None of the• were di1101ved .. 1 
Dalewanowski ,  in a section<' of his book The eo ..... tst Party of Poland enti• 
tled "A �•t•ry Wra1ppecl in Bnipa," llsu the thne nuons for the dissolution 
of th• party enumrated by Manul llky and "parrotted by others : "  the disintegra­
tion of the party , infi 1 tratton of the party by provocateurs md spies, and 
contalnatton of the party by Trot1kyi t• lnflmnces . He then proceed• wt th a 
nfutati•. The party vq not d11tni.aratln1 at the ti• but wu actually 
•Jpllldln1 both numrically ad influentially in the citi•• and in the country· 
side. Rural •ftPloymnt, the C:O••imi1t sponsorship of boUJ'l•oi1ie aararian 
refon, C:O-ist infiltration of nca-C01m1ni1t and • fellow travelin1' 01'1ani-
1atlou , an unyieldin1 1tn11l• aaalut Nall Gen_,, ad th• exploitation of 
patriotic 1lo1ans all contributed to the party 1atn1 . Eneaies of the party 
bid penetrated into the lower lewla of the party apparatus but never, e1peclally 
after the early 30 ' 1 ,  into the inner con of CPP leadership. The pejorative 
of Trotskylt• penetration 11 found vaam. At the ti• there were no aarked 
sips of activity by •lllben of this faction in Polmd. The real reasons for 
have not only been unable to see the real face of these wreckers , diverslonl1ts • 
1pie1 and mrdenrs , but have provecl to be carelff1 , inclifferent and naive 
about 1 t ,  md not mcomcnly have cooperated in promtin1 agents of forelp 
1tate1 to 10• re1ponsible po1t or other. . . .  quoted in Robert V. Daniell, ed • •  
A Documsatuy Historr of Comunl1• (New York : Randoa HoUle, 1960) , pp.54-55. 
1Por th• COllplete cli1cus1lon '" Andrsej lolbon1kl, •'The Poll1h Co..ani�t 
Party 19S8-1942," Slavic Review, No.3, Septellber 1967, pp.430-444. 
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the dissolution are now given. By 1937-1938 the possibility of revolution in 
Poland see11ed further away than ever. The Great Depression was over and had 
not been sufficiently exploited by the CPP. Stalin probably thought that in 
the event of another revolutionary situation arising in Poland the Red Arfll'f 
would do a 111ch better job. PurthenM>re, the CPP was not iaportant in Comintem 
calculations except u a translllssion belt to Geraany. With Hitler's triumph 
the hopes of any such upheaval vanished. Now it was felt by Stalin that Poland 
might serve as a diplomatic and llilitary bridge to the Third Reich .  The disso-
lution of the CPP acce>11plilhed three things : one, "discarded an ineffectual 
and unreliable instl'UMnt of policy;" two, 0waaing preventive war against a 
potential opposition;" and three, "ptting rid of the remants of domestic 
opposition. ul An infonied observer of tho Soviet scene during the Stalin period 
writes that he 
heard the declaration, made as far back as 1933, a few months after 
Hitler came to power, that the only possibility for Russia to survive 
as a Power was to 11ake sure that the conflaaration in the West should 
break out before the fire in the East. I have authoritative infomation 
to rely upon, that in 1937 the question of making a possible compromise 
with Hitler at the expense of Poland was already becoming more concrete, 
and Stalin wanted no internal opposition in cue of a comproaise with 
the Gemans ; not only was bourgeois Poland to cease to exist , but also 
the Polish C01111Unist Party. Z 
The CPP was one of the first victi• of the Stalin-Hitler aaree•ent. Poland 
itself was theoretically re11<>ved when , on August 23, 1939 ,  the Nazi-Soviet 
Pact wu signed. 
At the official rehabi 11 tation of the CPP in 1956 , it was fotmd that 11The 
evidence (for the dissolution of the CPP) had been faked by a gang of saboteun 
and provocateurs whose real role was only brought to light after Be.ria was 
lM. K. Dziewanowski , "Stalin and the Polish Commmists ," Op.cit . ,  p.64. 
2tbid. , quoting "Interview With an Bx-Insider," Soviet Survey, (July­
Septellber, 1960) . 
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urunasked. 111 This s tatement does not explain the dissolution of the party. It 
does not tell why nor who the above "saboteurs" and "provocateurs" were. 
The dissolution of the CPP and the alliance with Hitler crit'P l•d the 
Polish CoM&mist move•nt. The party wu deprived of its leadership, the rank 
and fi le's Marxist faith was strained, th• antagonism of non-Marxist Poles 
against Couunis• and the Soviet Union was aaeravated, and no attempts at 
founding a new Polish Co-.mist Party were forthcoaing until after the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Stalin's actions stinulated the patriotic 
emotions 8llODI Polish COltllUftists and resentment against Soviet pretensions . 
The effects would aaain come to the fore in 1948. 
ntree groups of Polish Co1111unists can be distinguished at the time of 
the dissolution of the party in 1938. The first and 111ost nmerous group was 
located in Poland and wu composed of the rank and file of the party. It w85 
in a state of disorgani zation because of the ban on C0111Dunht activities by 
the government which forced the Politburo to locate and diTect operations from 
Pari s .  As seen ,- during the second half of 1937, all the i11portant leaders were 
summoned to Moscow . Second and third ranking officials of the party including 
Gomulka ,  Bierut, Och ab ,  and Zawadzki were in Polish jails. Only two members 
of the Central Comal t tee of the CPP survived the purge , Alfred Lampe • in a 
Polish j ai l ,  and Julian BrWl, living in France until 1940. The rank and fi le 
within Poland refused to believe that the CPP had been disbanded. ntey he lieved 
that it was a plot by the Polish government. However, special Comintern emis ­
saries we,re sent t o  Poland calling for the strict adherance to the Comintern 
resolutions disbanding the CPP . During the second half of 1938 all organi zed 
Communist activity in Poland ceased. 
ltbid. , p .6 4 ,  quoting Ttbuna Ludu, 19 February 1956 ; also KPP Uchwaly i 
rezolucJ'8:-I I I , pp.462 and 59�599. 
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The second grouping of Polish Comaunists was in Spain . In the fall of 
1938 the international brigades were lar�ely withdrawn and aost of the Polish 
Co1J1111unists crossed the frontier into France by January of 1939. _ It was from 
these Polish Coamunists in Prance that Moscow apparantly planned to form the 
nucleus of the new party. In January , 1939 , a special "initiative group'' for 
that purpose was established in Paris composed of the veterans of the interna­
tional brigades. The group was ordered to send some of its members from France 
to Poland in order to rebui ld the party . 
The third broad grouping at this time was located in the Soviet Union. 
After the disappearance of the top leaders of the CPP and the Polish officials 
of the Co11intern , the remaining subordinates were arrested and sent to prison 
camps throughout the USSR. Most of these remained in prison unti 1 the latter 
part of World War l I .  Others were freed only after the war upon the · request 
of the Polish Co--.mist authorities. 
On the eve of the War the Polish Commmist RtOvement was to all practical 
purposes nonexistent. The dissolution, coupled with the foreign policy of the 
Soviet Union , had tendnated all work. 
On Septellber 1 ,  1939, Germany invaded Poland from the West . Si xteen days 
later Soviet forces began occupying the eastern part of Poland. By September 
29 Poland was divided between the Soviet Union and Germany according to the 
secret additional protocal to the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and 
the USSR signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939. The protocal concerns the delimi-
tation of Gel'1lall and Soviet spheres of interest in Eastern Burope and reads in 
part : 
In the event of a territorial and political transfonation of the 
territories belonging to the Polish State , the spheres of interest of 
both Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of 
the rivers Narew , Vistula, and San. 
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The question whether the interests of both Parties make the main­
tenance of an independent Polish State appear desirable and how the 
frontiers of this State should be drawn can be definitely determined 
only in the course of further political dovelopaents. 
In any case both Governments will resolve this question by means of 
a friendly undentanding. l 
With the collapse of the fo!'ller Polish state , the USSR and Geraany "consider 
it as exclusively their own task to restore peace and order in these territor-
ies • • • •  " 
When the Red Aniry troops arrived in Poland on September 16-17, 1939 , 
they treated all the people they found there as Soviet citi zens subject to 
Soviet l aw .  A protest of the Polish Govern11ent sent t o  al lied and neutral 
governments on February 2 1 ,  1941, states that : 
Tile Soviet authorities acting now on the Polish territories occupied 
by -the USSR are proceeding to register the population and are forcing 
Polish citi zens , under threat of reprisals , to renounce formally their 
Polish nationality , to cease all activity aimed at the restoration of 
the independence of Poland, and to declare that they wi l l  henceforward 
consider themselves loyal citizens of the USSR, 2 
· 
Soviet forces occupying Polish territory considered the land as an extension 
of the Soviet Union. It was not looked upon by the Soviets as a 11ilitary 
occupation but as a legal take over. On March 13,  1940, in the House of 
Comaons Mr. Hannah asked the Prime Minister whether he could make any state-
ment about the present conditions in the provinces of Poland occupied by 
Russian troops . The reply came from the Under-Secretary of State for Poreign 
Affairs Mr. But ler: 
My honorable friend wi l l  appreciate that information llbout conditions 
in this area is necessarily difficult to conft r11. Such reports u have 
reached his Majesty ' s  Government indicate , however, th at ,  as a result 
1 1nstytut Historyczny imienia Generala Sikorskeigo, Documents on Polish­
Soviet Relations 1939-1945 (2 vols . ;  London : Heine•ann, 1961), DoCUMnt 3-2 , p.40. 
21bid. , DocUJ1ent 83, p . 102. 
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of the Soviet occupation, they are p,radually approximating to the con­
ditions generally prevai ling in the Soviet Union. 1 
Upon the official incorporation of these territories into the USSR in November, 
1939 , the people became subject to all Soviet laws and regulations including 
the so-called "counter-revolutionary crimes . "  Polish forces did, however, con-
tinue to resist in considerable nu'llbers . Captured Polish soldiers were treated 
as ''bandits" and "criminals ."  Edward Rozek states that: 
From Septed>er 17, 1939, to Jt.me 1941 ,  1,692 ,000 Poles , Jews , Ukrainians ,  
and Byelorussians were forcibly taken from their homes and de�orted to 
Russia. This number includes 230 .. ooo soldiers and officers of the Polish 
aray; 990 ,000 civi lians , who were deported because of their 'nationalistic 
bourgeois backgro\D'ld; ' 250 ,000 political class enemies ; 210 ,000 Poles 
conscripted into the Red Arfl1f and then sent deep into the Soviet Union , 
and 12 ,ooo other Poles gathered forcibly from the Baltic area. AJBong the 
deportees were 160,000 dhildren and adolescents .2 
Most Polish officers who became Soviet prisoners of war at this time were , as 
wi ll  be seen, either executed in Katyn Forest and elsewhere or "amnestied" 
after the Polish-Soviet Agreement was signed on July 30 .  1941. Apparently only 
the Soviet Union denied that a state of war existed between their state and 
that of the Poles .. or even that a Polish state existed. On 2 1  August 1940, the 
Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the British government ,  Mr. 
Butler, announced that : 
Since September of last year the Polish governMnt have left his Majesty ' s  
Government in no doubt that they could only regard the violation of the 
Soviet Union of the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact as placing them in 
a state of war with the Soviet Union.3 
However, a speech by Comdssar Molotov on the partition of Poland and Soviet 
foreign relations made at the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Coun-
cil of the USSR in Moscow on October 31 , 1939 .. left little doubt as to the Soviet 
lwaclaw Jedrzejewicz, Poland in the British Parliament 1939-1945 (3 vols . ;  
New York : Jozef Pilsudski Institute of America for Research in the Modern His­
tory of Poland, 1946) , pp.412-413. 
2edward J .  Rozek , Allied Wartime Diploma�: A Pattern in Poland (New York : 
John Wiley and Sons , 1958), p .46. 
lwaclaw Jedrzejewicz, Op.cit . , p .434. 
68 
position. Molotov says that : 
Everybody realizes that there can be no question of restoring old Poland. 
It i s ,  therefore , absurd to continue thy present war under the flag of 
restoration of the foTmer Polish State. 
This Geraan-Soviet partition of Poland
· 
virtually finished the CPP off as 
a politic�l force . Nad-Soviet cooperation forced the Collintem to abandon 
its plans to reestab lish the a>P on the basis of the "initi ative group . "  The 
leaders of the group left Paris for Moscow in early 1940 t� be shipped later 
to Poland. Upon their arrival in Moscow they were told that current Nad-
Soviet relations made the rebuilding of the party i lladvised. 
In the areas annexed by the USSR, Polish Comnmists were regarded with 
suspicion , hostility, or indi fference. The reestablishment of tho party was 
as yet banned. 
The CoJlUl\Dlists that had remained under Geraan occupation , and most had 
not , were treat�d little better. Although having been ostracized by the detested 
Russians , the CoJllllllD'lists were s ti l l  treated by the people as traitors to Poland 
and puppets of Russia. The official Moscow line called for a friendly neutrality 
with the Germans which only meant collaboration by the Conmn.mists . Soviet 
behavior in the former Bastem Poland only sened to further co"'otmd the 
hatred felt toward the Polish Communists. 
The situation began to change · after the defeat of Prance in the S\.lllmer 
of 1940. Moscow had been rude ly awakened by the Gennan threat. A number of 
forMr CPP meni>ers were now sent to the Comintem school at Pushkino (near Mos-
cow) where they joined the Paris contingent. Most of the rank and fi l e ,  most 
of the men who would play major roles in reconstituting the party , remained 
outside this smal l beginning made by Moscow. Relations between Polish C0111111Unists 
11nstytut Historyczny imienia Generala Sikorskeigo, Qr.cit . ,  Document 
66, p.66. 
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and Moscow were thus little better at the outbreak of German-Soviet hosti lities. 
Unti l the s wmner of 1940, former CPP ment>ers remained for the most part 
aloof from any fol'llal organizations . This was the result of the Comintem 
directive of 1938, a feeling of hopelessness and betrayal engendered by the 
Soviet actions , and the feeling of helplessness created by the general ostra­
cism of a l l  co .. tmists in Poland. 
The three most iq>ortant groups to emerge after tho defeat of France and 
the call to reestablish by the Comintem were the Union of Worker-Peasant 
Cotmci ls (Zwiazek Rad Robotniczo-0\lopskich) , The Association of Friends of 
the USSR (Stowarzysienie Przyj aciol ZSRR) , and the "Bulletin Group" (Biuletynowcy) . 
These groups a l l  operated in the Warsaw area. 
The German invasion of the Soviet Union in Jtme, 1941, meant the end of 
political isolation for the Polish Communists. 'nley would now be ignored by 
neither the German nor Soviet authorities. The imediate result of the inva­
sion was the early infiltration and elimination by the Gestapo of the Union 
of Worker-Peasant Counci ls and the Association of Friends of the USSR. The 
Bulletin Group was the sole survivor. 
Most of the Polish Co1111Unists in the Soviet part of Poland retreated with 
the Red Army before the Germans . Some. however, chose to remain in Eastern Gali­
cia, including Gomulka. Four separate groups of Polish Co11111Unists existed in 
the USSR after the GeT11an invasion : Co111 1Rmist1 and leftist intel lectuals .  many 
of whoM were enlisted into various propaganda agencies ; those Poles drafted 
into the labor batallions and attached to the Soviet Army ; those drafted for 
work in industry and agriculture ; and those assembled at the special Comintern 
school in Pushkino. AlllOng this l atter group were Paul Finder and Jakub Berman , 
Nowotko and Molojec. At a meeting between the Polish group and Dimitrov , the 
Secretary General of the Comintern, the latter announced to them that they were 
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to form a new "initiative group" which was to be the basis of the new party. 
Their immediate tuk wu to prepare a manifesto announcing the foraation of 
the Polish CoJ1111Urtist Party and its prograa. 
This new party was to be known as the Polish Workers• Party (Polska 
Partia Robotnicza, or PPR) and was to emphasize a broad anti-fascist front 
with the working class playing the leading role. 
On Decellber 27, 194 1 ,  the initi ative group was dropped in the vicinity 
of Wars aw. Yet not until the middle of 1942 wu the consolidation of the val'i -
ous CoDlll\D'\ist groups accoq>lished. 
Al1101t immediately after the Geraan invasion of the Soviet Union , Poland 
not only made peace with the USSR on July 30 , 194 1 ,  but also concluded an 
alli ance on DeceJllber 4 ,  194 1 ,  and decided to effectively cooperate with the 
... 
Soviet Union. This , of course ,  •ant that Polish so ldien and ci vi 11 llJl9 who 
had suffered for nearly 2 years at the hands of the Russian Cormnunists would 
now be fighting at their side. 
The Polish-Soviet agreement annulled the Soviet-Geraan treaties of 1939 
relating to Poland, restored mutual diploma�ic relations , and created a Polish 
Army on the territory of the USSR. A. Protocal called for the amesty of all 
Polish citi zens deprived of their freedo• on Soviet soi l .  The text of the 
agreement , which was si ped in the British Foreign Office, is as follows : 
1 .  The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub lics recognizes 
that the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 relative to territorial chU'ges 
in Poland have lost their validity. The Government of the Republic of 
Poland declare.s that Poland is not bo\md by any Agnement with any third 
State directed against the USSR. 
2 .  Diplomatic relations wil l  be restored between the two r,overnments 
upon the signature of the Agree•nt and an exchange of ad>assadors wi l l  
follow immediately. 
3. The two Governments mutually undertake to render one another aid 
and support of all kinds in the pTesent war against Hit lerl te Germany . 
4. The Govem•nt of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expresses 
its consent to the formation on the territory of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics of a Polish Army under a commander appointed by the 
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Govemment of the Repub lic of Poland, in agree•nt with the Govemment 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub lics. The Polish A.rM'f on the Terri­
tory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub lics wi l l  be subordinated in 
operational 11atters to the Supreme Comand of the USSR on which there 
will be a representative of the Polish Army. All details as to coaand. 
organization and eq>loy•nt of this force wi 11 be settled in a subsequent 
Agreement . 
In a Protocol it stated that : 
The govem•nt of the Union of Soviet Sodalist Republics wi 1 1  grant 
a111esty to all Polish citizens who are at present deprived of their 
freedom on the terri to11 of the USSR either as prisoners of war or on 
other adequate grounds . 
On August 1 2 ,  1941, a decree by the PresidiUll of the Supreme Counci l of the 
USSR granted this &111esty. 2 A few prisoners were released i111111ediately , such 
as Sikorsti • s  newly appointed Col8ander-in-Otief of the Polish Arrl/'f to be 
formed in the USSR, others 110re slowly, and llOSt not at al l .  A note from Am-
bassador Kot to Deputy Colllllssar Vyshinsky concerning the ineo111plete fulfil lment 
of Soviet obligations towards Polish citizens delivered on October 13, 194 1 .  
states in part that: 
The eubusy is in possession of information that there are sti 1 1  in a 
nUllber of prisons and cups thousands of Polish citizens who were not 
informed of the Agreement concluded on July 30 ,  194 1 ,  or were infonned 
that the provisions of this Agree•nt and of the Decree of the PresidiUll 
of the Supn• Council of the USSR of August 12 did not apply to th••· 3 
The note then listed nu•rous e�les of h1prisonaents within the USSR. As 
late u Decellber, 194 1 ,  similar notes were still being written. 4 
In April, 1943, Polish-Soviet relations were strained to the breaking 
point when the· GeT111n1 announced the discovery of mass graves in the forest of 
Katyn near Saolensk. The Germans clai•d that they were the bodies of 10 ,000 
Polish officers aissing since 1939 and that the Soviets had 11&Ssacred them. 
libid . ' Docu•nt 106, pp.141-142. 
2 Ibid. , Document 1 1 0 ,  p . 145. 
3 .!!?!.!· , Documnt 129 ' p . 176. 
4Ibide t Document 159' pp.232-233. 
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The Polish Govern .. nt in London i ... diately rettuested an investigation by the 
Intematlonal Red Cro1 1 .  The Soviet Govel'ftMnt broke off relations with the 
Polish Covem•nt in Bxile claimn1 that aovem•nt of "collusion with the 
Hitler aovern .. nt." On Apri l 2 1 ,  1943, the following secnt •••age was sent 
by Prellier Stalin to President Roosevel t :  
The Hitler authorities , havin1 perpetnted a 11011 trous crime against 
the Polish officers , an now stagin1 a farcical investigation , using for 
the purpote certain pro-fascist Polish ele•nts pi cked by the•elves in 
occupied Poland, where everything is under Hitler's heel and where no 
honest Pole can open hi• mouth. 
Both the Sikorski and Hitler Governments have enlisted for the 
' investi 1ation ' the aicl of the lntemational Red Cross , which .  under a 
terror real• of gallows and wholesale extend.nation of the civi l popu­
lation, is forced to take part in the investi1ation farce directed by 
Hltlero It is obvious that this ' lnvestiaation , '  which , 90reover, · is 
beln1 carried out behind the Soviet r.ovemMnt•s back . cannot enjoy the 
confidence of anyone with a sellblace of honesty. 
The fact that the anti-Soviet cupalgn hu been started simultane­
ously in the Gena and Polish press and fol10W9 identical lines 11 
indubitable evidence of contact and collulon between Hitler · - the 
Allies• enemy -- and the Sikorski Govern•nt in this hostile capal1n • •  o .  
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
For these reuons the Sovift Govern•nt hu decided to interrupt relations with that Govern•nt. 
'11le President replied on Apri 1 26 , 1943, that : 
I cannot believe that Sikorski bu in ay way whatsoever colla­
borated with th• Hit ler 1anpters . In my opinion , however. he has ernd 
in takln1 up this particular question with the Intomational Red Cross .  
Purthenon , I u inclined to think that Pri• Minister C\urchl l l  wil l  
find a way of prevallin1 uron the Polish C'.ovem•nt i n  London in the 
future to act with more cmmon aense. 2 
Meanwhile , on 25 Af'rll Coaissar Molotov had presented a note to Avbassador 
Ro.er 1everln1 relations between the Soviet and Polish aovem•nts . 3 On 
Apri 1 26 Ro.er sent a note to �tolotov statina the reuons why the Pollsh govem­
•nt refused to accept the Soviet note of April 25 severing relattons o 4 
1stalln'• Correspondence with O\urchi ll, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truaan , 
1941-1945 (LOndon :  Lawrence and Wlshart , l9S8,, bOCU11ent Ao, p .60o 
2�. , Document 81, p.61. 
ltnstytut Historyczny illienla Generala SikorskoiRo. Op� cit o ,  Document 313. 
c!lli· .  Document 316c 
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On July 2 .  1952, the United States House C01111ittee Report on the Katyn 
Mus acre found uwaniaously" that "beyond any question of reasonable doubt • 
• • • the Soviet NKVD (Peoples Comissariat of Internal Affairs) cOlllllitted the 
mass murders of the Polish officers and intellectual leaders in the Katyn 
Forest near S80lensk , Russia. "l 
It is interesting to point out that Stalin stated that the ''Hitler 
authorities • • •  perpetrated a 11e>n1trous cri• against the Polish officers ." 
This statement was ude to Roosevelt in 1943. However, on Docemer 3, 194 1 ,  
in a conversation held in the Kremlin between General Sikorski . GeneTal Anden , 
and Stalin, the following exchange took place regarding these sue officers : 
Gen. S .  : It is not up to us to supply the Sovl et Govem•n t with 
accurate lists of names of our people ; however, conplete lists are in the 
p011es1ion of the commanders of the ca11ps .  I have with • a list con­
taining the nues of approxiaately 4 ,ooo officers who were deported by 
force and who pre1.ently sti 11  re111aln in the prisons and labor camps . 
Even this list is not COllplete , since it contains only nanes which we 
were ab le to take froa •110ry. I ordered th at checks be 1111de whether 
they are in Poland, with whom we have steady contact. It has been 
proven that· not one of thea ls there, likewise as in our prisoner of 
war cups in Germany. These people are here. Not one of them has 
returned. 
Stalin : That is impossible, they have escaped. 
Gen. Anders : Where then could they escape? 
Stalin : Wel l ,  to Manchuria.2 · 
The officers were either in Russian hands , as Sikorski stated, or in Manchuria. 
u Stalin sta.ted, but not in Genan hands. Ulti111ately, of course, they were 
at rest at Katyn . 3 
With the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Polish Govern­
ment in London and the Soviet Union in January of 1942 • the way wu clear for 
lJedr1ejewicz, Op. cit. , p . 181 , quoting House Co.Uttee Report , July 2 t  1952. 
2tnstytut Historyczny hd.enia Generala Sikorskeigo , Op.cit . ,  Doc\Ulent 159 , 
pp.232-233. 
3see also : Janusz K. Zawodny , Death in the Forest : The Story of the 
Katyn Porest Massacre (University of Notre Dame Press, 1962). 
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the recreation of a Polish Comamist Party. The new party , newly designated 
the Polish Workers ' Party , was now fo\D'\ded with Marcel i  Nowotko u Secretary­
General. The party differed fJ'Oll its predecessor in the exclusion of the word 
''Collllllllist" froa its title (the word "Comaunist" had by this the become thor­
oughly discredited) and in its strongly voiced patrlotis• (the party e11phasi 1ed 
the close relationship between the strug1les for national independence and against 
socialist e xploitation) . lb-..lka and other party leaders strongly concurred 
in this attitude for reuons of conviction md also in order to disarm the sus­
picions held by uny Poles aaainst Co-.anisa. By this means they were able to 
extend the support for the party by identifying it with the 111ajor desire of the 
people , the restoration of national independence. 
In the sprin� of 1942, the party established an ar11ed organization , the 
People ' s  Guard . and beaan to carry out lhdted acts of sabotage and terror 
against the Geraan invaders . 
During March of 19 .. 3 the Union of Polish Patriots was formd in Moscow 
with the Polish writer Wanda Wasilewska as chairaan. In J\D'\e the Union held 
a congress in Moscow which was to si gni fy Polish-Soviet unity and to strengthen 
relations between the two nations . 'n\e progr .. of the Union called for liberal 
reform in Poland after the war, acknowledged the territorial claim of the 
Soviet Union in eastern Poland, and demanded as compensation new territories 
in the west fro• Germany .  
By this t i  .. the Soviet government had begun to train Polish fighting 
uni ts to cooperate with the Red Army .  The Poles were recnd ted from those 
who had been deported to the Soviet Union during the first few months of the 
war. The units were led either by Soviet officers or by hand-picked pro-Soviet 
Poles . These units were grouped into the so-cal led Berling Anry named after 
their commander General Zypunt Berling. The first. foraation which went into 
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action was called the Koscius zko Division after the Polish hero of the national 
uprising of 1794 . This technique wu in line with the nae given the new Co11-
ll\Dlist Party, the Union of Polish Patriots. The Co..unists were playing with 
the nationalistic senti•nts of the Polish people. 
A list of important post-War Conn.mist Party leaders who were associated 
with the Union of Polish Patriots and the Berling Antf includes : Jakub Beraan , 
Hilary Mine, Stanislaw Radkiewicz , Edward Ochab, Aleksander Zawadzki , Roman 
Zubrowski , and Stefan Pedrychowsld . Hiscodts observes that : 
The first two secretaries-general of the PPR, Nowotko and Pinder, who 
were parachuted into Poland to work for the Party, were also Moscow 
trained, as was Boleslaw Bierut who, in 1943, wu sent to supervise the 
pro-Soviet organization in Poland, They and their colleagues who accoa­
panied and followed them, were thoroughly indoctrinated in the Soviet 
point of view and thereafter normally looked to Moscow for orders . They 
therefore c&M to be known u "aas covi tes , "  though many of them pri yate ly 
resented the treatment they had received while in the Soviet Union .  
Occupying a contrasting pole were the so-called ''natives" or patriots who 
spent the whole of the war in Poland and had never been to the Soviet Union. 
These included Gomulka and his best-known col leagues Zenon Kliszko, Marian 
Spychalski , and Wladys lef Bienkowsk i .  I n  1939 Go111lka and his colleagues had 
sent a note to Moscow fro1t the Soviet-occupied area of Poland asking whether 
they llight not join the Polish national resistance against the Nazi invaders . 
This gesture was seen by Moscow u being clearly premature . From this period 
on Gomlka and his group reaained out of favor with Moscow. With the outbreak 
of hostilities between Genany and the Soviet Union , the group had retumed to 
German occupied Poland. Here they took part in the undergro\Dld activities of 
the Comunist movement . The "natives" were JRUch less popular with the Soviet 
authorities than the "auscovites . "  Moscow realized that they could not rely 
upon the• as they could the "11U1covites , "  but they nevertheless appreciated 
lHtscodcs , Op.cit . ,  p . 83. 
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their usefulness .  
In November of 1942 Nowotko was shot , and a year later his successor, 
Paul Finder, was captured by the Gestapo. At this time Comulk a ,  a strong 
Polish patriot in contrast to the Soviet trained Nowotko and Finder, assumed 
the post of Secretary-General of the party. Gomulka was appointed at a time 
when co111111mications between the Party Central Cammi ttee and Moscow h ad evidently 
broken down thus leaving GoJ11Ulka' s coJDrades free to choose their own secretary. 
The party now clearly stressed national independence as one of its main objec-
tives . 
On July 4 ,  1943, General Sikorski wu killed in an airp lane accident over 
Gibralter. Stanislaw Mikolaj czyk , Vice-Premier in Sikorski ' s  Cabinet and Speaker 
of the Polish Parliuent in Exile,  was appointed Pri• Minister after his name 
had been chosen for that post by the Polish underground leaden in Poland. Gen-
eral Sosnkowski replaced Sikorski as Comaander-in-Otief. O\urchi 11 said, on 
Mikolaj c1yk 1 s  first official visit to him, that : 
I will fight for the freedom of Poland. I will fight for a strong 
and independent Poland , and I ' l l never cease fi ghting for i t .  
We ' l l  have •any troti>les with them (Russia) , believe me .  But also 
believe me when I say that I ' ll always be on your side. 1 
At the Tehran Conference on OeceJllber 15,  1943, Stalin had a�ain stated 
his policies in regard to Poland. He says that : 
The Soviet Govern•ent considers the Polish GovernJnent-in-exile to 
be agents of Hitler and charges its representatives inside Poland of 
murdering partisans engaged in fighting the Nazi s .  Before the Soviet Gov­
ernment would consider reestab lishment of relations with the Polish 
Government-in-exile it must order its agents in Poland to cease fighting 
the partisans and must utilize its troops and call on the Polish people 
to fight actively against Nazi Germany . The Soviet Government , provided 
it is given the northern part of East Prussia including Konigsberg and 
Ti lsit, is willing to accept the Curzon Line , thereby returning to Poland 
those areas primari ly inhabited by Poles. Although the cl ty of Lwow is 
admittedly aore than half Poles , it is in the centre of a definitely 
lstanislaw Mikolaj czyk , The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression 
(New York � Whittlesey House, 1948), p .41 . 
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Ukrainian area and could not be returned to Poland for that reason. 
Tho Soviet Government is prepared to help Poland achieve a western 
frontier along the Oder River. I  
On January 1 ,  1944, the Soviet radio announced that meni>ers of the PPR 
had met in Warsaw and set up a National Counci l with Boles law Bierut as chair­
man of its Presidium. The object of this Co1111!lunist move was to set up a pro­
Soviet ''representative body" which could claim poll ti cal authority as the Red 
Artry "liberated" the Polish state. However. the Counci 1 was not "representa­
tive" as the Comunist controlled Presidit.111 decided what orp,anizations could 
nominate representatives and how aany they could nominate. No e lections were, 
of course, possib le. The Council was to act as a legislative body until a 
parliament could be delllocratical ly elec·ted. At this same tiae the London 
Government had just decided to set up their own Comcil of National Unity on 
Polish soil thus providing another cogent reason for the Co111111Unist •ction . 
'Mle National Hoae Counci l .  in its declaration of appointment ,  sent its greetings 
to al l allied states : 
The National Home Council as the sole democratic representative and 
expression of the wi l l  of the Polish Nation sends to al l leading organs 
of the Allied States and Nations the assurance of its resolution to 
mobilize all the forces of the nation in order to intensify the struggle 
which should accelerate the co..on victory over the s avage Hitlerite 
hords . 2 
The Lublin Committee , as the Co1.Uld l  was later to be called, was not yet offi-
cially recognized by the Soviet Government .  
By January 1 1 ,  1944, �foscow had reinterated 1 ts declaration on the que!­
tion of the Polish-Soviet frontier 81\d had again stated that the Polish Govern-
ment in exile was "incapable of establishing friendly relations with the Soviet 
union," a prerequisite to the interests of both nations . Furthermore , "the 
1Instytut Historyczny iftd.enia 09nerala Sikorskeigo, Op. cit . ,  Document 64 , 
p. 105. 
2 Ibid. , Appendix No. 2 ,  p . 644. 
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emigre Polish GovemMnt" is nisolated froa its people" and "has proved inca-
pable of organizing an active struggle against the German invaden in Poland 
itself . "1 
The ColDlci 1 of National tkli ty and the De legate P lenipotentiary in Poland 
answered the Soviet statements by asserting on January is2 that "the only law-
ful and legitimate representative of the interests of the Polish nation is the 
Polish Government in London • • • •  " The ColDlci 1 declared that all classes , ci rel es , 
political parties and aroups had rallied mder their banner "with the only excep­
tion of insignifi cant groups sponsored by the Soviets /' and that the Polish 
people, fighting the I I I  Reich while the Soviets had been in their alliance, 
would not "consent to be used as a tool for the plans advanced by the Soviets 
who, again , strive for a new partition of Poland and aim at imposing Communist 
regime on Poland. "  The provinces of Poland in the ea5t which the Soviet Union 
now wishes to dominate are the same which she had doainated through agreement 
and cooperation with Genaany and which she fonally disavowed in the Polish-
Soviet alliance of July 30 ,  1941 . ''The Polish nation • • • wi 1 1  never agree 
to new annexation of any part of Poland . tt 
The National Council on 25 January drafted a resolution to accept the 
Soviet proposals relating to the estab liih•nt of a new frontier between Poland 
and that state. The resolution was quite in order with the Soviet demands and 
reads in part : 
The declaration of the Government of the USSR proposing the settle11ent 
of the Polish-Ukrainian-Byelorussian borden by an agreement with Poland 
is accepted by the National Home Counci l in the name of the Polish nation 
as the basis of a settlement of the question of the frontien between the 
nations concemed. 3 
l tbid. , Docwnent 74, pp . 1 33-134. 
2Ibi d . , Document 78, p . 139. 
3!lli· , Appendix No. 3, p . 645. 
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On 15 February 1944 the Polish Government formally rejected the Soviet 
demands regarding the Polish frontiers and changes in the composition of the 
Polish Government : 
The Polish Govern•nt is \Dlable to accept the demand pressed by 
the USSR that they should agree to the Curzon Line as the future Polish­
Soviet boWldary . 
Personal changes in the composition of the Polish Governll8nt and 
the Supreme eo-and of the Polish A1'118d Forces cannot be made dependent 
on the deaands of a foreign State. l 
On February 16 , 1944, Stalin, in a note to Roosevelt,  again demanded a 
"radical improvement in the coaposition of the Polish Government • • • •  "2 
By February 22,  1944, Cllurchi 1 1  and the British Government had made a 
complete reversal in their collllitmonts to the Polish Govem111ent-ln-Exile 
which had been outlined most recent ly in O\urchi l l ' s  talk with Mikolaj czyk . 
Speaking before the House of Co111M>ns , Olurchi 1 1  declared his sy111pathy to the 
Polish cause and his backing of the Russians : 
Russia has the right to reusurance against future attacks from the 
West,  and we are going all the way with her to see that she gets i t ,  
not only by the miaht of her arms but by the approval and assent of the 
l.H .  
The liberation . of Poland 11ay presently be achieved by the Russian 
armies , after these armies have suffered millions of casual ties in 
breakin& the German •ilitary machine. I cannot feel that the Russian 
demand for reasurrance about her western frontiers goes beyond the limits 
of what is reasonable or just. Marshal Stalin and I also agreed upon 
the need for Poland to obtain conpensation at the expense of Gemany 
both in the north and in the west . 3  
This statement is in direct contradiction with a statement •ade by Churchill 
in the House of CoJ11110ns on the non-recognition of any teTritorial changes ef-
fected during the war on Septeni>er S ,  1940: 
llbid. , Document 100, p . 176. 
2tbid. ,  Document 104 , p . 188. 
3Poland, Official Government DoCUllents , Vol LVI , Document 62 , P . 32 1 ,  
quoted in Edward J .  Rozek, op.Cit . ,  p .206 . 
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We do not propose to recognite any tet'Titorial changes which take 
place during the war, unless they take place with the free consent 
and goodwill  of the parties concerned. l 
A note sent by Mr. Eden to Minister Zaleski on July 18 ,  194 1 ,  reinterates the 
British resolve not to recognize territorial changes during the war: 
On the occasion of the signature of the Polish-Soviet Agreeaent of 
today 's date , I desire to take the opportunity of infonain g you that, 
in conformity with the provisions of the Anglo-Polish Agreement of August 
25th, 1939 , His Majesty's  Government in the United Kingdon have entered 
into no undertakings towards the USSR which affect the relations between 
that cotmtry and Poland. I also desire to usure you that, as has been 
publicly stated by the Prime Minister, His Majesty's  Govern11ent do not 
propose to recoRJlize any tet'Titorial changes which take place during the 
war unless they take place with the free consent and good wi 1 1  of the 
parties concerned. 2  
Hitler iJ11111ediately began using Oturchill 's  February speech over the Ceman 
radio to urge the Polish Anay on the Italian front to stop fighting: "Your 
land has been delivered into Stalin 's hands by Churchi ll  • • • •  you have no place 
to which to return when the war is done. "3 Hitler was correct in stating that 
the Polish Ar7lff would not be safe within its own homeland. The Soviet authori­
ties had ordered the demise of the Hom Arrq. In a letter to Eden and the US 
Charge d' Affaires , Mikolajczyk coq>lains that he had received a telegram from 
the Commander of the Polish Underground Army which informed him that an order 
from Moscow to the Soviet partisans operating in Eastern Poland had fallen into 
his hands. This order is as fol lows : 
On the instructions of Comrade Nozenko,  all partisans are ordered 
to disarm Polish detach .. nts. 'nlo1e resisting are to be shot on the 
spot. Al l Polish underground organizations are to be exterminated and 
their leaders executed.� 
The co-ander then relates an incident in which the above orders were carried out. 
ltnstytut Historyczny illienia Generala Sikorskeigo, Op. cit. , Document 79, 
p.97. 
2�. , Document 102 , pp. 138-139.  
3stanislaw Mikolajczyk , Op.cit. , p.ss. 
41nstytut Historyczny illienia Generala Sikorskeigo, Op.cit. , DocWll8nt 81,  
p. 143. 
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In March of the , .. year, Stalin �and the Polish eaten govem•nt 
wlth th• isolated Yuaoalav Royal Govem•nt. l 
On Jm1uary 4 ,  1944, Soviet troop� crossed th• pre-War Polish-Soviet fron­
tier and in July crossed �· Curzon Line (the Soviet recognised eastern boundary) 
and i1111ediately raised the question of political authority in the liberated terri­
tory. 
Radio Mo•cow an July 2 2 ,  1944, announced that the Polish COllldttee of 
National Liberation had bHn foJ'118d in Chel• the day before. This new execu­
tive body aoved to Lublin a few d8)'s later and hence becu. known u the Lmlin 
Comd.ttee. 2 11le Co-1ttee was C0111p01ed of •lli>en from the IMlion of Polish 
Patriots , the National Counci l ,  and left-wina groups fro• other parties who were 
prepared to collaborate with the Co...,i1t1. 'nle Lublin Collmittee did not 
resellble the L"*>lin Govern•nt of 1918, tho fint revolutionary govomment of 
free Poland of course now used for ratriotic reuon1 , but the Bialystok Com-
111.ttee of 1920, which the Red ATfllf had set up under Ddenhinski when Tuhachevskl 
wu sweeping into Polando 'lbe COllalttee vu to function u a pTOvisional cahi­
net , asswdng the aanage .. nt of the nation ' s  affairs until the Polish State could 
be formally reestablished. 
That sue day the National Ho• Council decreed that the Lublin Comi ttee 
would be the sole Polish representative body and that supre• comund of all 
Polish fightin1 units were now in its hands . 3 A day after the Lablin Co1111i ttee 
had been set up ,  the followln1 note was sent by Stalin to C\urchi l l :  
Wo find ourselves confronted with the practical proble� of administra­
tion of Polish territory. We do not vant to, nor shall we , set up our 
lstalin ' s  Corres�ondence with Olurchi l l, Attlee, R�osevelt and Tru•an p 
1941-1945, Op. cit. , p. 13. 
2see Annex, Docu•nt No. 2 for the decree of the National Hom& Counci 1 ,  
July 2 1 ,  1944, appointing the Polish Colllllittee of National Llberationo 
31n1tytut Histcnyczny ildenla General• Sikorskelgo, 2J!.cit . ,  Appendix 
No. 6 ,  p . 650. 
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own adllinistration on Polish soil � for we do not wish to interfere in 
Poland's internal affairs . That is for the Poles themelves to do. 
We have therefore, seen fit to get in touch with the Polish Coamittee 
of National Liberation , recently set up by the National Counci 1 of 
Poland, which wu fomed in Warsaw at the end of last yea!', and con­
sisting of representatives of democratic parties and groups • • • •  1 
These so-called representatives of democratic parties and groups had, for 
the most part , been hand picked and trained in Stalin's own school. A memo­
randUJ12 was handed by Mi'kola)C&yk to Oturchil l  on 24 July conceming the setting 
up of the Polish COllllllittee of National Liberation in Chelm and its ul th1ato 
purposes, stressing the nature of Soviet involvement , the unrepresentative co•-
position of the Comttee , and the Co•ittee's attacks on the London govemment 
which wu declared to be a !'self-styled authority , bued on the illegal fucist 
Constitution of April ,  1935 ."  The •110randU11 goes on to say that the declare-
tion by the Colllllli.ttee that the London govemaent is "illegal" gives rise to 
the fear that the Ho• Army ,  who have fo�'1t the armies of Hi tier for S years 
thereby aiding the war effort of the United Nations , wi 11 be bTolcen up and per­
secuted. The Committee announces that it intends to put into force its own 
political , econollic, and social programme in the territo:ry occupied by Soviet 
forces , includillg reformation of the courts of justice and the citizens ' mi litia, 
and the formation of their own local administrative conmittees . The me110randum 
ends by asserting that: 
Al 1 this is happening contra:ry to the repeated assurances of Marshal 
Stalin that he desires tho restoration of an independent Poland. Such 
moves , enacted on the territo:ry of Poland, especially if the announced 
intentions of the Polish Colllllittee for National Liberation should be 
realized, constitute an attempt against the independence of Poland.3 
lstalin 's Corres�ondence with Olurchil l, Attlee, Roosevelt and Tnanan, 
1941-1945 , QP.clt. , p .  42. 
21nstytut Histo:ryczny imienia Generala Sikorskeigo, Op.cit . ,  Document 164 9 
pp.293-295. 
ltbid. 
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On July 24 the offi ci al protest of the Polish Govem•nt in London .against 
the setting up of the Polish Comittee of National Liberation wu issued. I 
General Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin wu appointed the Soviet Pleni­
potentiary to the Co-1.ttee in Lublin. On July 26, 1944 , Osoblta-Marawski 
signed an agreement with the Soviet Govemment in Moscow by which the Soviet 
Union recognized the Lublin Conai ttee. The Soviet Co11111ander-in-Chief was 
given wide powers on Polish territory so long as mi litary operations continued. 
That same day Molotov stated that : 
1he Soviet Govern11ent does not intend , to establish its own adainistrative 
bodies in the territory of Poland, considering this to be the affair of 
the Polish peop le. It has decided in view of this to conclude with the 
Polish Colllldttee of National Liberation an Agreement on relations between 
the Soviet Co!lllland and the Polish Administration. 
The Soviet Government s t ates that it does not pursue the aia of 
acquiring any part of Polish territory or of chan1ing the social order 
in Poland, • •  , 2 
The London Government again protested but to no avai l .  As the Soviet 
Army drove the Germans to the wes t ,  the Comaunist controlled Lublin Collllittee 
and National Home Counci l ,  the only two Polish authorities recogni zed by the 
Soviet Govemment ,  fi lled the politi cal vacuwn. 
On 31 July Mikolaj czyk arrived in Moscow at Stalin's invitationo He 
was received by Molotov and curtly told that he should see the Lublin represen-
tatives as Stalin was bU5y. Mikolaj czyk declined saying these representatives 
should not be excluded from the talks but that he preferred to see Stalin first. 
While he waited the Warsaw rising began on August 1.  
The Polish Local Home Arsy commander had been told by the London authori-
ties to aive assistance to the Soviet Anry in its advance across Poland. It 
often happened, however, that such assistance ended in Soviet forces disaning 
the Polish underground troops and giving them two alternatives , j oin the Herling 
ltbld. , Document 165, p . 296. 
21bid. , DoCW11ent 170. p . 30 1 .  
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Arur:t , or be iq>risoned (1181\y officers were shot) . In September the London 
Govemment estimated that 21 ,000 Mn had been arrested in this way (the worst 
example of Soviet duplicity , however, was to occur in connection with the 
Warsaw rising) . On Augus t 3 ,  prior to seeing Stalin , Mikolajczyk received 
the f�l lowing telegram froa his deputy in London : 
'nle latest reports from Poland describe the attitude to our �dergro\D'id 
Anti/ as fol lows : 
1 .  Everything east of the Curzon Line and the river San is treated as 
an organic part of the �SR. Our units of the Underground Arrtrf located 
in these areas are faced with two alternatives : 
(1) co..,lete disaTnd.ng, 
(2) inclusion into the Berling Array . I  
'nle Soviet authorities , throughout the war, had accused the Home Anq, 
which was loyal to the Govem•nt-in-E xi l e ,  of fai lure to resist the Nazis. 2 
On July 29 and 30 ,  1944, the Moscow radio station JCosci us zko broadcast an 
appeal to· Wars• to rise in _ arm against the Nazi s .  3 On Aupt 2 ,  1944, the 
forces of the Ho• Arfl/ rose against the Nazi s .  The decision was made on an 
estimation of the Soviet-German front,. the abi lity of the Genans to quell such 
an uprising, and the positive te1111per of the people of the city. 
A few days after the Hom Arm'f rose in revolt in Wars aw ,  the Red Artflf 
ceued military operations on the outskirts of the city. On August S a dispatch 
froa the delegate of the Govemaent and the O\airun of the Counci l of National 
Unity was sent to Mikolaj czyk infond.n1t him of the cessation of military opera­
tions by Soviet troops on the Warsaw front. 4 Mikolajczyk immedi ately sent a 
letter to Stalin requesting assistance for the people of �ars aw .  On August 16 
Stalin sent a telegram to Mikolaj czyk refusing any assistance , remarking that : 
lPoland, Official Govemment Documents , Telegram No. C ,  Vol. VII •  Document 
16 .. quoted in Rozek, op. cit . ..  pp .236-237. 
2see Moscow Declaration of January 1 1 ,  1944, above . 
lfor the text of the appeal see Andrzej Pond.an .. The Warsaw Rising (London � 
1943) , p. vii. 
41nstytut Histot')'czny imienia Generala Sikorskeigo, Op.cit . ,  Document 184 0 
p . 324e 
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'lbw Warsaw action, which had been started without the Soviet Co111111and's 
knowledge and without any contact with i t ,  is a reckless adventure causing 
use less victi• uong the inhabitants • • • •  
In view of the foregoing the Soviet Co11JD&nd decided openly to dis­
claia any responsibility for �e Warsaw adventure because it wst not 
and cannot assUM responsibility for the Warsaw affairo 1 
Of course Stalin 's telegram is in direct contrast with the continuous broadcasts 
issued from Moscow calling on the population of Poland to drop all caution and 
to start a general rising against the Geraans. The broadcasts of 29 and 30 
July had exhorted the population of Warsaw to rise iD111ediately u "the hour 
of action bu already arrived . "  On the 20th of August Roosevelt and Churchill 
demanded that Stalin assist in the Home Army's struggles in Warsaw. On 22 August 
Stalin refused, sayina that : 
Sooner or later the truth about the handful of powerseeldng criminals 
vho lamched the Warsaw adventure wi l l  out. Those elements , playing 
on the credulity of the inhabitants of Warsaw, exposed practically 
unarmed people to Geraan guns , anour and airCTaft. The result is a situ­
ation in which evety day is used, not by the Poles for freeing Wars aw ,  
but by the Hit lerites, who are cruel ly ex�ndnating the civil population. 2 
Meanwhile, the Soviet authorities continued their liquidation of the units 
of the Ho• Arsy and organs of the Polish adllinistratlon who had come· out of 
hiding. A note fro11 Cot.mt Raczynski to Mr. Bden on August 24 gives the follow­
ing examples : 
15 . 3. 1944 Volhynia: Soviets have disarmed our outpost in Pr1ebra1e . 
12 ka. north-eut of Kiwerce . Part of the aen were arrested. Others 
were shot. On the 9th of March in Rozys &cu the Coaander of the HoM 
Arwy Unit and 3 •n were shot, 20 were arrested and taken to Luck where 
several were h1nged. 
19. 7 . 1944 After a friendly meeting on 15 . 7. between the Connander of 
the Wilno region of the Polish Home Arwt and General O\emyakhovsky 
Soviet Co•ander of the White Russian front, the Soviet authroities acting 
tmder fal1e pretences arrested the 17 Jtme Polish Ho• Army's staffs of 
the regions of Wi lno and Nowogrodek . 
11bid. , Document 198, pp. 346-347. 
2tbid. , Document 205 , p . 356. 
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12 .8. 1944. All throughout the country arrests and disandng of the 
Home Arsy soldiers by the Soviets under false pretences e Arrests cover 
the districts of Wilno, Lwow, Lublin, Nowogrof8k ad Biala Polluka. 
60 officers were arrested in Lwow on July 31. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
On the sue day the Polish Comd.ttee of National Liberation issued a 
. 
decree , aimed at the Ho• Anly, dissolving all secret military oraanizations 
on the territory liberated fro• the Geraans .  The decree was siped by Bierut , 
Osabka-Morawski , ad General Rola-Zymierski. 2 
On the l.tth of October, Mikolajczyk·, analydng the situation which con .. 
fronted the Polish Govemment in London, stated that "the Polish Govemment is 
eipected to cOlllit suicide of its own volition ."3 The Tehran decisions changing 
Poland' s. eutem frontier were taken "without the knowledge and consultation 
of the Polish Govem•nt. "  The Soviet govem•nt has brought into being the 
Polish Coard ttee of National 1,ib•ration which is a "de facto" rival of the 
Polish Govem•nt. The prerogatives taken by this Comdttee require so• font 
of lesalization. It ls thus expected that the legiti•ate Polish Govem111ent 
should fuse with th• rival Polish Govemment created by the Soviets. Of course, 
this would mean the legalization of the"Soviet Govem•nt •s \mi lateral decision 
of investina Soviet agents with powers of a Polish Govem•nt," the approval 
of the •faits acco11plis" created by the Soviet Govem•nt , the ratification of 
0a11 activities of the Comdttee in Poland, including arrests and deportations ,"  
and "the loss of  Poland's eastern provinces" ad "the efface•nt of  independence 
in the reaainder of Polad."  
On 27  Deceld>er 1944 in a note to Roosevelt , Stalin again voiced his praises 
of the Polish National Collld.ttee clailling that the Conmittee's policies and 
l�. ,  Document 207, pp.357-358. 
2tbid. , Appendix No. 9 ,  p.654. 
3tbid . ,  Docwaent 238, pp • .tlS-416. 
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achievements had "led to" the "consolidation of democratic powers of Poland 
and to powerful strengthening of authority of the National Comittee among 
the wide 11U1es in Poland and amng wide social Polish circles abroad. 111 On 
31 December the National Ho• Council sitting in Moscow, believing the capture 
of Warsaw to be i-anent, transfol'llOd its Polish Collllittee of National Libera­
tion sitting in Lublin into the Provisional Govem•nt of Poland. The new 
provisional govem•nt was dolli.nated by the Workers ' Party which had been 
formed by the Coudntem during the winter of 1941-1942. Those belonging to 
other parties in the new govem•nt came fro• left-wing groups which were pre­
pared to col laborate with the Co111111Jnists. It consisted officially of five 111ed:>ers 
of the Socialist and Peasant Parties , four aenbers froa the Workers ' Party , two 
meabers from the Democrat Party , and one ''non-party" anty general .  The offi cials 
of the govemment included the followina: Bierut (Chairman of the Conmd.ttee of 
National Unity) , te�orary President of liberated Poland; Osobka-Morawski (Head 
of the National Liberation Collllittee) Preaier and Foreign Minister; Wladyslaw 
Go11Ulka (Secretary General of the Polish Workers ' Party) First Deputy Prime Minis­
ter; Stanislaw Janusz (Vice-Olairman of the Peesant Party) Second Deputy Prime 
Minister; General Rola-Zyaierski , Minister of National Defense and Commander-in­
Otief; Jozef Maslanka (leader of the Peasant Party) Minister for Home Affairs ;  
Stanislaw Radkiewicz (Workers ' Party) Minister of Public Security; Konstanty 
Kollbrowski (Socialist Party) Minister of Finance ; Ednmd Zalewski , Minister of 
Justice; Edward Bertold (Peasant Party) Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian 
Reform; Wiktor Trojanowski (Socialist Party) Minister of Public Works ; Stefan 
Matuszewski (Secretary General of the Socialist Party) Minister of Inforaation. 
Moscow had already given the National Liberation CoJlllllittee de facto 
lRobert v. Daniels , Op. cit. , p . 1 36 .  
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authority in the liberated areas of Poland, and now Stalin recognized the new 
Provisional Government (5 Jan 45) . The United States and Great Britain' con-
tinued to recognize the London Govern11ent. Theoreti cally Poland now had two 
governments , one sitting in London and one in Lublin. 
On January 6, 1945, the Polish Govem•nt in London issued a protest 
declaring that : 
'nle official recognition by the l5SR of a Soviet-sponsored Provisional 
Government in Lublin constitutes a direct violation of the fundamental 
right of the Polish nation to possess a genuinely independent State. 
free from foreign intervention, and an infringement of the untramelled 
right of the Polish people to organize their intemal existence as they 
see fit. l 
On January 17, 1945, the Soviet !ort!tf captured Warsaw and . two days later , 
the new Provisional Govem11ent J10ved froJll l,ublin to Warsaw thus acquiring the 
prestige attached to the capital city. 
In February Roosevelt , Churchil l ,  and Stalin met at Yalta. Negotiations 
on Poland were held while the military situation favored Stalin. His armies 
had occupied most of the territory to be discussed at the conference and were 
rapidly moving forward , while the allies had been halted by a German offensive 
in the west. Churchi ll and Roosevelt were also in a compromising mood as they 
desired to have Stalin join the war against Japan. Stalin. on the other hand. 
was now standing firm on all issues of vital t._.,ortance to the Soviet Union. 2 
At 'Teheran RoOS'evelt and Churchi ll had implicitly agreed to Stalin ' s  
setting of the eastern frontier of Poland at the Curzon Line. By conceding 
this ,  they had hoped to ensure Polish freedom to elect the government of their 
choice. However, Stalin was to win a major victory. The Western powers were 
11nstytut Historyc&ny ildenia Generala Sikorskeigo, Op. cit . ,  poct.Unent 294. 
2eyrtl Black writes that the "chief concern of the American and British 
statesmen regarding Eastern Europe wa.s to negotiate a compromise which would 
acknowledge the basic Russian security requirell9nts without formally recognising 
a Russian sphere of influence. James F. Byrnes later expressed it this way :  
' I t  was not a question o f  what we would let the Russians do , but what we could 
get the Russians to do. "' from "Soviet Policy in Ea.stern Europe ," Annals of the 
American Academy of Political Science , CCLXI I I �  p . lSSo 
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prepared to recognize the claims of both the London and the Provisional fD\'ern-
ment of National Unity as long 85 a free election of a new and derocrat i c  Polish 
Government was guaranteed. These demands , however, df!generated into an accep-
tanceof the existing provisional government "recognized on a hroader democratic 
basis with the inclusion of de•ocrati c leaders from Poland itself and from 
Poles abroad. 1 1 1 This new provisional govern•nt was to hold, "as soon as pos-
sible," 0free and unfettered e lections" on the basis of "uni venal suffrage and 
secret ballot" in which .,all de11ocrati c  and anti-Nazi parties should have the 
right to participate .112 Of course the London Government played no part in these 
negotiations .and no role was assigned to i t  in the formation of this reorgani-
zation of the provisional government into one "more broadly based. "  
On February 7, 1945 , Molotov proposed to the conference in regards to 
Poland that the "Eastern frontier of Poland" with minor digressions should be 
the "line of Curzon ," that "some democratic leaders from Polish emigre circles" 
should be added to the Provisional Polish Government . that the said government , 
so enlarged ,  "should · as soon as possible call the population of Poland to the 
polls for organization by· general voting of per11anent organs of the Polish 
Government.''  anJ that Molotov. Harriman , and Kerr. "should be entrusted with 
the discussion of the question of enlarging the Provisional Polish Government • • • •  0 1 3 
After a meeting of these ministers a cOlmlUJ\ique was drafted and agreed upon by 
all present and issued on FebruaTy 1 1 ,  1945 , in whi ch the demands mentioned above 
were initiated. 4 The means employed at the confeirence were in keeping with those 
11nstytut Historyczny iaienia Generala Sikorskeigo, gp. cit . ,  Document 308, 
pp.520-52 1 .  
2Philip E .  Mosely very aptly documents the Soviet definition o f  democracy 
in "Across the Green Table From Stalin ," Current History (1948) Vol XV, p . 1 3 1 :  
"It was Mr. Vyshinsky , however, who presented the classic Soviet syl logism on 
the definition of ' democracy . '  'Tilat party ,'  he said on one occasion , ' is most 
democratic which fights most strongly against Fascism; the Co1JIJl1UTlist party is 
the most WlCompromising opponent <?f Fas cism; therefore it is the most democratic 
party . '  At Yalta and Potsdam Marshal Stalin showed no mislDlderstanding of such 
terms as ' free elections ' and ' representative government ' and was quite w i l ling 
to use them in the Western sense .  
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outlined by Litvinov to Hopkins in March , 1943, when discus�ing the future of 
Poland and its post-War frontiers. Li tvinov 11fe 1 t that Great Britain and the 
United States should decide what was to be done about Poland and 'tell them' 
rather than ask them. 115 
On February 13,  1945, the Polish Government in Exile deno'Wlced the resolu-
tions adopted by the Big Three at the Crimea Conference : 
The intention of the Three Powers to create a 'Provisional Polish Govern­
ment of National Unity' by enlarging the foreign appointed Lublin Committee 
with persona vaguely described as ' democratic  leaders fro� Poland itself 
and Poles abroad' can only legalize Soviet interference in Polish internal 
affain .  As long as the territory of Poland will  re111ain under the sole · 
occupation of Soviet troops . a Government of that kind will  not safeguard 
the Polish nation even in the presence of the Bri thh and American diplo­
Jnats the \D'lfettered right of free expression. 6 
Roosevelt and Churchill  saw the Yalta agreement as the best possible settle-
ment which ,  when executed, would mean Poland's  freedom and independence . Moscow 
interpreted the settlement to mean that the creation of the new Government would 
Soviet attacks upon 'political democracy• or 'nU111erical democracy' becatne collU!lon­
place only at a later time, when the Western Powen persisted in reminding the 
Soviet govemment of the specific prOllises aade at Yalta." 
31nstytut Hi1toryc1ny illienia General& Sikorskeigo, 0p.cit . ,  Document 306, 
pp .518-519. . 
4� • •  DocU111ent 308, pp.521-522. 
SRobert E. Sherwood , Roosevelt and Ho kins ; (New York . 
1948) , p . 713. It is interest ng to note at nne ate y o ow ng t e Yalta 
conference the three powers issued a "Declaration on Liberated Europe'' which 
ended by declaring that "By this declaration we reaffirm our fai th in the prin­
ciples of the Atlantic Charter, our p ledge in the declaration by the United 
Nations , and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving 
nations world order tmder l aw ,  dedicated to peace , security, freedom and general 
well-being of all mankind. "  in U. s .  Department of State , Foreign Relations . The 
Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington: U. S.  Government Printing �  
Office , 1955) , pp .977-978. 
61n1tytut Historyczny imienia Generala SiJcorskeigo, Op.cit • •  Document 309 , 
p.  521. 
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be only a slight expansion of the Lublin C'..ovemmento This is quite evident in 
a letter from Stalin to Roosevelt in which Stalin censures the activity of the 
Anglo-American representatives in the co .. ission for Polish Affairs and states 
that the reorganization of the Provisional Polish Govemmnt should be reduced 
to the addition of only a very few new 11embers : "As to the ratio of old and 
new Ministers in the Government of National Unity , it Id ght be established 
more or less on the saae lines as was done in the case of the Yugos lav Govem­
ment. 111 The precedent Stalin 111entions is the Yalta compromse between Marshal 
Tito and Premer Subasic which set the proportion of strength in the Yugoslav 
Govemment as 25 : 3 in favor of the Co•unists . 
On January 19 , 1945 , the co1111ander of the Hoae Anrtf had ordered that 
that organization dissolve itself because of the hostile attitude of Soviet 
authorities towards undergro\D1d Poland. In a telegru fJ'Oll Premier Arciszewski 
to Cllurchil l the fomer appealed for intervention in favor of the persecuted 
soldiers and 11tnllbers of the Polish underground.  2 On March 8 ,  1945 , Church! 1 1  
received a letter fraai Premier Arciszewski giving evidence o f  the Soviet tac­
tics used in Poland. The following are only a few : 
January 22, 1945 , Cracow Province : • • •  The Couand of Berling' s army is 
strictly controlled by the NlVD. According to a state•nt 11ade by one 
of Berling's officers , about 70 percent of the soldiers are in favour 
of the Government in London . 
February 1 ,  1945 , Cracow Province :  The Soviet •i li tary authorities take 
no accolmt of the Lublin ColllJllittee and act independently. The Lublin 
ColUd.ttee slavishly comply with all their demands . A visa from the Soviet 
ubusador and the pet'llission of the People's Coaissariat of Foreign 
Affairs is necessary in order to travel to Lwow, • • •  
February 1 4 ,  1945 , Wars• Province: Public security is lmder the direction 
of Radkiewicz , who ls dependent on the NKVD and not on the Lub lin Comittee. 
The ld.litia in the vi l lages is similarly situated. The Polish Workers ' 
Party is· controlled by the NKVD and used for political investi gations • • • •  
ltbid. ,  Document 335 , p.561, 
2tbid . ,  Docu•nt 304 , pp .516-517, 
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Februaiy 20. 1945. Radom Di.,trict: The NKVO is taking 1ystematic steps 
to dis�over the whole organization of the Ho11e Arst/ and to arrest its 
meJtb"n o ,, • ,, 
March 1 ,  1945. Bialystok Provi"�� :  • • •  nie NKVD often •work ' in the uni· 
form of Polish officers� Spies and collaborators with the Gestapo were 
at first arn1ted by the NKVD-- later. however, they were set fne and 
the NKVD employed thea as their own sples • •  � . 1 . 
On March 10 the delegate of the London Government in Warsaw sent a dia., 
patch to Premier Arciszewski concemlng the arrests of important Polish political 
leaders. 2 
By the first of Apri l ,  Stalin 's treat•nt of the Yalta ncomendations 
had become well known by the British Govem11ent. In a letter from Olurchil 1 
to Stalin the fo1'1Der states that: 
We also have learned with �urprise and reRret that M. Molotov's 
spontaneous offer to allow obaorven or llisaions to enter Poland has 
now been wl thdrawn o We are therefore deprived of all •ans of' checking 
for ourselves the lnfonation ,  often of a •ott aplnful charactei-, which 
is sent us almost dally by the Polish r.ovem11ent in London. We do not 
understand why a veil of aecncy should thus be drawn over the Polish 
scene. We offer the fullest faci lities to the Soviet Government to 
send lllaaions or individuals to vlait any of the territories in our •ill· 
tary occupation • • •  o 3 
Stalin had drawn "a veil of secrecy • • •  over the Polish scene... Ho had inter-
preted Yalta as giving h1a a free hand ln Poland. The Soviet Union treated 
Polish territory as a land of conquest to be exploited and 1ovemed by any 
al'bitrary mans Moscow ·IUaht deem appl'Opri ate. On April S Count Raczynski 
submitted the following 111es1a1e ncetved from the reJrion of Bialystok on 15 
March 1945 : 
Unheard of m.arders, raping of women, shooting at random at people 
on the roads for the joy of 1 t .  
All able-bodied 11en and wonen are being deported eastwards for 
forced labour. 'nle NlVD and the Lublin Gowm•nt are arresting soldien 
of the Home Arwy and their fud lies and are subjecting them to bestial 
cro11-ex .. inatlons. 
Local offices of the Lublin Government aTe staffed either by the 
libid. , Documnt 319, pp�S36-S4 1 .  
2�. ,  DocUDMtnt 322, p.5430 
3tbid� i Document 332 , pp . 555-556.  
93 
NKVD or by pro-Soviet eleraents . 
The population naains faithful to the Govenunent in London and 
begs for Allied intervention • • • •  1 
The real nature of Stalin's 11ethods and the helplessness of the West 
was overt ly shown shortly after the Yalta Conference. At this time officers 
of the Red Ar'lllf made contact with •Jllbers of the main Polish resistance 11e>ve­
ment. The leaders were invited to take part in negotiations to coordinate 
the activities of the Soviet forces and the national resistance movement during 
the last phases of the campaign. Sixteen leaders of the Polish underground were 
flown to Moscow with a guarantee of personal security to meet Stalin. However, 
the leaders were thrown into prison, given a pti>lic trial for cri•s against 
the Soviet Antf , and 12 were given prison te1'119 from 4 months to 10 years . 'nlis , 
of course ,  •ant that some of Poland's leading non-Communist leaders were rel'IOved 
from the political scene during a critical 111011ent, Those arrested included tho 
fol lowing:  the Vice Premier of the Polish Govem•nt, Jan Jankowski (Labor 
Party) ; three Ministers of the Polish Government , pennanently in Poland , Adam 
Bien (Peasant Party) , Stanislaw Jasuikowici (National Democrati c Party) . and 
Antoni Pajdak (Socialist Party) ; the Comander of the former Ho• Anrf ,  General 
Leopold Okulicki ; the Chairman of the secret Polish Parliament,  known as the 
Counci l of National Unity , Kazilderz Pu1ak (Socialist Party) ; eight mellbers of 
the chief political parties in Poland, as follows : Stanislaw Mierzwa (Peasant 
Party) , Kazillierz Baginski (Peasant Party) , Josef Olacinski (Labor Party) , 
Franuzek Urbanski (Labor Party) , Zbigniew Stypulkowski (National De11e>cratic 
Party) , Ka1ilderz Kobylanski (National Democratic Party) , Piotr Czemlk (National 
Deaocratic Party) , and Michalowski (National De11<>cratic Party) . 'nle Soviet 
eJCplanation of the disappearance and arrest of the political leaders of Poland 
ltbid. , Document 334, p.559. 
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appeared in a TASS comunique of May S :  
General Okuli cki ' s  group , and in the first place General Olculicki 
hi111elf, are accused of preparing and co1111.i tting wrecking acts in the 
rear of the Red Army , which resulted in over 100 Red Anty off'icers and 
men losing their lives . This group of 16 persons did not 'disappear , '  
but was arrested by mi litary authorities of the Soviet front and i s  \D\der 
ex&llination in Moscow. 
This aroup is also accused of organillng and aaintaining i l legal 
wireless transai tting stations in the rear of the Soviet troops ,  which 
is punishable by llw. All these persons or soJRe of the11, depending on 
the results of the investigation , wi l l  be collllldtted for trial. l 
On Apri l 22 , 1945 , Stalin and Bierut signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutu-
al Assistance , and Post-War Cooperation .  This , of course , was in direct violation 
of the Yalta agreement stating that the Lublin Government was only provisional. 
Stalin had put his official stuip of penanence on that organi zation. The 
Polish Government in London i111Dediately issued a protest but to no avai t o2 
On April 28 Olurchi ll sent a letter to Stalin saying that it woulcf be 
impossible to recognize a Polish Government deprived of independence . Churchi ll 
warned against dividing the world into two antagonistic caaps. In reply to 
Olurchi ll on May 4 , Stalin said that: 
As regards Poland, it is her being a neighbour of the Soviet Union that 
llakes it essential for a future Polish Government to seek in practice 
friendly relations between Poland and the USSR, which is also in the 
interests of the other freedom- loving nations. • • •  we insist, and shall 
continue to insist, that only people who have demonstrated by deeds their 
friendly attitud4p- to the Soviet Union , who are wil ling honestly and sin­
cerely to cooperate with the Soviet stato , should be consulted on the 
formation of a future Polish Govem11ent . 3 
Possibly Stalin was not cogni zant of the autonomy of nations and their theo­
retical immunity from foreign dictates . In fact , Stalin was insisting on 
imposing his own poll ti cal syste11 on another state, thereby precluding any 
consultation on the fonaation of a future Polish state by those professing 
l tbid. , Document 352, pp .587-588. 
2.!E.!!· ,  Docwnent 346, p .574. 
ltbid. ,  Docwaent 350, pp.584-585. 
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nnd practi cing <le�ocrati c principlcs . l  His statement to Milovan Djilas explains 
sufficiently Soviet behavior: 
111is war h not as in tho pas t ;  whoever occupies a territory ahc• 
imposes on it his own social sys tea. Everyone im11oses his own sp:t�,., 
as far as the army has power to do .  I t cannot be otherwise. 
On June 12 , 1945, th� Co&amissi on authorized by the Cri�ea Conference � as  
invited to �1oscow for consultation on the fol'llntion of n Poli sh Provi 5 i onn1 
Government of National Unity based on the fol lowing individuals :  Reprc�et:tati \'es 
of the Polish Provi•ional Government accol"ding to information recei vc<! froP Her· 
saw, Boles law Bierut, Edward Osobka-Morawski ,  Wladys l a.w  Kowalski , and Wl �dy$l6w 
G0111ulka have beon appointed representatives of the Polish Provisional r.ovcYnment ;  
l)omocratic leaders from Poland, Wincenty Witos , Zygmunt Zul awski , Stani � l aw 
Kutrzeba ,  Adam Krzyzanawski . and Henryk Koloddejski ; Oo111ocratic leaders f't'ot� 
abroad. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk• Jan Stanc&yk , and .Julian Zakowski . 
The Policy of the Soviet Union in reaard to Poland anc.l the fonation of 
this new govem11ent wu clearly 111ade by lleputy Premer GoauU:a on June 18 at 
a r:teoting of the Polish delegates called in connection with the establishmor.t 
of this ROVemment: "We sh al 1 never give up the power. 112 
The new government was for1ted on June 28. It included 21 mini sters . 1 6  
of whom had been members of the Lublin Colllllittee or the previ ous provi s i onnl 
government . The sod alist Osobka-Mo�awski re11ained Premier, tl ladys law Cor.iulbi. 
became the First Deputy Premier. and Stanislaw Mikol aj czyk became S�cond De�uty 
Premier and �tinister of Agriculture and Land Reform. Of the five ne"' mini�ters . 
only Mikolaj czyk , a me11her of the Peasant Party . was detemined to res h t .  TI•L' 
other �inisters either put up no effective resistance or were reAdy to cor.cromise 
with the Co11111uni1ts. The �hole of Polish people were not represented b y  tnt� 
1 In a report from Avc- re l l  Berrl111an to Presi clent �<>c�twf' lt sent �n n.:•-:-!roer 
30 ,  1944, Harriaan stated that the Soviets in Poland and . throughout Eastern 
Europe wcro ·•e!fll�loyinJ.: the w i dtr verlotr r.>f ooens nt their df.!::!1o� r. !  • ·· c-cc:JP�tion 
government. 
By July 6 both Great l'lri tain ond the United St ates had rer.or.ni zoc! thr 
new Polish Provisional Govomment .  At the Potsda. Conferenc" on July 1 7 ,  
the USS R ,  Great aritain , and the United States announced that the Polish coH rn­
ment in London had "ceased to exist . .. 3 Thu.� ended by fiat from abroad wh at 
Hit ler and Stalin had hegun in Septelli>er 1939 .  A l l  that remained wa� Mr. 
Eden ' s  declaration in the House of COlllllons 1nade on June 24 , 194 1 :  
Thon ls one reference I wou l d  ask the Hou!u� to let 111e 111ak(\. At 
a time like this our thoughts go out with heart-felt sy111pathy to our 
Polish Ally. Once agai n ,  their soil is a battlefield. Once -a£a1n th�i r  
people suffer for no fault of their own .  The Polish people have ha<� a 
hard history. By their courage in a ti11e of unparal leled ordeal , they 
have earned and they wi 1 1  redeem their freed01n . That remo.i ns ouT r ledge. 4 
troops , secret police, local cOllURUnltt parties , labor uni ons , sympathetic 
leftist organi zations , sponsored cultural societie� , and econo•i c pres�ure 
to assure the establishJtent of 1"0li11e� which • • • actually depend for their 
existence on groups responsi ve to all suggestions enianating from tho Kreml i n . ' '  
T•l•aru of Oec.llber 30 ,  1944 , u .  s. DepartMnt o f  State , Foreign Relations , 
Tile Conferences nt Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washinnton : U .  S .  C'.ovemsnent Prlr.t­
lna ollice ,  1§5�); p.224. 
21nstytut Uistorycmy hdenia Gonorala Sikonkeigo. Op. ci t .  , Noto 362 , 
p . 60 1 .  
3111scocks ,  Op. cit . ,  p .9 3 .  
41nstytut Uis·toTyczny hdenia General a Si korskel go , Op. ci t . ,  Document 97, 
p . 1 12 . 
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 
AS RELATED TO YUGOSLAVIA ANO POLAND 
The victories of " liberation" won by the Soviet andes in Eastern Europe 
during 1944-1945 represented the beginning of a new order in that area. The 
Yalta and Potsdu mandates were carried to these areas at the point of a gun .  
Alexander Dallin writes that "the Soviet empire was established , in 1944-1945 , 
at the point of Russian bayonettes and in the wake of Russian tanks . ul And 
Michael Plorinsky says that "the basic factor in establishing Soviet dominion 
over Eastern Hurope was mi 11 tary occupation . 112 
The mininiu� wartinte Soviet expectations grew as the battlefields shi fted 
westward. Orders to Polish and Yugosl av Communists to aake themselves insepar-
able parts of the post-War political structure , to form popular fronts . was 
the very minim� the Soviets originally expected. However, this gradually 
changed to the maximtn warti.e expectations created by the fait accomplis of 
the Red Al'IR)'. Polish and Yugosl av Comm\D'lists now ceased being mere candidates 
for partnerships in post-War govem11ents and bee&11e the ent>ryos for such govern-
Mnts . 
There are a number of motives in this change in Soviet foreign policy. 
First, the reborn and rejuvenated Russian nationalism beginning in the middle 
) 
j 
1930 ' s  and emphasi zed during the war coup led with the COftUlllD\ist Messianic 
spirit presented Moscow with the ideal of covering the entire globe with Soviet· 
like regi11es . Second, the economc reconstruction of the war·tom Russian state 
lAtexander Dallin, "Soviet Policy Toward Bastem Europe ," Joumal of 
International Affairs , XI , i ,  p.48. 
2Michael T. Florinsky, usoviet Expansion," Current Histo!Y, XXVI , p . 323. 
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necessitated the subordination of the economies of Central and Eastern Europe 
to the Soviet economic syste11. And third, opportunism and political power pre­
sented themselves to the Collm.IJlists . Louis Fischer writes that "Opportunity 
knocked at the Kremlin gate , the opportunity to extend Russia's  power. The 
te11ptation was to great to resist. ttl Opportunisa presented no problems coupled 
with Co1U11Jnist ideology. Oscar Jaszi pointed out as early as 1944 that: 
The new Russian ruling class is the exponent of the llOSt unlimited 
raison d ' etat theory: the end sanctifies the means • . No ideologic 
reservations or moral scruples wil l  restrain Stalin front a course which 
he regards as of vital interest to the Soviet State. 
Isaac Deutscher says that Stalin ' s  interest in Eastem Europe in 1945 
was sti l l  pri11arily strategic and econOllic. Only later when opportmlity 
knocked would ideological consideration take on an added impetus. 3 This explains 
Stalin ' s  annoyance over Tito's left-wing deterwdnation to fo1'111 an exclusively 
Corm1nmist Government and to proclaim Yugoslavia iamediately as a Coftllftuni!'t State. 
The political situation with the West was as yet not opportune. Furthermore , 
these actions lessened Yugoslavia's economi c contribution to the Soviet Union 
while increasing her political independence. Deutscher says of Stalin ' s  attitude 
of 1945 : 
He was approaching the proble• of the Russian zone of influence in a 
manner calcul ated to 1ati1fy nationalist Russian demands and aspirations 
and to wreck the chances of conunist revolution in those terri torles . 
He prepared to exact and did in fact exact heavy reparation s .  4 
lLouis Fischer, 'llte Great Challenge (New York : Duel l ,  Sl oan and Pearce , 
1946) , p . 188. 
• J 
2oscar Jaszi , "Central Europe and Russia," Journal of Central European 
Affairs , V, p . 1 1 .  
3zbi gn�ew K .  Brzezinski in The Soviet Bloc, Unity and Conflict (Cambridge : 
Harvard University Press) lists five major areas of SoViet interest during the 
war and isatnediately after which determined Soviet policy: to insure Russian 
security by eurting influence over the lands immediately west of the Russian 
frontier, thereby denying the area to Germany; to insure that Eastem Europe 
would not be controlled by domestic elelllOnts whi ch ,  while hostile to Genany , 
would also be hostile to the Soviet Union ; to exploit the area for purposes of 
Soviet economic recovery ; to deny the area to the capitalist world, the potential 
enemy of the USSR; and to begin a Communist ideological offensive into the are•. 
41saac Deutscher, Russia AfteT Stalin (London , 1953) , p . 79 .  
99 
There were 11any reasons why the Soviet Union did not absom the Eastern 
European states directly. Such an overt act would have needlessly antagoni zed 
the West while also greatly weakening the international Comll\D\ist movement out­
side Eastem Europe which -weared very prOll:lsing at the ti•. Purthenore , 
it would have co111pllcated the tasks of occupation and exploitation i f  not led 
to open revolt against the Comamist regi•• • And finally, national differences 
and emities were too great to be so blatently ignored. Moscow could exercise 
domination by llOre smtle •ans. 
The •thod Moscow chose to introduce wu one of li•ited toleration. 
Such a policy was undatory for a nUllber of reasons. 'nle Commmist parties in 
all states but Yugoslavia fo\Dld themelves in a numerically weak position in 
1945 . To overco• this disadvantage they opened their ranks to uny hetero­
genous ele•nts thus swelling the party wl th untrained and unreliable amli>ers . 
Purthenore , anti-Cmmmist (and often anti-Russian) feeling wu so formidable 
that any overt attack would likely plunge a state into civil war. Also Russian 
pledges to the Westem Al lies ude a gradual develop•nt much more preferable 
to an abrupt halt. And Pinally ,  the national Co-.mist situation ,  especially 
in Prance and Italy where Comamists were courting left-wing socialists , pre­
cluded any police state •thods . 
Brzezinski outlines three varying patters of CollllLlftist activity pursued 
to obtain domination .  The first w u  consolidation of power, already obtained 
through Soviet occupation by 1945, and the initi ation of domestic refol'lllS not 
necessarily doctrinaire in fon. 'Ibis pattem wu fol lowed in Bulgaria, Rumania, 
and Poland. ·The second pattem entailed efforts to obtain poll ti cal power 
through participation in the political process and through active encouragement 
of intemal reform. This process wu followed in Czechoslovakia. The final 
pattem wu the consolidation of power obtained by local COllllUftist efforts, and 
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the la\D\ching of a radical totalitarian revolution.  This was followed in 
Yugoslavia. H\.Dlgary presents a marginal case. 
Thus in Yugoslavia (also i.n Albania) Comunist forces had attained power 
largely through their own efforts while the native non-CoBD\D\ist revolutionary 
movement wu defeated by Soviet foreign intervention and international arbitration.  
By the sUllUler of 1945 , Soviet military forces had occupied all Poland, 
�'UJlania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czecho!llovakia, and the Collll\.Dlist sector of Ger-
aany. During this period similar types of regi•• emerged in these territories, 
and for some years in Yugoslavia. The govemaents which emerged were officially 
called "Popular Democracies. 01 
The four political forces interested in shaping the Eastern European 
states each saw so•thing different in the hybrid fo1'111Ula of "People 's  Democracy."  
Stalin 's policy at the time was one of wait and see with his new .. fotmd collabora-
tion with the Western Powers . He thus viewed the "People's Democracy" as a 
transitional form of govern11ent during the years of collaboration with the allies 
which would ultimately lead to integration into a great European Co11111\D'list 
doainion of Soviet Russia. In the case of Yugoslavia, Stalin did not want to 
antagonize the West with an overt dictatorship of the Communist Party in Yugo-
' 
slavia nor to imply, however sywibolically, that Yugoslavia was another repd:>llc 
of the USSR. Thus while pressing for a closer all�gnment with Rumanla and 
Poland, he wu indifferent to Yugoslavia's clai• to be a CollllUl\ist state and 
a meri>er republic in the ful ly of the USSR. 'M\e Western powers saw in the 
constitution of these states the •ans by which all parties could reassert the• 
selves and take part in the govern•nt,  while the anti-COtftllunists thought that 
they would be reasonable free politically lDlder the constitutional frmnework 
of the "People's Democracy. "  And finally, the Comunist parties and leaders 
in Eastern Europe saw in the "People's De11e>cracy" a systea by which they could 
1Tito was the first to cal l the state he 'was about to foni in 1945 a "People's 
i>emcracy. 11 
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occupy the key positions of state and thereby actually govem. Emphasis wu 
placed on the sovereignty of each "Peoplets Demcracy . "  The very title itself 
suggested that the new states were not Co111Unist republics and would,  in fact , 
act u barriers to further Soviet integrationist 11e>ves . 
However, in the cue of Yugoslavia, such claim of sovereignty concealed 
two assertions : that Yugoslavia, as a dictatorship of the proletariat and a 
state with a Commnist ideolo11 , should not be treated as a junior partner in 
need of 'guidance ; •  and that Tito, who had won political power lar1ely through 
his own efforts , should shan power, at least on paper, with other political 
forces and parties in Yugoslavia. Tito objected directly to any such sharing 
of power -..d to the -Soviet intervention in •atters which she had given no prior 
auidance nor help in solidifying. 
"People's Demcracy" •ant many things to aany interests , yet, as Neuaann 
10 aptly puts it : 
Deprived of its excess verbiage , the concept of the people's democracy 
boils down to two simple criteria. It is a state in which the classless 
society hu not yet been achieved, but in which the Comamist party 
has the upper hand and has beg\D'l the tuk of liquidating its opponents & 
It ls also ·a state which fol lows the lead of the Soviet Union. l 
The "People's Democracies" were only on the threshold of social development. 
Thus , even i f  the roads to socialisa varied, the more advanced USSR still enjoyed 
the position of aulde. The seeds of futun ideological amordination were thus 
b1pllcit in the concept. 
The constitutions of these "People's Deaocracies" were actually mdeled 
on the Soviet Constitution of 1936. Parli.-nts were elected by direct , equal , 
secret, universal suffrage, but then wu only one list of candidates in most 
instances , and the parll-nts •t for only a few days every year. Between 
lRobert G. NeU11ann, "Constitutional Documents of But-Central Europe •" 
Joumal of Politics ,  XII ,  p.626. 
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parli ... ntary sessions legislative business was carried on by the Presidima 
whose •llbers were even more rigorously selected by the Co-.niats than for the 
parli-nts . Local authorities were selected sillilarly and silli larly controlled. 
In other words , the governmental apparatus was strictly s\i>ordinated , u in the 
Soviet Union, to the central authorities. 11le judicial branch was also fil led 
with party nollinees elected by the correspondina levels of the political hier­
archy . Co-.mists also controlled the police, any ,  aus organisations , and 
education. The pnss, .. boob , broadcutin1, etc. , were used by the party for 
propaganda to indoctrinate the population. 
11le "People's De•cracies" were thus a tactical and practical aaneuver 
to let Co..uaists 1ain and coasolidate power in order to llOVe on to a more 
drastic staae while at the s ... ti• aaintainlng strict party subordination 
to Moscow. The purse trials , rapid colltctivization, and reliance upon th• 
the Soviet Union probably c ... sooner than expected by local Communist leaders. 
By 1948 what had been "correct" in 1945 wu "treuoneble." 
Accordlna to Hush S.ton-Watsonl then were three phues in the esteblish­
mnt of popular democracy in the But European states : the genuine coalition, 
the boaus coalition, ad the mnolithic block. Poland's post-War history 
beains in the second phase where several parties nomnally shared power ad 
possessed an independent orgal1ation but where in actuality the leaders of 
the aovern•nt were chosen not by thea but by �he Communists. Yugoslavia 
skipped the first two staps and found herself in stap three where Co-.mist 
leaders not only laid down lines of polley but centrally controlled the organi­
zation and discipline of the survi vina non-Co•unist groups . During this 
stage socialist parties wen forced to fuse with the Co..unist party and all 
overt political opposition wu terainated. Poland's transition fl'oa stap two 
lHu&h Setaa-Watson, 'lb• East Europea Revolution (New York : Pruger, 
1956) , pp . 167-171. 
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to three began in the autum of 1947 with the flight of Mikolajczyk to the 
West.  
Seton-Watson lists five .. jor aspects of Stalinization in the Eastern 
European countries : Pint, th• Comllunist attitude to th• peasat and socialist 
parties ; second, the role of the Soviet lll itary including political and econo­
lllc intervention; third, levers of ·pawer used by the Co....ai1t1 ; fourth , the 
ellploltatlon by Moscow and local Co..uni1t1 of national confllcta ; and fifth , 
the significance of differences in the social structure. 
The peasat parties were the first objects of Communist attack. During 
the suppression of the peasant political oppositioll the violence of the Coau-
nists reached its climax. This was due to a n\lllber of reasons. The peasant 
parties represented, in reality or potentially , the aajority of each nation 
and the strona••t deaoeratlc forces in the 1tatu • 1 Purthenore , the peuant 
parties possessed riaorous progr ... in opposition to those of th• Co111amists , 
nvealin1 the existence of an unbridaeabl• ideological difference between 
th• Co-i•t� and peuant1. These parties mat , therefore , be discredited 
' 
ad split by th• Co-.mist1 in order for the Coll9Uftists to achieve unchallenged 
power. 
The socialist parties were newed u necessary tools ln the transition 
1ta1e of the "PeGp1le 's De110cracy. "  When their worth had been expelled, their 
life spana would be teninated with a fusion into the ideologically pure Coa-
, 
mnist Party. Absorbtion of 1ociall1t parties into the ColR\B'list parties occured 
throuahout Eastern Europe in 1948. Poland's socialist party wu llbsorbed on 
December 15 , 1948. 
There were three type• of Soviet intervention into Eastern Europe : "direct 
political action based on the threat of military force, "  "indirect political 
lpor a brelkdown of urban and rural population in Poland md Yugoslavia 
see Annex, Table NUllber 2.  
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action," and "econolll.c actlon."1 
Direct political action bued on the threat of lll itary force and its 
actual use wu especially important, u hu been seen, in the cue of Poland. 
Bxaplea in that state are numerous , rangin1 fl'OJI the creation of the Ld>lin 
eo.ittM ln 1944 to the nOllination of Soviet Marshal Rokossovski u Co•ander­
in-0\ief of the Polish Arw, in 1949 . In Poland Stalini1aticn wu due .,re to 
Soviet lli.lituy force , and •Yen leis to internal factors , than in any other 
country, especially Yu1os lavia. 
Indirect political action ls represented by the systea of treaties enac­
ted betwMn the Soviet Union md the 1tate1 of Eutem Burope. 'ftlere were 
seven political tnatiea in that period signed between the Soviet Union and 
these states , coupled with tho1e between the Eut Buropea states the•elves . 
'nlese political treaties are supple•nted by eoonolde and cultural conventions. 
The post-War objectives of Soviet econolli.c policy hinged upon the pro­
cure•nt of u mch econollic aid u possible hoa foreign countries, especially 
those occupied by the Red Arsr, in order to speed Russian economic reconstruction. 
Between 1945 and 1947 capital goods , aachinery, rolling stock , and li�stock 
were appropriated froa Red occupied 1tates and sent back to the Soviet Union. 
By 1946 llOSt of the trade which had preYioU1ly flowed to Western Europe wu now 
rechann,dled to the Soviet tmion. The goal vu the eventual lntearation of 
the econOllles of the Comunist dOlllnated countrie1 with that of the Soviet Union. 
Butern Burope wu exploited econolli.cally by the USSR larply through 
three •an• : "joint" or lliud Soviet-local companies which, in fact , were 
aanapd exclusively to the benefit of the msR and siphoned off the resources 
of these countries directly into the Soviet Union; inequitable pricing arr1nge­
•nts in trade a1ree•nt1 which gave the Soviets special oriented prices (such 
lsetao-Wataon , Op. cit. 
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u the agree•nt with Poland in Septellber, 1945, by which Polish coal wu to 
be sold to the Soviet Union at a price one tenth of that offered by Denaark) 1 ; 
and lut, looting and pillaging during the initial war years . As one writer 
put it, even the Molotov Plan of January 1949 ''is not only an econold.c proaru, 
but ultiutely an instrument of power politi cs . "2 
'nle Com.mists i .. diately seized the levers of power within the state. 
All key positions were occupied, especially the Ministry of Interior which 
controlled the police (in Polmid the Ministry of State Security) , and the Min­
istJy of Justice. All broadcuting wu i-diately seized, and Co�ists 
were placed in key positions in the unap..nt of national factories and in 
trade unions . In Poland land reform wu a key tool in gamering peasant sup­
port. This consisted in the ellpropriation of Geraan peuanu in the westem 
borderlands and its use u patronap for the Comnmists. The govemment was 
also reaodeled along Soviet lines. In Poland the C:O-ists got control of 
the local aovemmntal power only after, with Soviet support, they had seized 
power at the center, while in Yugoslavia the Partisas of Tito used their 
cells to attain power on all levels without direct Soviet interference. 
Co-..nists in both Poland and Yugoslavia treated national probleas in 
their respective countries in an opportunistic way. 11leir ultiaate concem wu 
to reduce all nationalities to the saM level of subjugation to Moscow. I f  it 
was to Moscow 's advantage to exacerbate national conflicts , then all else , 
including national concems , took second. 
In Poland the national hatred of the Poles for their Genaan neighbors 
wu deliberately aagnified by the Soviets in order to widen the gulf between 
lPor COllplete details see Mikolajczyk , 0p. cit. , pp. 158-159. 
2Anon. ,  '"nle Molotov Plan : Bconold.cs of Soviet I111perialisa," News fro• 
Behind the Iron curtain, I ,  ix, p . M .  
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them. This was done in order to force the Poles to look for defence in the 
Soviet Union mid place the• at the .. rcy of Soviet foreign policy. 
In Yuaoslavia it wu to Tito's advantage to parade under the baner 
of the unity of all nationalities in the state. By so acting, Tito could 
exploit the wishes of the majority of the population who were sick of national 
hatreds and conflicts so prevalent throughout their history. Attention can 
here be placed on Lenin' s  recipe of apporttnis• on the national question stated 
on May 12 , 1917 that "In Russia we must stress the right of separation by the 
subject nations , while in Poland we must stress the right of subject nations 
to unite ." Tito was very ingenuous in his use of the national question as a 
tactical step in his rise to power. 
Communist progras in both Poland ad Yugoslavia were most opportunely 
tied to the national interest .  This , of �une ,  posed a dile•a for the poli­
tically active non-Comunist national elenents . In both countries the opposition 
was split by these methods , reminiscent of Caesar's divide et •'!'era, into 
three aroups. The first aroup was composed of the undergro\D\d resistance and 
wu known in Poland as "Preedom and Independence" (WIN) and "National A1'118d 
Forces" (NSZ) . In Yuaosl avia scattered Chetnik elements reaained after the var. 
By 1948 most of the above had been liquidated. 'nley had counted on war between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, and it had not been forthcoming. 
The second and laraest group wu composed of those who attempted to work 
within the framework of the system and who oraanized democratic parties . These 
groups , largely composed of the peuet parties, depended upon free elections 
and Western backing. Neither were forthcoming. 
The third group col laborated with the Comunists. They justified their 
' 
actions by pointing to the domestic progr&111 of the Communists. This group 
included the left wings of socialist parties and radical agrarians. Disi llusionment 
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with COlllllDlist programs soon followed as radicalization progressed from the 
policy of distribution of large estates �ng the peuan1' through the NBP stage 
to the liquidation of the kulaks, the collectivization of agricultul!e_, and the 
socialization of industry. As wi l l  be seen , this radicalization caused con­
flict between Moscow and her Comunist leaders in both Poland and Yugoslavia. 
COtl'OSITION OP THE CO,....IST 
PARTIES OP YUOOSLAVIA AND POLAND 
There were a nud>er of •ajor groupings of ColllllUllists in Eastem Europe 
at this ti•: opportunists who had jumped on the bandwagon when they set that 
Coan\D\isa was the "aove•nt of the future ; "  idealists who had joined th• move-
11ent seeina in it a future social transformation and ultimate reign of justice; 
fascists who through the revolution had been converted from brown to red (included 
many opportunists) ; conservative bureaucrats who had been needed to fill key 
positions and who had been blackui led into submission ; and finally the toughs 
who had been of use in the yean of "persuasion. ul 
R. V. Burks dia.etrically categori zes the co11position of a typical party. 
The outer circle , or "soft periphery ," he says , is composed of opportunists, 
auerri llas, fellow-travellers, voters , and front memers . It is this circle 
which is needed to oveiwhel• the opposition during the first phases of the take"' 
over. Quality at this ti• is sacrificed for quantity. Occupying the inner 
circle are the party activists who are centered aro\D\d the hard core of leading 
cadres . Fluctuations in the party strength of leading cadres , activists , and 
opportunists will vary relative to the particular conditions faced. In Yugoslavia 
the situation could be i llustrated by the chart on the followin1 page. 
In the first few years after the war, the Comrunist party in Poland was 
also not h0110aenous . Durin& the period after "liberation ," the period of 
strugale for political power, the party had needed quantity in order to overawe 
lPor the percent of the total population belonpng to the Coaunist parties 
of Eastern Europe in 1938 and 1948 see Annex, Table Number 3. 
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Year 
1920 
1923 
1932 
1941 
1945 
1952 
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YUOOSLAV PARTY M:MBERSHIP 
Prob ab le status of 
the bulk of the 
Historical situation Melll>enhip •ll>•nhip 
Newly organized, the party hid 
the third laraest electorate in 
the country 60,000 Activist 
The party was driven under-
ground; mch of it• •li>ershlp 
wu in prison 6,000 Leading Cadre 
Abandon•nt of parll .. ntary 
aovern .. nt and e1tablish11ent 
of a royal dictatorship; police 
pressure incnued 200 Leading Cadre 
The party achieved 1elli.- legal 
status and was increasingly popu-
lar u a foe of Nazis• and a sup-
porter of Czechoslovakia 12 ,000 Activist 
After a bloody civil war, tho 
party e11erged u the •aster of -
Yuaoslavia 141,000 Activist 
After seven years of power 179 ,000 Opportunist 
Source : R. V. Burks , The Dynudcs of Comunis• in Bu tern Bre , 
(Princeton : Princeton unlvenlty Preas , 1§61), p .1� 
its opponents. Durina early 1944 Polish Workers ' Party •lllbenhip was only 
20-30,000. However, with the ireat influx of Soviet-Polish Comunists and through 
local recruit•nt the party numbered 235,296 by the end of 1945 . By 1946 this 
total had reached SSS,888; and by the end of 1947 the party had swollen to 820,786. 1 
But with power finaly restina in the hands of the party , the uny heterogenous 
and "unreliable" ele•nts could now be safely purged. Quality would now replace 
quantity . 
lA. Iwanska, ed. , Conte112orary Poland (Hwun Relations Area Pi lu , 1955) , 
p. 316. 
YOOOSLAVIA: A SPECIAL SITUATION 
Yugoslavia represented a special situation after the war. Here, the 
party could comt on enthusiutic support fr• at leut a large llinori ty of 
the population .  Furthe1'110re ,  the superior average quality of its Mnbers and 
its lelders attained during the war was not sacrificed for quantity iJ1Mdiately 
after. Tito viewed any dilusion of his party with disaay. The aus recruiting 
which wu undertaken by the People ' s  Front, the Comunist-controlled "110nolithic" 
8Gllopoly political oraanization, reaained in that organization while the party 
itself kept in the backgromd. 'nlis wu one of the things that Tito would be 
reproached for by the Coainform in 1948; it was one of the major reasons for 
his aaintainence of 1overei1nty during that conflict. 
Tito' s  victory in Yu101 lavia wu won by his own indigenous party apparatus 
in an armed struagle against the fucists and de>11estic c:ompetition. l The CPY 
wu treated u first aaang the Co..unist parties of Eastem Europe u late u 
-
1947 and the cnation of the Collinfon. The Yugos lav party and state appeared 
u the IM>del for all other Butem European Commmist parties . As late u March 
31 , 194 7 ,  Yugoslav Preaier Josip Broz-Tito in his foreign policy report to the 
National Assellbly stated: 
· Yes , Yugos lavia, and the other countries of the But as we 1 1 ,  are going 
to��ther with the Soviet Union, but they are going with it precisely 
because they know that it does not threaten their independence . . . .  We 
are 1oin1 with the Soviet Union because from there we constantly hear 
voices of peace , and that corresponds to our aspirations • • • •  2 
lFor a discussion on the importance of Soviet assistance to the Partisans 
in 1944 see Harry Hodaklnson , Challenge to the Kremlin (New York : Praeger, 1952 ) ,  
pp . 47-48. 
2Yugos lavi a, Ministarstvi inostranih postova. White Book , (Beograd , 1951) . 
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No other Comumi1t party in Butem Europe following the end of the war went 
u rapidly down the road to CoD\D\i1a and one party govem•nt u did Tito's 
Yugoslavia. The elections for the Constituent Alseli>ly had been held on 
Novellber 1 1 ,  1945. without an opposition list but with a separate box in which 
anyone wishing to risk repstering a protest vote could drop his ballot. Nlnety­
six percent voted ''yes . "  I t  chal lenged the aovem•nts and public opinion of 
the West. It tried and executed Mihailovich. It established a Soviet pattemed 
republic after abolishing the mnarchy. It quickly suppressed the remaining 
non-Co..unists. The "people's aeaocratic phue;• i f  there wu one, ended for 
all practical purposes in the early fall of 1945 with the resignation of the 
three ''Westem" mellben of the Cabinet. And, final ly , it was overtly defiant 
in its attitude on the 1\i>ject of Trieste. Vaclav Benes writes that "It wu 
not Tito's 1•1ging behind, but the fact that he wu trying to catch up with 
the Soviet Union too quickly, that annoyed Stalin. ul 
The Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation 
sianed with the Soviet Union on Apri l 1 1 ,  1945, wu the first treaty signed 
by the new government and actually occurred before the war was over. This 
treaty wu signed in a spirit of accord and coaradeship . However, it is inter­
esting to note , u Sergius Yakobson points out, that "the Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty 
wu the only one aaong the Soviet pacts cligned during the war which did not pro­
vide ' �gainst interference in the intemal affairs of the signaton . ' "2 
As hu been noted, relations with Moscow were not as saooth as gleaned 
from the surface . 3 In a speech delivered in Ljublajana in May of 1g45 • Tito 
lvaclav Benes . Eastern European Govemment and Politics (New York : Harper 
and Row, 1966) , p . 197. 
2ser1ius Yakobson, 'tthe Soviet Concept of Satel U te States ," Review of 
Politics , XI . 
3As early u March of 1942 Tito, in a letter to Pijade, .h ad showed a ten ... 
dency to refuse even remote control: "I have not aade much atte..,t to argue it 
out with Grandad (Moscow) . I have, however, told hia t?1at he had drawn quite 
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definitely aroused Stalin 's w�ath by stating : 
It ls said that this ls a Just war, and we have considered it such. 
Howevex-, we also seek a just end. We demand that everyone shall be 
•uter in his own house. We do not want to pay other people •'s bills. 
We do not want to be used u a bribe in intemational barpinina. We 
do not want to pt involved in a policy of spheres of influence . 1 
At this ti• Tito wanted Trieste frOll the West,  but the Soviets were unwi l ling 
to back hi•. On June S the Soviet ui>assador delivered this fonaal adaoni tion 
to the Yugoslav Poreian Office: "Tell Colll"ade Tito that i f  he should once again 
permit such an attack on the Soviet Union we shall be forced to reply with open 
cri ticis• in the press and disavow hi•. 112 '11\is is the first threat of excomu-
nicatlon froa Moscow. 
Turning to an analysis of the Yugoslav Govem .. nt itself one finds that 
the Constitution of 1946 was a near facslllile of Stalin 's Soviet Constitution 
of 1936 and bon little or no re1ellblence to previous Yugoslav constitutions. 
A new political structure had b�en transplanted from Russian to Yugoslav soil.  
The Constitution dealt not only with the political structure but also with the 
socio-econoaic upects of society. It included a bi ll of econollic and political 
rights, but its use "for the purpose of chanaing or _disturbina the constitutional 
systea in an mti-deaocratlc sense" wu proclai•d "illegal and punishable." 
It also proclai•d the principle of federalisa "includin1 the riaht of secession ," 
only to uke it ineffective by a broad definition of the powers of the central 
govem•nt. '11\roup the fusion of the judicial and lepslatlve powers and cen­
trali zation of public prosecution , it guaranteed that there would be no delay 
wrona conclusions from my reports , for the situation is quite different froa 
what he iaaglnes l t to be." fro• Harry Hodgkinson, Op. cl t. , p. 45. 
lQuoted in Huilton Pish A1'111trong, Tito and Goliath (New York : 'lbe 
Macaillan C�any , 1951) , p.64. 
2Ibid. , p.65. 
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on the road to "socialism. nl Benes says that the Constitution of 1946 served 
a dual purpose : 
It wu a docu.ent of Yugoslav proaress towards the Soviet llOdel ,  way 
ahead of all other peoples de.,cracies, and it facilitated the take ove1.' 
of reaainin1 private property and the use of various radical •thods to 
speed up
2
industriali1ation and transfora the social structure of the 
country. 
Tito, boating of this Constitution in 1948, proclaiaed that it 
has only confi!'lled, or rather codified , what was won during the war • • • •  
Now we are in the possession of the buic el .. nts for building socialism 
in our coma try. Let ua once aaain see what these ele•nts are: 
(1) The state authority which replaced the old bourgeois authority is 
a real people 's govemmnt • • • •  
(2) The A'rW/ is a C011pletely new, people's amy • • • •  
(3) The state security , the Militia, the OZNA (secret poli ce) , etc. , are 
organs of the people's authority ; their task is to keep a strict watch 
and vipl • • • •  
Consequently , we have a eo11pletely new state aachinery , which is a vital 
condition for further develop•nt in the direction· of socialism, that 
is to say, the political conditions for that develop•nt have been created. 
(4) Radical nationaU.1ation • • • thus basic aaterial conditions·, have 
been created for builClin1 socialisa in our country. 
(S) A united standpoint hu prevailed uong the vut aajority of people, 
rallied in the People's Pront • • • •  3 
Three e lemnts stmd out in the political sphere of the constitution: 
repmlicanisa, federalisa, and·· the separation of church and state. The first 
wu ai•d against th• monarchy , the second wu incorporated to placate the 
desires of the differing nationalities , and the third wu ai•d at the re lip-
ous organizations of the state. The federal structure was pattemed after that 
of the Soviet �ion and thus vu not a true federalisa, except possibly in 
its ethnic and cultural autonomy. In fact, it wu a fon of administrative 
decentralization, a quasi-federalls• at best. The Yugoslav govem•ntal struc­
ture rested priaari.ly on a sup.re• central 1ovemment. Each of six repti> lics, 
lvaclav Benes , Op.cit� ,  p . 203. 
2!!!!,! • • 
3Ibid. , p . 19 1 ,  quotin1 Tito, Selected Speeches and Articles, 1941-1961 
(Zaaret>:-Yaprijed, 1963) , pp . 83-84. 
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Sezt>ia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia ,  had 
its own government which was patterned afier the central or federal govern .. nt 
and which had its own elective assellblies and cabinets with jurisdiction over 
certain local utters . Bach wu also represented in the Co\Dlcil of Nationalities , 
the second chuber of the bic-ral legislature. The Constitution was so arranged 
that al� national antagonis .. llight be lessoned and eventually extinguished. 
EconOllically the Constitution e11phaai1ed state planning and socializationo 
However, it specifically stated that the state would protect in particular "the 
owners of 1aal1 and •diua-si1ed land holdings . "1 Tito's object wu to ellbark 
only on a certain tolerable amount of experimental collectivi zation and assis­
tance of cooperatives . As will be se�n ,  this cautious pace wu later conde111ed 
by Moscow during the split. However, by fol lowi1;11 the rmical Soviet line of 
collectivi1ation , Tito would have estranpd more than one half of the population. 
This , of course , would have led to the euy overthrow of his 1overn•nt , a step 
Moscow wu anxious to take in 1948. The steps in such a process are collectivi­
zation, the opening of hostilities with the peuanu , the cessation of food 
' . 
supplies , econollic standstil l ,  overthrow of Tito, and replace•nt with a Soviet 
stooge rep• siltilar to those in other Coamnist CO\Dltries of Butem Europe. 
The smvenion of Tito'• rep• by Moscow had to begin with the two aain 
ele•nu of his power: the CPY and the Yugoslav Any (in actuality a quasi­
political oraanization itself) . The Aftl/ and the CPY were, however, firmly in 
the control of Tl to. Al 1 •llben had attained and were aaintained in power by 
followlna Tito and would be quite unwlllln1 to atv• up this basis. In fact, 
aany soldiers and party officials looked upon the Soviet Union in dismay for 
past acts . One reason cited by Mosha Pij ade wu that frm the beginning of 
the war down to 1945 when actual contact vu aade between the Partisans and 
}quoted in Jovan Djordjevi�, ''Yugoslavia's New Constitution," CUrrent 
History, X, p . 423. 
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and the Red A'n/f, Soviet Ru11ia had provided no uteri al or llili tary aid to 
Tito. l Purthenore, the struggle during the pre-Stalingrad period when Moscow 
had been fiptina for its existence had placed all ldeolopcal aspects in a 
secondary status . Por Tito, however, the struggle vu simply a new form of 
the fiaht for Co.-misa. during this period the Soviet govern•nt feared of 
endangering its relations with the Western allies and thus tried to quiet 
Tito �y emorting hia to present himelf u a pro1T911ive nationalist. His 
aanisfestations of love for the lBSR and Stalin were to be stilled. 'Fhis see•d 
inco..,reheuible to Tito. 'Mle Soviet Mntality is reflected in the following 
cab le froa Moscow to Ti to' s headquarters on March S ,  1942 : 
Revievina all your infonation one gets the i11pnssion that with some 
justification the fol lowers of England and the Yugoslav govern•nt believe 
that the Partisan aov••nt is u1umn1 a coaunist character and that it 
intends to sovietize Yugoslavia. Why , for instance, was it necessary 
to organize a s�cial prol•tarian briaad• when the buic and i1811diate 
task consists now in the unification of all 1nti-Hiter elements in order 
to cruch the o�iet' ad achieve national liberation! • • • is l t 
really so that, besides the C�ists and their followers, there an 
no other Yuaoslav patriots with whoa you could fight against the eneayf 
It 11 difficult (for us) to agree that London and the Yugoslav government 
are collaboratin1 with the invact.r--there must be 10• aisunderstanding. 
We beg you to review seriously your tactics 1nd actions, to check whether 
you did all you could to create a united and real national front of all 
enellies of Hitler and Mussolini in order to defeat the conqueror and 
invader, and if not, to take quickly the necessary steps and to infon 
us about th••· 
'Ibis doCUMnt not only reveals the Soviet •ntali ty at the ti•, but also the 
tactics used by the Partisans. Not until February , 1944, did the Soviets send 
their first llission to Tito's headquarters. 'Ibey had .,re than once before this 
ti• attempted to establish liaison with the forces of Mlhailovich . As early 
u May, 1942, allied delegates fro• Cairo had been with the Partisans. 
lAdu B. Ulu, Titoisa and the Collinfora (Cubridp: Harvard University 
Presa , 1952) . p . 74 .  
2tbid . ,  quoting Mosha Pijade, 'lbe Sto') of Soviet Help in the Yusoslav 
Uprialni:ln Serbo-Croat (Belarade, 1950). or Tl to11 reaction to this cab le 
see Paae 1 1 1 ,  Pootnote 3. 
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E111nity within the party fold was also felt against Moscow for its unwi ll· 
ingness to push the Yuaotlav case for Trieste with any kind of firmness (see 
above) , and its sabotage of Yuaoslavia's plans for a Balkan Federation. This 
federation, long a d�u held by Tito, called for the union of BulgaTia and 
Albania with Yusoslavia under the leadership of Tito. Tito saw hi11Self as the 
Stalin of the Balkans , the leader of a huge South Slav Confederation of Co11111U­
ni1t states . However, in an article in Pravda on January 28, 1948, all federative 
or confederative plans including a customs \D\ion were denounced. The Soviet 
Union would not tolerate any developaents which might have increased the bar­
gaining power of the But Central European region with the Russians. In essence, 
the question was one of political power. Stalin could not accept any "little 
stalins" who lliaht question his sovereianty. 
The three •ain elements in the backeround of the diaputo u it unfolded 
were the Soviet attitude toward the Partisans during the war (the Yugoslavs 
now set Soviet policy u motivated by purely selfish considerations) ,  the 
Soviet duplicity conceming the Balkan Confedera�ion and Yugoslavia's role in 
it , and the question on the rapidity of proceeding with radical collectivization. 
These, the aain ele .. nts, rest upon the dispute itself, the Soviet attempt 
to destroy the l�adenhip of the CJ>Y and to fill the Yugoslav Ar.,, Co•unist 
Party, and the Govem•nt in general with Soviet agents. 
The �SR' s agent of party control outside the Soviet Union , the Collintem ,  
had been dissolved in May of 1943 ostensibly on the grounds that l t no longer 
served the interests of the worldng-clus 110ve•nt in the different states. 
This anti-revolutionary gesture, however, occurred at the height of the Nall 
advance into the Soviet Union and durln1 the sue period as the preceeding 
cable to Tito, a period when victory over Geraany superceded any revolutionary 
work abroad and when unity and assistance from the Westem allies was a 
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necessity to survival. On May 22, 1943, the Presidit.111 of the Executive Co• 
mittee of the Collllwaist International issued a resolution proposing the disso­
lution of the Collintem. The following is an excerpt fro• that resolution: 
The Pre1idiU11 of the Executive of the Comaunist Intematlonal calls 
on all supporters of the Communist Intemational to concentrate their 
eneraies on the whole-hearted support of and active participation in 
the war of liberation of the peoples and the states of the anti-Hitlerite 
coalition for the speediest defeat of the deadly enemy of the working 
clu-. Md toi lers--Genaan Fuels• and its associates and vassals . 1 
In a cha�acteristlc reply to vhy the Ca.intern had been dissolved, Stalin 
stated to Harold King, Reuters correspondent , that the dissolution was "proper" 
because it exposed "the lie of the Hj tlerltes to the effect that 'Moscow' 
alleaedly intends to intervene in the life of other nations and to ' Bolshe-
vixe' thea.'' It also exposed the calt•ny that the "Comamist parties in the 
various countries •1j8 al legedly acting not in the interest of their pe�le but 
on orders froa the outsid&." It faci litates the work of ail the patriots in 
the uniting of all progressive forces "into a single caq> of national liberation--
for unfolding the struggle against fascism," • • •  "thus clearing the way to 
the future organization of the co11panionship of nations based upon their equality . "2 
By 1947, however, international and Eastem Buropean developments precluded 
any such "companionship of nations based upon their equality" and aade the for­
ution of a guiding agency mandatory to Moscow. The West had instituted the 
Truaan Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in order to stop the spread of Comaanism 
from Moscow. Any veil of post-War allied unity had now been broken . President 
Truaan stated that "It must be the policy of the �ited States to support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed llinorities or by outside 
ln.e Strategy and Tactics of World Co111M1Disa (Washiniton , 1948) , pp. 16S-168. 
2w1111a z. Foster, Histon of the Three Internationals (New York : 
national Publishers C0111pany, 19 ) , p.438. 
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pressures • "1 In Pebruary of 194 8 the coup d'etat had occurred in Prague, and 
in March Britain, Prance, and the Benelux countries had signed the Brussels Treaty 
establishing a Westem Union. Intemational tension then reached its high point 
since the war when the Soviets blockaded Berlin. In l!astem Burope itself the 
nascent nationalistic and independent spirit of the leaders of the •ajor Comu-
nist parties which had appeand durina the transitional period after 1944 took 
on added iapetus. Stalin felt that if tbis tendency was left unchecked it would 
probably •an the loss of his satellite states. The Co-.mist Information Agency 
(Collinfon) wu thus foned in 1947 to quell this tendency in the Comunist . 
parties and to mawer the •challena• of the We1t.11 The Cold.nfon was the syd>ol 
for the tendency toward unifonity in the Collilunist block. It fully exerted 
its power in 1948. 
At the foundina conferenc. of the COJlinfon held in Poland in Septent>er, 
\ 
1947, Zhdanov, reporting on the intemational situation, h..S recast the Co-.anist 
view of World War II ad represented the current world situation as a bitter con-
test between the "1ociali1t cap" and "American i11periali••·" The states uso-
elated with "the i11periali1t lmited States ad Great Britain an the dangerous 
foes of national independence ad the self-deteninatlon of nations ," while 
the Soviet Union ad the new democracies an "a reliable bulwark against encroach­
•nts on the equall ty and self-detenination of nations • • • •  " The Truan Doctrine 
is "aggressive."  The Marshall Plan 11 a "sche• to create a bloc of states bound 
by obligations to the United States," and the gratina of American credits is 
a •n ttnc011pen1e for their renunciation of econOllic, and then of political, inde­
pendence."  Con1iderin1 the state of the Colllnmist Bloc and its leaden, Zhdanov 
said that: 
Som co11rade1 understood the dissolution of the Coaintem to i11p ly the 
elillination of all ties , of all contact, between the fratemal Comnmist 
lQuoted in Hiscocks, Op.cit. , p. 138. 
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parties . But experience has shown that such J1Utual isolation of the 
Conmmist parties is wrong, haraful and, in point of fact , unnatural • • •  , 1 
The fonation of the Cominform had first been urged by the 1ealous and orthodox 
Tito (Gomulka was the only leadin1 figure in opposition to its founding) to 
quiet all unorthodoxy in the Couamist movement. However, as Brzezinski states : 
What he had forgotten was that illitation within diversity did not imply 
the •- political con1eqmnce1 u i•itation within uniforiaity. In the 
foner, hd.tation was an act ·of independent decision made in tens of 
ones own specific situation .  In the latter case, illltation led to subor­
dination to the center and that subordination Ti to was not willing to 
acknowledp .2 
There was thus no real ideological content in Tito's position at the ti• 
of the break and probably none in Stalin' s .  Tito, speaking to the Central 
Co-1ttee session which •t on April 12, 1948, and upheld his resistance to 
Moscow, adJlitted as 11Uch when he said: "Co11ra�s , re•llber, this is not a 
utter here of any theoretical d11cuasion . . . .  Comades , the point here, first 
and foreJIOlt, is the relations between one state and another."3 "Titoisa" 
was thus the first aympto• in the new phue of Commnist political unification 
precipitated by foreign and intemal develop•nts . Diversity in theory and 
practice now no lonpr reflected the ti•s and wu , in fact, danprous . An 
editorial appearina in the Collinfora joumal of March, 1948, says that: 
The Co111Unist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) , created 81\d educated 
by the great geniuses of revolutionary theory , Lenin and Stalin, serves 
as an exuple to all fraternal Comunist parties of how to approach the 
develop•nt of Marxist theory . . . .  4 
The dictates of Moscow must now be followed precisely. 
lnie Stratear and Tactics of World Comunisa, Supple•nt 1 ,  Op. cit . ,  pp.212-2290 
2sr1e1in1ki, 0p. cit . ,  p . 338. 
3Ibid. 
41bid. ' p. 7 1 .  
'llfB SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE 
The actual dispute between the Soviet Uni on and Yugos lavia is documented 
in a nUllber of letters exchanged between the Central Comi ttee of the Co•u-
nist Party of Yusoslavla (CC of CPY) and the Central Collld.ttee of the Coammist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CC of CPSU) , and in statemenu and co.uniques made 
by the Coldnfora, and their replies by the CC of CPY. 
On 1 8  March a letter had been sent frOll Bulganin to Ti to informing the 
CPY that the CPSU would i•medlately withdraw all ld litary advisers and instruc-
tors because they were "surrO\Dlded by hostility." And, on 19 March , a telegraa 
was nceived which informed the Yugoslav 1ovemment of the withdrawal of all 
civi lian experts in Yvaoslavia. The reason given was that certain econo•ic 
inforaation was not given out when requested by Soviet representatives . 
On 20 March 1948 Tito sent a letter to Molotov. I Tito complained that , 
after investigating the first accusation, no basis was found for the reason 
of the withdrawal of the llilltary advisors and that , u to the latter accusa­
tion, "your people were told lon1 ago that the official representatives of the 
Soviet Govenment could obtain all important and necessary infonation direct 
from the leaden of our country ," rather than from the rank and fl le. State 
economic secrets c1nnot be gt ven out at randoa byssubordinates as many could 
fall into the hands of the COlllllOll eneay. Tito rejected any sort of "lack of 
hospitality and lack of confidence" towards the Soviet experts and representa­
tives. Prior to this time no co11p lainu had been aade to Tito, who had never 
refused to see any of the Soviet personne 1. Tl to concluded that "the above 
lnie Soviet Yugoslav Dispute, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
pp.9-11.  
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reasons are not the cause of the •asures taken by the Government of the USSR. "  
Tito then requested to be lnfoned of what the real tromle was. Alluding to 
Hebrang and Zhujovic. he said that "Inasmuch as the Govemment of the USSR is 
obtaining its lnfonation fro11 various other people. we feel that it should use 
it cautiously• because such lnfonation is not alwqs objective. accurate, and 
. ' 
given with good intentions . "  He ended ·by expressing his deepest respect. 
On 27 March a letter froa the CC of CPSU to Ti tol and his comrades infoned 
Tito of the other "facts" which led to Soviet dissatisfaction and to the subse-
quent straining of relations between the two countries but which ''were not connected 
with the withdr•al of Soviet advisors . "  The first fact enU11erated by the letter 
c.oncemed certain "anti-Soviet ru110un circulating uiona th• leading comrades in 
Yugoslavia" such as '"the CPSU ls degenerate , ' "  " 'great-power chauvlnis• is 
r111pant in the USSR, "' " 'the USSR is trying to dominate Yugo1 lavi a econoai cally, ' "  
and '"the Cominform is a •ms of controlling the other Parties by the CPSU. "' 
The letter stated that these slanderous remarks , usually C&J10flaged by left-wing 
phrases such as " 'socialism in the Soviet Union has ceased to be revolutionary, ' "  
and that Yugoslavia is the only true exponent of '"revolutionary socialism' "  
have been aade by such questionable Marxists as Djilas, Vukmanovic, ICidric, 
Rankovic,  etc. Such statements naturally create an anti-Soviet at110Sphere 
which endanaers relations with the Soviet Union. The letter then C08')ared such 
activity with that of Trotsky, who also "started with accusations of the CPSU 
as degenerate, u suffering from the lbd. tations inherent in the narrow nation­
alism of areat powers ," and who caaoflaged his attacks with left s logans of 
world revolution. "It is well known," cites the letter, "that Trotsky himelf 
bee ... degenerate , and when he was exposed, crossed over into the caq> of the 
swom eneaies of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. We think that the political 
ltbid. , pp . 14-17. 
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career of Trotsky is quite instructive." 
The second "fact" was the disturb�ng nature of the condition of the CPY. 
"We are uazed," it says , "that the CPY, which is the leading party, is sti 11 
not COllpletely legalized and still hu a seld.-leaal status. Decisions of the 
Party oraans are never pm lished in the press , neither are the nports of party 
assellblies ." Purthenore , "De110cracy is not evident within the CPY itself." 
The Central Comdttee was not elected but "co-opted." Criticism and selt-criti­
ciaa within the party barely exist. In addition, the Minister of State Security 
controls the Party cadres rather than, according to the theory of Marxis•, the 
Party controllina all State organs in the country. 'Jbe initiative of the Party 
... .. is thus not on the required level. "We cannot consider such an organi­
zation of a Commni1t Party u Marxist-Leninis t ,  Bo lshevik." The <PY has also 
been ''hoodwinked by th• degenerate and opportunist th·eory of the peaceful absor-
ption of capitalist ele•nts by a socialist syst••· • • •  " The policy of the class 
I 
struggle is not being felt in the party , which explains why no action has been 
taken to halt the increue in the capitalist ele•nts in the villages and cities 
who are now taking the initiative. 
The letter then CCJllll>ared the CPY and its People's Front to that of the 
Men1hevik1 who had been described by Lenin u "malicious opportunists and liqui-
daton of the Party :" 
According to the theoxy of Marxis11-Lenini1• the Party is considered as 
the leading force in the country, which hu its specific programe and 
which cmmot •rae with the non-party ... 1e1. In Yugoslavia, on the 
contraxy , the People ' s  Front is considered the chief leading force and 
there wu an atte11pt to get the Party 1ub•rs•d within the Front. In 
his speech at the Second Con11"91s of the People ' s  Pront, Comrade Tito 
said: ' Does the CPY have any other progl"u• but that of the People's 
Front? No, the <PY hu no other progl" .... , the programe of the People ' s  
Pront is its progl" ... . ' 
The letter ends by asking that the · "english spy ," Belebi t,  who reuined 
in the Ministxy of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia after the Soviet Govem•nt 
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had aade known to the Party that he wu a spy, be removed, u the Soviet 
Governaent cannot place its correspondence \l\der the censorship of a spy. 
, On 13 April Tito and Kardelj sent a letter• to Stalin mad Molotov expres-
sing surprise at the above letter's tone and contents and smllltting their 
belief that it was the result of "insufficient ltnowled1e of the situation here." 
Such information u was received by the Soviet Union was based on "inaccurate 
and tendentious inforaatlon" received either fro11 ''known �ti -Party ele•nts 
or fro• various dissatisfied persons . "  It hu become clear that "S. Zhujovic 
and A. Hebrang were the uin culprits in providing" such "slanderous and inac-
curate information. "  Th••• two "desired to hide their anti-Party work and their 
tendencies and attempts, exposed earlier, to break up the \Dli ty of the leader­
ship and the Party in 1eneral.11 
"It is very difficult to undentmd" how attacks for aakina anti-Soviet 
, 
critlcis• on such popular leaders u Djilas , Kidric, etc. , who have proven 
theuelves to the party in •any difficult situations, can be advanced without 
•ntioning the source of information. "These are ths s- imn who performed 
invaluable services in popularizing the USSR in Yugoslavia and won priceless 
renown in the war of liberation." These •n have spent years in prison for 
this popular11in1 activity. These are now the hiah-rankina leaders of the new 
Yuaoslavia. These people could not "work •to blacken the Soviet . syste•' because 
that would mean betrayin1 their convictions, their put . "  
Purthermre , the aajority of the •llbers of the CC of the CPY were not 
co-opted u alledpd, and the party is now planning to hold a Party congress 
in which "a .statute and a Party proll'-- will be broupt forth ," and will 
"later be adopted in i ta esaenti als by the Peap le' s Front at its congress . "  
Democracy does exist within the Party. The Minister of State Security , 
ltbid. , pp . 1 8-29. 
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who is also Organizational Secretary in the a>Y, in no case interferes with 
the "self-initiative of party organizations . "  Pnedo• of criticis• and self­
criticis• is carrie.d out at all regular Party ••tings and conferences. 
Al legations of a doruncy in the concept of class struggle in the CPY 
and of the growth of capitalist el ... nts in the cities "ls completely inaccurate ." 
''Where did this information co• f1'0ll , when the entire world knows that since 
the October revolution, nowhere in the world have then been such fira, con-
sistent social chanps as in Yugoslari.af" 
our party ls a ca11pletely legal oraani•ation and known to "every un in 
Yueoslari.a as the leadina force ," not se1d.-le1al as alledpd. In addition, 
All the important decisions, fro• those of the Federal govemment down, 
regardina all questions of social and state life ,  are either decisions 
of the Party or ude on the initiative of the Party, and the people \D\der­
stand and accept th•• u such. 
Conceming the utter of Belebit and why he reuins in the Ministry of 
Poreian Affairs, the aatter stands thus : 
lardelj and Djilu once told Molotov that we are not all clear about 
Beleblt , we never had any proof then and we have none today. 'nle utter 
is still under investiaation and we would not care to re110Ve and destroy 
a aan on the basis of suspicion. 
Tito and lardelj now state the "•any reuons why we an dissatisfied" 
with the Soviet Union. First, the Soviet Intelligence Service is recruiting 
Yugosl av citizens into their lntelliaence service in a co\D\try "going toward 
socialisa." These include •any "officers , various leaden , and those who are 
negatively disposed towards the new Yugoslari.a." This has been done in spite 
of repeated protests and cannot be looked upon u anything else but detri•ntal 
to the interests of our country. Purtheniore , ''we have proof that certain agents 
of the Soviet Intelligence Serri.ce in recruiting our Party •llben cast doubts 
on our lemders , sought to ruin their nputation, showed the• u inefficient 
and unreliable." "This work • • • cannot be called loyal and friendly towards 
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our country • • •  ," u it "kills confidence in the leadership, demoralises people, 
leads to the co11proaising of leading people, and bec011es a channel for collect· 
in1 false information day by day." Ti to concludes that these "questions • • • 
can be elillinated and explained." 
The reply to this letter froa the CC of CPSU wu forthcollin1 on 4 May 
1948. 1 It announced that the documents and evidence s\i>aitted by Tito and 
Kardelj "did not i11prove on the earlier doaments ."  In fact, ''they further 
complicate aatten and sharpen the conflict." The "tone of the docuaents • • •  
cm only be described as exagpratedly ui>i tious."  The documents do not esta­
blish the truth, no erron an honestly adllitted, nor is any necessity for their 
elillination proposed. The Yuioslav leaden see such criticls• "u 1111 insult 
to the prestige of the CC of the <PY and as wderainina the abitions of the 
Yugoslav leaden." "In order to extrl cate th••• Ives fro11 the di ffl cult s 1 tu­
ation for which they are themselves to blaM," the Yugoslav leaders are using 
the "new" •thod of completely denying the existence of any error. Such a 
"childish •thod of groundless denial of facts" is "merely laughable." , . 
Furthermore, the accusation that Soviet representatives are recruiting 
Yuaoslavs for their intelligence service "is full of hostile attacks aaainst 
the Soviet officials in Yugoslavia," and "does not at all correspond to the 
facts."  The reprisals taken a1ainst Hebrang and Zhujovic for revealing infor­
mation to Soviet citizens is "not only an i11pemissible settling of private 
accounts but incompatible with the principles of intemal Party de11<>cracy" and 
another e�le of the anti-Soviet attitude prevalent among the leaders of 
Yugoslavia. 
The letter concluded by diaposing the Yugoslav errors as the result of 
an unbounded arrogance based upon past successes. Differences between the 
11bid. , pp.31-52. 
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two parties should not be studied by CPSU representatives sent to Yugos lavia 
u the CPY had proposed in the previous letter but should be discussed by the 
next session of the Cominform. 
Another letter from Tito and Kardelj to Stalin and Molotov on 17 May 
e�res1ed the discouragement felt at the Soviet reply to the docu•nts pre­
sented by the CPY. l It also stated that the proposed discussion at the next 
Coainfora session would not be agreeab le as "even before we were informed, the 
nine Parties received your first letter and took their stand in resolutions . "  
The utter h u  not reaained an internal aatter between parties but hu been 
carried "outside the pend.ssable circle" with the result of party and country 
insults . And yet the party dee•d itself still within the Soviet fold . It 
called for the liquidation of the accusations throuah the deeds of the CPY • that 
is , •we will resolut•ly construct 1ocial11• and re•ain loyal to the Soviet Union, 
reaain loyal to the doctrine of Marx, Engels , Lenin ,  and Stalin. 'nle future _ 
will show, as did the past, that we will realize all that we proaise you. "  
On 22 May the CC' of CPSU cleclared2 that Tito's letters o f  17 May and 20 
May only further aggravated "their crude ais takes in utters of prlncip le, the 
hanfulness and dan·aer of which the CPSU indicated in its letter of 4 May 1948." 
The letter also insisted upon the discussion of the situation in the CPY at the 
next •etina of the Coainfon. 
On 20 Jme the CC of CPY informed the Cominfon3 of its refusal to· take 
part in any discussions on the question because "from the bepnnina up unti 1 
this ••ting of the Bureau" the disagree•nt ''hu been put on 111 incorrect 
basis" through "uneo11radely criticisa," "rude and unjust accusations based on 
1,!ll!. ,  p.53. 
2_!ll!. ,  pp.54-57. 
3Ibid. , pp.58·60. 
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isolated quotations and anti-Party elements ," 11condelllation without considering 
our argwaents ," and a "response with even greater and ' totally unfounded accu· 
sations . ' "  
During the second half of J\Ule the Information Bureau held a meeting in 
Ruaania. 1 At this ••ting it was found that "the CollllUllist Party of Yugoslavia 
hu pursued an incorrect line" both in utters of foreign and do•stic policy. 
Approval wu given of the action taken by the CC of CPSU in talcina the "ini tia­
ti ve in exposing this incorrect .-policy," especially in "C011rades Ti to, Kardelj , 
Djilas and Rankovic." The Cominfora then declared in a series of points that 
the leaders of the CPY were following an "lUlfriendly policy toward the Soviet 
Union and the CPSU," had "filled to follow the Marxist dictates on the theory 
of classes and class strugale," were "revisina the Marxist-Leninist teaching 
about the Party" by aaintainin1 the belief that the ''People's Fron t ,  and not 
the Co11JmJ1ist Party" is "the uin leadina force in the co\Ultry," had "restricted 
inner Party democracy by holding no elections and prohibitina criticism and 
self-criticisa in the Party," had failed to honestly accept the criticis• of 
the Soviet Party to correct these mistakes because of a "bomdless ubition, 
arrogance and conceit" and instead "•t this criticism with belllaerence and 
hostility ," and had "rejected the repeated suggestions of the fraternal Co-.a­
nist Parties to discuss the situation in the Yugoslav Party at a meeting of 
the Inforaation Bureau. "  In conclusion, the Cominform found that they were in 
conplete agreeMnt with the analysis of the CC of CPSU. The CPY had "taken 
the path of seceding from the united socialist front aaainst i11perialis•," were 
"betraying the cause of intemational solidarity of the working people," and 
were takina up a "position of nationalisa." The Cominform then called upon the 
ltbid • •  pp .61· 70. 
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the healthy 6le•nts of tho Yugoslav Party to compel l  their leaders to rectify 
the above outlined llistakes . I f  such action was not forthcmdng by these leaders , 
the healthy eleMnts · should "replace the• and • • • advance a new intemational­
ist leadership of the Party . "  
On 29 June a state•nt was issued by the CC of CPY on the above resolutione 1 
It called upon the Party aellbership to close its ranks in order to realize the 
Party line and to strengthen further Party unity. It appealed to the working 
•asses in the Peopl e ' s  Pront "to continue to work even more persistently on the 
building of our socialist hoaeland." 
The Collinfora'• appeal to the Yugos lav Co•unists to overthrow Tito met 
with little or no response . 2 In fact , in the face of this b latant Soviet threat, 
most of the Yugoslav Comlunist Party and the greater part of the nation rallied 
bohind Tito. Clissold says that "It wu de•on�trated clearly that the Partisan 
movement durina the war had bred a strong nationalist feeling which provided 
the strongest buis for Tito' s  regi• ."3 The Yugoslav leaders played upon this 
question of nationalis• and aade 1 t 1ppear to their people that "national COllllU­
nisa" was the issue involved in the Coainfora expulsion. The Yugoslav plea 
that "No matter how much each of us loves the land of socialism the USSR, he 
can, in no case, love his country less114contained more than national communism 
or Balkan sentiment or skillful propaganda. It contained a plea by the leaders 
of the Party for their own self-survival , for the maintainence of their own 
political sovereignty. The question, then , boiled down to whether Tito, Ranko­
vic, Dj ilas , Kardelj and company were to have control in Yugos lavia. As 
1Ibid. , P •  79 .  
2stalin had expected little di fficulty in elillinatin1 Tito. Stalin at one 
point had clai•d "I wi ll shake my little finger-:.and there will be no more Tito." 
frOll Walter Lafeber, Op.cit . ,  p . 69 .  
3stephen Clissold, A Short History o f  Yuaoslavia, Op. ci t . , p . 247. 
4the Soviet Y��oslav Dispute, Op. cit . ,  p . 19 .  
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Brown says : 
The fact that the Soviets wanted to exploit Yugos lavia, had just 
frustrated Tito's el'panlionist sche•s . 1nd reaarded Bel1rade as 
a satellite pawn, was not u importanf'. to Tito as the fact that the 
Soviets were undel'llining his control of his party and state apparatus 
by dealing directly with whichever of his s\i>jects they chose, and were 
encouraging Yugoslav officials at every level to look upon the Sovie} 
ambassador in Belgrade a1110St u the de facto leader of the country . 
The Cominfora accusations of doctrinal sins outlined in the above letters 
did bear some truth . However, most were less applicable to · the Yugoslav Co1191· 
nist Party than other parties of neighboring lands and possibly to the CPSU it­
self. In fact , Tito had loyally fol lowed Moscow 's lead. It wu Stalin who 
picked the quarrel, a quarrel aade necessary by the totalitarian imperative 
of the elimination of diversity and spontaneity. Ripka says that: 
Ti to was condemed si1ply because, refusing to be a mere puppet in the 
hands of Stalin, he rebelled against having to fulfi l l ,  without a word 
of protest,  the Kremlin ' s  wishes and orders. Ho was expelled because he 
did not wish the Yugoslav Co..unist Party , the adainistration� the police , the Anrt and the economy to come \D'lder direct Soviet control .  
The central issue in the dispute , then , was not the Balkan Confederation , nor 
nationalism, nor any deviation from Marxist-Leninist theory , but the question 
of Who was to have political power in Yusos lavia. 3 All other reuons given 
were merely used as em'eellishments , arguing points , rationali zations for the 
conflict which were later believed. 
lJ .  P" Brown , "Polycentrism: the Balkans ," Survey, 42, (Jun) . p . 82.  
2ttubert Ripka, Eutem Europe in the Post-War World (New York: Praeger) , 
pp . 89-90. 
3nie crux of the whole matter, then , was the independence of the Yugoslav 
leaders and their insistence, against Soviet advice, of following policies 
which they believed were best suited to Yugos lav conditions and which were 
calculated to further the end of their own interpretation of Comunist aim 
by such methods which would ftlOSt likely keep Tito and his followers in power. 
nm POLISH �B 
The Polish PTorislonal Govem•nt of National Unity was theoretically a 
coalition of five parties , the PPR, the Polish Socialist Party , the Peasant 
Party, the OelDOcratic Party• and the O\ristian Llhour Party. In the future 
power stru11l•, however, the Democratic and Olristian Labour parties were of 
little i11portance. I t  wu the PPR which was to exert its doainance through 
Soviet backing md rule the state. Soviet power wu imperative as the p·arty 
was quite saall (June, 1942: 4,000; Su ... r, 1944: 20,000 ; August, 1945 : 
188.,904) 1 and could count on no support from the people. The Soviet Amy 
provided th• basis of PPR power. The P1uant Party posed the ••jor stmbling 
block to PPR sovereignty. This party alone wu led by a patriotic Pole .. 
Mikolajczyk , who was prepared to challenge COlllUftlst authority. Mikolaj czyk 
could comt on wide popular support in this non-Comunlst and predoainantly 
aararian country. 2 In 1943 the Polish Workers ' Socialist Party (RPPS) had 
been fo\D'lded. However, it was too obviously a fellow-travelling organizaticn 
to suit Co•unist purposes. The party was therefore •rged through the aachina­
tions of Olobka-Morawski in September of 1944 at an All-Poland Socialist 
Party Conaress in Lublin into a new Polish Socialist Party (PPS) . Osobka-
Morawski became the chai man of the new party, and Stefan Matuszewski , a aeli>er 
of the Union of Polish Patriots , becaae the secretary-general. The results of 
the •raer were i._diately felt in the attraction of aany foner •llbers of 
lttiscocks , 0p.cit. ,  p.95. 
21he Polish (Co1111m1i1t) Workers ' Party (PPR) counted only 28.2 percent 
of its •llh•n u peuantl u compared with 62.2 percent worken. fro• w. Zaleskip 
'n\e Pattern of Life in Poland (Paris , 1952) , p.56. 
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the old PPS. However, the regular party •llbers were handicapped at this ti• 
by t_h• abscence of any able leadership. The llOSt proainent socialis4: leaders 
perished during the war, · were in exile, or under arrest. Dubois and Niedztal­
kcwski had been shot by the Genans , Puzak and Paj ak perished in Stalin• s 
prisons , Erlich and Alter were executed by the NKVD, and Arciszewski was head 
of the free Polish London Govem•nt until his unti•ly death. the enlarged 
llftbership did, though , include a remant of the pre-War socialist leaders who 
brought with them a diversity of opinion and an attitude of independence which 
wu not suitable to Comuniat purpoHs . Therefore , the left-wing faction , led 
by such men as Jozef Cyrankiewicz and Oskar Lange, aradually asserted control 
of the Socialist Party and thus prevented it frcm aiding the democratic forces 
led by Mikolajczyk. 
1be aain aia of the PPR at this ti• was to broaden the buis of its 
support uong the Polish people. In order to allay the fears of the Polish 
people ifhose suspicions of Coaaunisa and the PPR' •  close association with the 
Soviet Union were quite deep and widespread, the PPR leaders instituted a 
aoderate program and appealed to the Polish people's patriotisa. As seen , this 
was done to convince the Westem Powers that the Yalta agreements were being 
fulfilled and to allay the fears md w-ln the support of both Polish people at 
home and abroad. Both Gomulka and his Soviet advisors prefer�d to avoid vio­
lence and civil conflict. Objectives were thus 80dtfied, left-wing parties 
were courted, and mppeals were aide to nationalist and clericalist senti•nt. 
The Pint Congress of the PPR therefore played down the Conunist charac­
ter of the PPR and e..,hasized its links in the strug1le with Nazi Ger11any. 
1be Congnss , held in Deceaber of 1945 , passed a resolution which affined that : 
1be Polish Workers ' Party is a new organi zation of the working class 
and the toiling masses of town md country, an oraani zation bom and 
created during the struggle a1ainst the Hitlerite invaders for the 
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freedom and independenie of Poland, for the rebirth of the ccn.mtry in 
a spirit of deJDOcracy. 
The Comm ists also tread waryly with the Polish economy, preferrin1 
to sacrifice imediate transformation for a gradual pace which would receive 
the backing froa both workers and peuant. The peasant had been propitiated 
in September, 1944, throuah a radical land reform which had been first announced 
in the "July Manifesto" of the LW>lin Comittee. No attempt nor •ntion was 
aade,hhowever , of collectivization. Nationalization was not •ntioned but was 
introduced and first carriedoout on a lildtted and widely acceptable scale. 
On January 3 ,  1946, in a l• entitled "Conceming the Seizure of Basic Branches 
of the National EconOllf ,'' nationalization was begun in all llining and industrial 
enterprises "capable of e11ployin1 aore than SO workers per shift . "  However, 
compensation of those dispossessed wu recognized, except for those Geraan owned , 
although few ever received any. The Govemaent adopted a Three Year Plan of 
Economic Reconstruction in July of 1947 to be placed in effect on January 1 .  
This plan created new pattems of econOllic and social relations . Gomulka and 
his Minister of Industry and eo-rce Hilary Mine stated that the economy wu 
to be organized in three separate branches to include those state owned, coopera­
tives , and· those privately owned. 'nle foundations for a "People's Democracy" 
were thus laid throuah a blend of political and econoldc policies , throuah ter-
ror and reform. 
As noted, in 1943 the Peuant Party had been set up under Conunist spon­
sorship. When Mikolaj czyk retumed to Poland in 1945 , he found that cooperation 
with the pro-Couunist ele•nts of the party was impossible. Therefore , in 
Septeni>er, 1945, he founded a new Polish Peasmit Party (Polski• Stronnictwo 
Ludowe or PSL) with Wincenty Witos as chairman . In October Witos died and 
ltbid. , p . 347, note 14. 
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Mikolajczyk succeeded him. By January the party •abership exceeded 600 ,ooo 
and posed a challen1e to the Communists in the fortheo11ing elections . However, 
this appeared to be 1n impossible tuk. 'nle party had no effective support 
in the broadened provisional govem•nt , the opposition had the strength of 
Soviet power behind the•, and there was little that the Westem powers could 
do to help Mikolajczyk. Even if the PSL did win the elections , the Soviet forces 
would almost certainly proceed to overtum the election. Furthel'llOre, by the 
s\l!Uler of 1945 llOlt Poles were weary and tisillutioned. Most either re luctant ly 
acquiesced or resigned theuelves to the situation . Overt efforts at resistance 
were tempered by the fact that the aovemMnt had the full support of the Soviet 
Union and by the 11oderate and current acceptabi lity of the Co•unist progrus . 
A llinori ty of anti·Comaunist patriots did refuse to acknowledge Co-.mist dollina­
tion and continued their desperate and hopeless resistance. 'nlese included a 
nlllber .. of ri1ht-win1 groups , the so-called "forest detach•nta" which survived 
well into 1946 and even later. But any type of •ajor resistance was durpened 
by the security syste11 instituted by the government. 
'nle Polish security systea was established under the tutelage of th� 
Soviets in order to cope with such irreconcilables u the above and to under­
mine Mikolaj czyk ' •  Peasant Party . A depart•nt of public security was set up 
\.l'lder Radkiewicz by the LW>lin Collllittee and later tumed into the Ministry of 
Pm 11 c Security . Radkiewi cz and several of his col leagues had taken courses 
"for adllinistration and security" in the Soviet Union. Soviet police played 
a vital part in the Polish security syste• through training, example, and the 
occupation of key positions . According to figures cited by Rozek 1 the security 
police nuabered some 230 ,000. Rozek breaks his figure into 90,000 special 
police staffs spread over the country, 100 ,ooo organized in for11al mi 1i tary 
lRozek , Op. cit. 
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units , and 40,000 plainclothesmen. In addition to the above , a Citizens' 
Militia and an Intemal Security Corps were set up in the autum of 1944 and 
the spring of 1945 which cooperated with the security police and nUllbered 
120,000. The Mini1try of Public Security thus had nearly 400,000 aen at its 
disposal during the critical period between 1945-1947. It should also be 
pointed out that the Red Any in Poland numbered 300 ,000 and the Polish Army 
and NICVD 200,000. The govem•nt stated in its organ If Wale• in 1946 that: 
The security oraans u a whole are healthy and very dedicated in their 
work , and as such we will defend the• against all \Dljustified and false 
accusations . For the security orams are a sharp weapon in the hands 
of Polish de110cracy in the strugle against reaction. We wi l l  not allow 
this tool to be wrenched fTOa us . 1 
During this period wholesale executions and b1prison•nts were conducted 
aaainst the opponents of the govem•nt in a llOSt atbitrary fashion .  And, 
u the aajor opponent of the govenment wu Mikolaj czyk's PSL. the aovemMnt 
used every •ans available, including genuine political arg111ent1, privileged 
official propaganda, and brute force , to defeat and terminate all activities 
of the party. The PPR had no intention of al lowing the Yalta "free and unfet-
tered elections" to take place, u th• PSL, having by -far the strongest popular 
backing , would pose a serious threat to the existing govemment. Security 
police thus hupered PSL activities. Its publications and broadcasts were 
severely restricted, its meetings interfered with , its officials threatened , 
and thousands of its •li>ers h1prisoned. Gomulka, although personally dis-
liking many of the excesses perpetrated against the resistance movements , was 
wil ling to support any •uures to defeat the PSL. In July of 1945 he said that 
''Mikolaj czyk is a syllbol of all anti-democratic elements, of all which is the 
eneay of democracy and the Soviet Union . "2 Mikolaj czyk threatened G011Ulka's 
!Quoted by Zbigniew Brzezinski , "Gomulka's Road to Socialisa," Problems 
of Co1111Unism, VIII , iii , pp.8-15. 
2ni1cocks , ()p.c.tt . ,  p. 103, quotina Zarys hiptorii polskiego t-uchu robot­
niczego, 1944- 194�55. 
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power. 1 
. The Teherm; Yalta, md Potsda a1ree•nt1 all, in one way or another, 
expressed th• view that post-War Butem Europe wu to be aovemed by regi•s 
"de11e>cratic md friendly" to the l.6SR. 2 At Yalta lt wu aan•d that election• 
for the co.position ot the future pvenment were to be held ·"u soon u pos­
sible" and the co.mnique issued at Potsd• stated that the pvern•nt in Polmd 
had agreed to do so. However, the elealom , despite Westem pnssure, were 
not held till January of 1947·. 
Between JWle, 1946, ad January, 1947 , the PPR and PPS leaders visited 
Mo9c:ow and are said to have ncelved personal iutructiou by Stalin re1ardin1 
th• January eleaiou. In Novellber Cyrwlewlca, on behalf of th• PPS, slped 
a pact with the PPR unltina -that party with the PPR in a 10-callecl ''De110cratic 
Bloc" for mdted action. Also iacluded in th• Bloc wen the Comuni1t d•inated 
De110cratic and Peasant parties who previoualy had bMn repnsented on the Lublin 
Comitt.. . The purpose of the Bloc wu to or1ani1e all Marxist• in the stru1-
al• for a "People's O..ocracy ." In Septellber, 1946, an Bleaoral Lav was passed 
which dl1frachi1ed all persona ,W. lty of collaboratina with th• occupation 
authorities or with "Pucist oqwzatlons . u  The Comuni1t1 used this law u 
a pntext to deprive over a 111.llion people of th• vote. One week before the 
ballotina, PSL candidates were struck off th• lists in 10 out of 52 election 
districts. These 10 dlatricts �oaed nearly one fourth of the total popu­
lation of the country and included anu when the PSL wu the 1 tron1est .  
Bleaion day, January 19, 1947, found only few PSL scrutineers at the poles , 
thus no b1partial supervision could be clai•d. A total of only 36 wt tnesses 
111or a list of protested actions made by the Polish Peuant Party 111 the 
Provisional Parliaaent in Wars., see t.tlkolaj czyk , Op.cit. , p . 294. 
2However "free but friendly'1 was a contradi ction. As Stalin put it at 
Potsdu: "A freely elected aovem•nt in any of these countries woµld be 
ati-Soviet. "  fro. P .  B. Mosely, Face to Pace with Russia, PPA Series No. 70, 
1948, p.23. 
1 36  
of the Peasant Party were allowed to be present during the counting of the 
ballots in S ,200 polling places. In those 36 polling places , the PSL offi­
cially gained between 65 and 85 percent of the votes . 
The results of the election were not published unti l January 28, 1947. 
Out of a total electorate of 12,701 ,056 there were 11,413,618 votes cast. 11\e 
governaent 's "Democratic Bloc" received aver 80 percent of the votes and gar­
nered 394 seats . The PSL won 28 seats. Of the re.aining 22 seats, all but 
the one won by the independent socialist Zygmunt Zulawski went to collabora­
ting parties. In the first debate in the new Seja, Zul•ski stated: "What 
1 saw • • •  surpassed all II)' • • •  fears . It wu not a free election, it was 
not an election at all, but organized violence over the electorate and its con­
science • • • •  "l The United States and Great Britain protested and the Aaerican 
ubusador to Poland n1i1nod but to no avai l. The Communists were in complete 
control. 
11\e purpose of the elections had been to elect a Seja which would act as 
a constituent uselbly. This Seja, however, did not fulfil l  its mission of 
providing Poland with a permanent constitution until 1951. During its first 
meeting held on Pebruary 4, 1947, a l• wu pused restoring the offi ce of 
President of the Rep\i>Uc. Bierut wu i-diately elected to that office. On 
February 19 a constitutional law wu passed which gave the country a provisional 
constitution known as the "Little Constitution. "  This l• created a new execu­
tive body composed of the President, the Marshall, and the three Vice-Marshalls 
of the Seja. The Seja it•elf was the sole legislative body. Between sessions. 
the gonrnaent could issue decrees having the force of law, which required the 
Counci l of State• s approval and the subsequent endors eaent of the Sej• when it 
lHiscocks, 0p. cit . ,  p. 105. 
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reuseli>led. 
The new govern•nt vu closely controlled by the C0111Dunists. Although 
the PPR formed only a minority in the new government , its •abers held five 
key positions. G011Ulka retained his old offices, Hilary Mine and Radkiewicz 
reaained in charp of Industry and Commerce and Public Security , end tvo PPR 
•llbers held the ainistries of Education and Foreign Affairs . 
Mikolaj czyk and the PSL were now coapletely excluded froa the governaent. 
The spirit of the PSL had been broken in the electoral defeat and in its exas­
perating elCperiences before •the election. After the elections the aovem•nt 
put an end to all opposition f� that direction by arresting aany mellbers of 
the PSL and forcibly closing local branches of that organization. Political 
pressure was made quite evident through public political trials in which 4eath 
penalties were often handed out and throuah • ni. gn of tenoris• carried out 
against party •llbers . Collmboration with the party wu also reduced through 
the appeals of the govem•nt to the patriotic sentiment of the people and 
through its moderate prograa. In October, 19•7 , Mikolaj czyk and a few of his 
COIU'ades in the PSL , believing their lives to be in danger, escaped to the West .  
The collapse of the PSL •ant the end of the unequal struale for the 
esteblish•nt of Comaunist power in Poland. The Communists were now well on 
their way to esteblishing the "monolithic bloc." The only party reaaining 
which might pose a problem to the Co•unists wu the PPS, although it was not 
a real threat. 
with the PPR. 
In fact , •any of its •llbers were prepared for colleboration 
Any real threat fro• the direction of the socialist cup had been 
thrwarted in 19•5 when Zuletski had atteJ11>ted to found a separate Social De•o­
cratic Party; Durin1 the followlna period PPR confidence in that party was 
shown when the PPR deliberately had chosen two PPS mellbers in succession as 
pri• ministers . Conflict between the two parties was Jdni11al until the years 
1947-1948 when the Co1111Uni1ts had solidly esteblished their position and were 
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ready to tum aaainst the PPS. 
During the "Pint Goaalka Period," 1945-1948, Soviet influence was quite 
evident throuahout the country. Russians held key positions in both the security 
police and the any. General Zylderski, Co-.nder-in-Chief of the Polish Antf 
and Minister of Defense from 1945-1949 , was little 11e>re than a Soviet puppet. 
In fact, the new Polish Any was trained and rebui lt under Soviet supervision. 
Bedrich Bruepl says th•t "There is little doubt • • •  that there were Soviet 
officials as agents in the different ainistries and in all branches of the adlain­
istration which were l�ortant enough from the Soviet point of view , to make 
their presence desirable. "l Brzezinski. lists six upects of imposed political 
control on Poland and the other Eutem European states including direct con-
sul tation between the Soviet and sate 111 te leadership, permanent supervision 
of clo•stic events through reliance on the Soviet ubas1adors, close contact 
between the various party organs , direct penetration of govem•nt institutions, 
isolation of the satellites from the rest of the world and from one another, 
and Soviet mi litary lli&ht. In Poland all high positions in the party and/or 
aovem•nt hierarchy were completely subordinated to Soviet authorities . Jozef 
Swiatlo, a high level Polish defector, has testt.fied before a Comittee of the 
US Congress that "No one can be appointed as a JMnli>er of the Central COllJlittee 
of the Polish Co•nmist Party • • •  without the prior approval of Soviet authori­
ties . u2 The Polish. secret police carried on their work with the assistance 
and general supervision of Soviet officers , especially General I .  Serov. The 
head of the Polish Security Ministry, S. Radkiewicz, had Soviet officers as 
his personal body guards and was advised by General Lalin of the Soviet Ministry 
of State Security. Of the 20 departments in the Polish Ministry, eight were 
lBedrich Bruegel, "Methods of Soviet Domination in Satellite States ," 
Intemational Affai rs ,  Jan ,  1951. 
2us Conpress, House of Representatives , Select Co-1 ttee on Communist Aggre .. 
sion, Investigation of Co-1st Agre11ion, Tenth Interi• Report of Hearings , 
8ld Congress, 2d session (Washlnjton , 1954), pp.53-54. 
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headed by Soviet officers directly and three had Soviet advisors. Eleven Poles 
or Polish Jews have been identified in these ainistries. Of these 1 1 ,  4 were 
former employees of the NKVD and 1 a foner officer of the Soviet armed forces . 1 
The so-called "Mu9covites" were also Moscow trained and took orders froa 
the Soviet govem•nt. Any distinction between them and Soviet agents and 
officials in Poland, especially before 1949, is obscure. The aajor difference 
between the Muscovites and the native CC>lalllists, Go1111lka, Spychalski , Bienkow­
ski , Kowalski , Klissko, and Loga-Sowinski , rested on the &JM>unt of stress put 
on Polish nationalism. The Muscovites , led by the former officasrof the Soviet 
NKVD Bierut , urged a tougher line during the period of the bogus coalition, 
relying upon the Soviet forces alone for backing. The Muscovites accused the 
natives of being "radishes ," red outside but white inside. They themselves 
were beetroou, red all the way through. 
An article pmlished in Nowe Dro1i (New Roads) , the theoretical journal 
of the PPR'• Central Committee , by Gomilka in January, 1947, entitled "Strong 
in Unity" reveals the underlying differences felt between the Polish Comrunists , 
especially the Natives , and the Soviet Union. · The article maintained that there 
was no need in Poland for the violence and bloody revolution that had taken 
place in Russia, no need for the dictatorship of the proletariat . Poland, says 
Gomulka, will follow along its own road to Socialism. This can take place be0 
cause "our democracy is not similar to Soviet democracy , just as our social 
structure is not the same as the Soviet structure. "  Gomulka then stressed the 
"peaceful, evolutionary develop•nt" toward socialism which could take place 
throuah the cooperation of the two worker's parties and their alliance with the 
lAdaa Brollke writes that "'11le Polish Comunists now admit their subordina­
tion to the Russian Comunists prior to 1956. A recent article published in 
the theoretical journal of the Polish Coanunist Party acknowledged that the 
relationship between the foreign CollllllWlist parties and the Soviet Co11111unist Party 
meant in practice 'the imposition upon all the parties of the views and opinions 
of one party , or to be more precise the opinions and views of its leadership. ' "  
Adam Bromke , "Nationalism and Comunis• in Poland," Foref;,an Affairs , XL .. 4 ,  p.636. 
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peuants . Go11Ulka described this Polish system as a "People's Democracy. 111 
However, the basic assumption of all Marxists, that of hosti 11 ty between 
capitalist and socialist states and the funduental hostility of all ''bourgeois 
de110cracles ," wu not forgotten. The Polish state aust be significantly trans­
ferred internally in order to lift the state out of any such stage. 'lhe "People0s 
Oe110cracy" was this stage. As Bierut was to explain : "The People's Demcracy 
is a special fora of. revolutionary authority which c ... into being under new 
relations &JDOng classes in the internal arena. u2 1bus even the Muscovites 
expressed the•elves in similar teru . In June of 1946 Bierut had stated that 
"This specific order is not bued on any existing aoclel .  It is not similar to 
the Soviet socialist order or to the classical economc system of the West. 113 
I 
Goaulka, however, was even •ore explicit when he said: 
Our deaocracy u well as tho social structure built and consolidated 
by us are without historical precedent. . . .  We are not a country with 
a typical capitalist structure, because essential branches of our indus­
try u well as banks and transport have been nationalized. We are 
not a country of social structure , because the non·socialist sector of 
our production occupies a very i11portant place in our national econOllY. 
We have acknowledged the necessity and the utility of individual initi­
ative and of non·socialist foras of production for a definite section of 
our industrial production: we have rejected completely the collectivi1a­
tion of agriculture. 4 
Gomulka believed that the Comaunist party could not divorce itself co,.,letely 
frm nationalisa and patriotisa, thereby appearing to be a purely Soviet aaency 
as had been done in the put by the party. Instead, the -party would stress the 
basic COllpatibility between Polish national interests and world Coamunisa. 
Goaulka, analyzing the put failures of the party and the correct policy of the 
lttiscocks , 0p.cit. , p. 115. 
2s .  Kardelj, On People's Deaocracy in Yugoslavia (New York , No Date) , p . 29 .  
31bid. ' p . 14 .  
4Hi1cocks , 0p.cit . ,  p. 115. 
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future , stated in 1944 that : 
The fundaaental error of the CmllUftilts was that , while fully appreciating 
the question of the stnagale for the social eaancipatlon of the working 
•uses , they did not sufficiently appreciate the question of independence • • • • 
The struggle for social eaanclpation cannot be separated froa the stnaggle 
for natioru�l euncipation. l 
Puture seeds of confllct with Moscow were being sown. As Peter Brock points 
out, even the radicals and socialists in Poland in the 1840 's had found that: 
Without national independence the achieve .. nt of socialis• was iapossible. 
But in order to win independence the Polish socialists were constantly 
driven to abandon.a at least for the time being, the propagation of their 
socialist ideals . � 
During the period 1945-1948 the Soviet Union practiced the policy of wide­
spread disaantling and other fons of economic exploi tatlon in Poland • . In the 
fluid post-War political conditions , the Soviet Union was not certain how the 
West would react to its political tactics in Eutem Europe. This uncertainty , 
coupled with the enormous needs of domestic reconstruction in the Soviet Union 
itself, made exploitation most opportune. Stanley Zyzniewski observes that : 
During certain stages when relatively minor concessions appeared necessary 
to enhance its political interests in these East European countries , the 
Soviet government did not hesitate to make them. But the continuing un­
certainty about a successful attainMnt of its political objectives like­
wise pra1pted Soviet authorities to confiscate and commandeer through a 
variety of devices as aach of the But European econollic assets 8! was 
feasible to bolster a rapid rehabilitation of the Soviet economy . 
Polish-Soviet economic contacts began with the Soviet policy of pressing 
for control over the affairs of the Eastem European states . The Soviet support 
of the Lublin group in July of 1944 included an agree•nt for deliveries of 
emergency foodstuff and materials to Poland. This was undoubtedly meant to en­
hance the effectivene11 of the Lublin adllinistration .  Bconoaic agreements by 
lar1ezinski, 0p.cit . ,  p.53, quoting Trybuna Wolnosci ,  Dec. 22, 1944. 
I 
2Peter Brock, "Social11• and Nationali1• in Poland, 1840-1846," Canadi an 
Slavonic Papers , IV, (1959) , p. 146. 
3stanley J. Zyzniewski, "Soviet Tutelage and the Polish Economy fro11 1945 
to 1956," Polish Review , IV, (1959) , iii , p . 2 2 .  
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1945 included short ten credits fro• the Soviet Union. The beginning of the 
redirection in the flow of trade froa West to But now began. In an August 
1945 agree•nt ,  the Soviets unilaterally recognized the new Western boundaries 
of Poland. The new western areu were quite beneficial to Polish interests 
but were outweighed by extensive disaant ling by the Soviets before the war 
ended. An official Polish state•nt puts the value of the disaantled products 
' 
at over $1 billion in post-War prices . Purthenore , in a reparations agree•nt 
signed in Auaust o.£ 1945 the Polish aovern .. nt a1reed to deliver shipments of 
coal to the Soviet Union at reduced prices . This was for compensation for the 
remaining Ger.an assets in the new territories u well u for sU>sequent deli­
veries of 15 percent of the Genan reparations due the Soviet Union. Mikola­
jczyk says that a price of $ 1 . 25 a ton was set while world prices ranged froa 
$12 to $16 a ton at the ti•. Poland delivered .,re tha 52 lli l lion tons of 
coal to the Soviet Union. The Poles received in return no more then $60 mi llion 
in reparations . Polish losses can be set at $650 ,ooo ,ooo. It ldght be added 
that in 1947 the Soviet govern•nt , in answer to the Marshall Plan, extended 
a short tera loan of $28 111 l lion to Poland to fad 11 tate purchases in the West 
for econoaic reconstruction. Such schizoid policies continued throughout 1946-
1947 • •  
'nle aain task which f acecl the Polish govem•nt in the po1t-War period 
wu reconstruction. By the autum of 1946, mch pro1re11 had been aade on the 
recovery· prOIJ'•• The Three Year Plan of Reconstruction covering the period 
1947- 1949 emphasized recovery md not a r.tical transition. The results were , 
on the whole, reaarkable. This wu due in part to Gomlka's skillful leadership 
and to the patriotic deteraination of the people. The main objectives of the 
Three Year Plan were achieved and in aome cues surpassed. However, during the 
early staps of the prograa, UNRRA assistance played a great part ($600 ,000 ,ooo 
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in supplies and administration and shipping costs) .  
In the SUllJDer of 1947 the Polish Government desired to accept the � offer 
of Marshall Aid. Hilary Mine explained in June of that year that Poland was 
not in the sa.e situation as a Great Power such as the USSR. Poland needed 
American help .  Mine was convinced that the Soviet Goverruaent would take that 
into accmmt. However , Soviet press�e later induced Polish rejection of this 
Western aid. The Soviets answered the threats to their satellites from the West 
by erecting their own econosi c bloc which emphasized rapid industriali zation 
and close econOllic links with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was now forced 
to alter its policies as the state of Eastem European resources aade it manda­
tory that the Soviet Union extend credits and supplies of equipment. As seen, 
the Soviets now aade a considerable loan to Poland. But the Soviets gave with 
one hand and took with the other. There was only a slight reduction in the 
outright Soviet exploitation. 
After the defeat of Mikolaj czyk and his PSL, there was no danger of 
"reaction," thus the friction between the PPR and the PPS was revived. Prior 
to this time it had been the policy of the PPR to stress the close cooperation 
between the two parties. Now , however, the party had served its function , and 
the Comnmists had no intention of allowing the widespread sympathy the PPS had 
amng the workina class to deve lop into an effective threat to their supremacy . 
On 1 May 1947, Goaulka called for the fusion of the party with the PPR. During 
the 11011ths of May and June the PPS felt the s - t�ctics that had been used 
against the PSL. More than 200 right-wing aemben of the PPS were arrested 
durina this period. Political trials were then held to find these gui lty of 
various "cri11es" against the state. By July of 1947 the mellhership of the PPS 
had been reduced froa 800 ,ooo to below the PPR level , a reduction of more than 
150,000 "undesirab les. "  The final union of the PPS and PPR did not come unti l 
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after Goaulka's fall .  
During this period there occurred a bifurcation in Poland's political life , 
that of domestic politics and that resulting froa the relationship of dependence 
on the Soviet Union. The two-faced character of many Soviet political state11ents 
now became quite apparent. The first differences betwen Moscow and Goaulka 
beaan in 1946 simultaneous ly in the two fiel ds .  
Soviet "liberation" and "fratemal" help was n ow  seen as a pretext to 
ruthlessly occupy and exploit Poland. This was all too visual in the passing 
of political rule over Poland into the hands of "delegates" and "advisors" sent 
fro• Moscow. Go•ulka would now begin his struggle for political power. 
A dispute with Moscow was also occurring at this tiae in the economi c 
sphere . Here , reckless orders froa Moscow to speed up the sociali zation of 
Poland ' s  economic life were seen in Poled, and especially by Gomulka, to be 
a harbinger of chaos . Gmaulka felt that it would be suicidal both for the 
econOllY and for the party as such tactics would sow the seeds of dissatisfaction 
and possibly revolt UlOl'lg the masses . He therefore officially opposed all such 
programs . His state•nt in 1946 that "We have not the s lightest need to follow 
in the footsteps of Soviet agrarian policy • • • because of the Polish condi-
tion • • • •  111 now took on an oainous omen . G0111Ulka wu now showing an mtforgi veable 
sin, independence of judge•nt and courage of action . Goaul'ka had also been 
the only person throughout the satellite states to oppose the foraation of the 
Cominform and later to criticize that organizations attitude to the Yugoslav 
party . As the period of diversity in the satellite states drew to a close , 
Gomulka shown out like a beacon in the dark. Moscow would not tolerate such 
independence , an independence which was driving Poland outside the political 
l • R •  ,"The Fate of Polish Socialism," Foreign Affai rs ,  Oct, 1949. 
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sphere of Mos cow. The goal , said Golllll ka, "Both for the PPS and for the PPR" 
is the "independence of Poland • • •  to which all others are subordinated." 1 
Such presuation was intolerable to the leadership in Moscow who now espoused 
a aonoli thic view. In JWte of 1948 Go11Ulka brought the conflict into the open 
at a meetina of the PPR central c�ttee. He foWtd, however, that his support 
even &J10ng his fellow party •llhers was limi tted by the great Soviet power 
which had brought in and maintained his party in Poland. By early autumn Go11Ulka 
was made to recant his errors and the Polish state became completely subservient 
to Moacow. 
1Zbigniew Brzezinski ,  "Go11Ulka's Road to Socialism," Probl•• of Co-..nisa, 
VII I ,  iii , p . 10,  quoting w. Walce, Vol .  2 ,  p . 163. 
OONCWSION 
Two ati the cal current• ••rae when 1tudyin1 the histories of the Coau­
nist parties of Poland and Yuaos lavia. '11\ese currents first nwal th•••lves 
at the births of the n1pective parties. On the one h•d, there ls 1mordina-
tion to the Coaintem •d Moscow hlnaf.n1 upon th• "21 Condi tlons" and intematlonal 
10Udarity , and on the other hand then an centri fuaal tendendes bued on 
ideolo1ical, practical, and national differences . Unity and conflict are ever 
recurrin1 the_. . 
In Yuao1lavia the Sociali1t Workers • Party he been founded to oppose 
the "ldnl1terial11a" of the Social Oeaouats. However, cll11entlon iflllediately 
1tnac:k its own ranks when the "centri1ts" refuaed to accept the "21 Condi tlons 0 •· 
t.elin1 that such action would •• subat.1sion to a foreign body. From this 
period on, the party wu divided between Left ad Right-wins factions stnssln« 
naw "Nenahevik" and nc. "Bolshevik" tactics .  Individual Mlll>ers aravitated 
fl'Oa an outlook of dependence and subordination to Moscow to one of independence 
and ''national Comwi1a." Popular support of the party reached i t1 zenith 
t ... diately after th• party ' •  inception and f1'0tl thenae waned considerably. 
1be party wu an llleaal· orsanl 1atlon lacklna any nal local autonomy or popu ... 
lar support. Befon the outbnak of hostilities in Burope, the party could 
fon1ee no hope of political 1ucces1 in the imediate future. 
The Comauniat Party of Poland was also a party invested with dissention 
at its birth. 'lbe Comunist Workers • Party of Poland wu formed vith the 
union of the PPS-Left md the SDKPtL. Both parties brou1ht with the• ''here·,, 
tical views . "  1be PPS-Left brou&ht with it the right deviation or so-called 
146 
147 
Zalews1czr1ana, and the SDlPiL the left-wini or Luxellbur1est deviation. 1be 
right deviation wu born of national 110tivatiou (Pol11h Road to Socialisa) 
and the left with a feeling of reput1nance against any inhibitin1 of "prole� 
tarim de11C>Cracy." 'lbe CWPP 1-diately proclai•d its •llbenhip in the 
Co-..ni1t International and its amservience to the "21 Conditions . "  However, 
throuahout the 1920' and 1930'1 Moscow found it a continual nece11ity to take 
the party in hand. 'lb• party found no support aong the traditionally anti• 
Russi• popula.tion, and the continuoua smordination of th• party to the 
imperialistic pollci•• of Moscow further added to the party'• unpopularity. 
Th• nationalistic Pol11h people could not accept those who "C011prollised" th� 
ho•land. The party was thua torn between allegiance to Poland and to Moscow. 
At its helaht the party cowted no •re tha 20 ,000 •llben and could hardly 
be called a political or1ei1auan. In 1939 th• party wu di11olvecl by fiat 
froa Moscow. 
Soviet fonign policy durins World War II further C011pounded this dicho ... 
toll)" in the Yuaoslav ad Poli1h partie1.. 'lbe division of Poland by Nasl 
Geruny ad the Soviet Union all but ended any Comunist sympathy �lthin Polad. 
'11l• party had been pulled by its roots and would now have to be transplanted 
froa Moscow. With the invasion of the Soviet Union, c_. the rebirth of the 
eo-t•t party . However, th• party vu created frOll and wu co11p letely sub­
servient to the Soviet Union. It wu simply uaed � another apnt in Soviet 
foreip policy. As the Red anies •ved toward the west they brouaht with 
th•• the Polish Comittee of National Liberation, a or1an11ation abdlar to 
the Bialystok Coamittee of 1920. 
In Yuao1lavia, however, the situation wu different . Here the puppet 
ngi•s aet up by the AJd.1 wen infi 1 trated ad obstructed by the Commnists 
juat as they had done with every other 1overnment during their existence. 
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And with the Gerun invuion of th• Soviet Union. the eo-iats were ordered 
to bepn an all out 1t�1l• aaalnat th• Pudsts muter a popular front. Now, 
for the first tilM in the party'• history, the i-diate al• of the party were 
at one with those of the peoples of v-.oslav!a. The confusion betwHn patrio­
tlsa to the ho•lad ad Co-..nisa dls1ppeared. Tito now welded his Parti1ans 
into a well-ol"dered fl&)ltina unit utilisln1 the various ethnic ,roups within 
the state. nae only doMstlc cnpetition faced by Tito were th• Chetnik forces 
of Mihailovic who suffered mch the •- fate u the Comuniat Party of Poland . 
colllboratlon with the invaders and loss of much popular support. And yet the 
Soviet Union continually chutlsed Ti to for smordinating the fi&ht aaainst 
th• Axis to social revolutionary aoall. 
'ftaus while Soviet policy wu larply beneficial to the Yugoslav Co1m1-
ni1t1 , (it h1ppened to be in confoalty for th• .,..nt with the de1in1 of at 
leut a larae 111.nority of the population) it wu destructive to any Coaunlst 
sympathy in Polmad. 
In Yuaoslavia the forcH of the Partisans were able to achieve victory 
thrwah their ow lndiaenom party 1pparatua in an armed strual• aaaimt 
Pucista and dOMatie ennles. In Poland th• Co..mlats swept to victory 
in the wake of the Red Any.1 Popular support rested with the Polish Govem­
•nt in London. 'ftaat covemaent wu defeated thrqh the political uchinatlona 
of Stalin and the fait &CCO!pli created by the Soviet Arr11 . 
Post-War Soviet foretan policy towards Butem Europe revolved about the 
twin ai• of exploitation and consolidation of power. Diversity within the 
lTe1ti110ny heard before th• u.s. Conanas. Houae. Select Comittee on 
eo-mist A1,nssion. Second Interia �ort . (H. Rept. 2650. Wuhinaton : 
Govemmnt Printina Office, 1§54), p.S�eatlblished the fact that Cowml•• 
wu able to fuse l ta rule upon the people of the captive nations only when it 
wu supported by the Red ArflY. preceded by subversion which wu poll tlcally, 
technically. ad flnacially enpneered by the Krealln. "  
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the b lock wu extolled for reuons of ellpediency. Later, when opportunity 
knocked, ideological considerations would tlke on an added impetus . This 
process began with Stalin 's adjust•nt to the policy of the "contain•nt of 
Co..mis•" beaun by the United States in 1947 (Truaan Doctrine, Marshall Plan) • 1 
Stalin now ai•d at preventing the disintegration of the Co-.mlst regi•s in 
Butern Europe and at strengthenin1 their loyalty to the Soviet Union. Stalin 
would accept no challenaes to hit ideolo1ical and political leadershlpe 
Stalinist dictua wu now applied riltdly to do•stir. ""ci-rcuutances . .. 
Sterility in thought ,  policy, ad action ensued. 2 The new pattern wu to serve 
as a buis for relations between the USSR and Eutem Europe. The clus 
stl'\lagle was to be intensi fied, and all enellie1 who had infi ltrated the Co1111U­
nist move•nt were to be liquidated. A radical sociali zation of agriculture 
and industriali zation were to transform the "Peoples De11<>cracies . '' '11\e result 
would be uniformity and confond.ty throughout the satellites . 
Gomlka and 7.ito now s• their power challenged and their countries faced 
with economic chaos . Centri fugal tendencies bued on practical , national, and 
ideological di fferences were heightened. 'lbe results were felt !mediately in 
the Soviet-Yugos lav dispute and in the actions of Go11Ulka. Hawever, Gomulka 
wu to fail in his resistance to the Stalinist dictum and T.i to was to achieve 
success. 
11\ere are a n'Ullber of detel'llinin1 factors which have been •ntioned to 
explain Tito's uintainence of Power and Gomlka's failure. Firs t ,  the libera­
tion of Yugoslavia occurred largely throup local effe>rts by the Partisans rather 
lTito probably could not have broken •fr/ frOll the Soviet Union if the 
U.S.  had shown no interest in Greece, if the Commnist parties had not been 
pushed out of the govem•nts in France and Italy , and i f  the general atmosphere 
of international relations had been one of \Dlb1peded expansion of Soviet power. 
2An article appearing in Rude Pravo, May 25 , 1952, explains this aptly: 
"Love of the Soviet Union does not tolerate the slightest reservation. 11\e road 
into the morass of treuon indeed begins on the inclined plane of reservations 
and doubts regarding the correctness of the policy of the Sovie� Union . "  
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than by the advancing Red armies as in Poland where Soviet troops sti 1 1  remained 
in 19•8. Here , geoaraphical contiguity and the lines of communi cation to Soviet 
forces stationed in East Germany made it necessary that Poland should be a reli­
able meniber of the Soviet block. Thus for purely geoaraphic reasons Poland had 
not the sue freedoa as Yugos lavia to detach herself fro11 the Soviet alliance. 
Second, in Yugoslavia there was a aradual develop11ent of the party and its regime 
on native soil rather than the C011p lete importation of persons from Moscow. Together, 
this gave the Yugoslav group a greater degree of independence from Moscow than that 
enjoyed by the Poles . Furthermore , Tito was unique among ComJl\D'list leaders in Eas-
tem Europe in having peasant support, in facing no considerable bourgeoisie 
opposition, and in being a genuinely popular national leader. In contrast ,  The 
Polish Co9Ullist Party was relatively weak. It needed the support of the Soviet 
Union to maintain its power. Ganulka enjoyed tremendous popularity among his 
comrades but at the same time his control of state and party organs was in no 
sense co111parable to that of Tito ' s .  Tito could count on the unquestioned obedi­
ence and loyalty of the COllllWlist hierarchy. He was tbe head of a solidly united 
group of native Co18'lDlist leaders who controlled the ansy , the secret police, and 
the party apparatus . Go111Ul1ca was at the mercy of the Soviet security system. 
The •ajor cause of the survival of Tito's regime was , •t the sue tie, the basic 
cause of the breach with the Soviet Union . This was simply that Tito had created 
his own army and civi l adllinistration. He had made the careers of his officers 
and his bureaucrats , and with a handful 1 of exceptions , they re•ained loyal to 
him. Brzezinski observes that "Tito had achieved his power by accepting and 
practicing Stalinisa, and the Stalin-Tito rift revolved about, and was resolved 
on ,  the power plane. Go111Ulka fai led in 1949 because his ideological rosition 
was divorced fr011 effective power . "l Political power wu thus the determining 
factor in the divergence of Co111111nis� in Poland and Yugoslavia in 1948. 
l.Zhigniew Brzezinski , "COlllllWlist Ideolof')' and Power: FTo• Unity to Diversity," 
Journal of Politics , XIX, p . 549. 
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TABLE NUMBER 1 
MBMBBRSHIP OP 'nlB a»Y (1919-1941) 
1919 
June 1920 
July 1920 
December 1920 
Deced>er 1923 
1924 . 
January 1925 
May 1926 
First half of 1928 
November 1928 
January 1929 
Middle of 1932 
End of 1932 
October 19 33 
Oecellber 1934 
End of 1�35 
Aut\Jml of 1937 
May 1939 
October 1940 
Beginning of 1941 
Source: 
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·S0 ,000 
60,000 
65,000 
80,000 
688 
800-900 
2 , 300 
2,000 
3,000 
2 ,034 
3,SOO 
300-500 
1 ,000 
1 ,600-1 ,700 
2,000 
3,000 
1 , SOO 
3 ,000 
6,4SS 
8,000 
TABLE NUMBBR 2 
URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION 
Pol1nd (1949) 35.8 64.21 
Yuaoslavia (1948) 16.2 83.82 
loxtord Realonal Economic Atlas, The USSR and 
Eastern EurOJ?! (Oxford University Press , tondon ,  1§56) , p.93. 
2cordon w. Eut ad A. E. Moodie ,  The Ch1Dgin1 
World (Harr1p ,  London , 1956) , p . 12·6. 
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TABLI! NUMBER 3 
SIZBS OP THE aM«JNIST PARTIBS OP BASTSRN EUROPE 
CaeClloslovakta 
Hun1ary 
Bulaaria 
R011anla 
Poland 
Albania 
Lk5SR 
Yu1oslavia 
Source: 
Percent of Tot&l Population Belonging to the Party 
· circa 1938 circa 1948 
.s 21. 
. 3  10 .9 
. 4  6 . 3  
.006 . 6 . 3  
.06 6.0 
.o 3.8 
1 .4  3 .8  
. 09  2.6 
R. V. Burki , The Dynudcs of Co-.miaa in Eutern Sr•• 
(Princeton: Princeton Dnlvenlty Pre11 ,  1961), p .S� 
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DOCUMlNT NUMBER 1 
Directive for Future Work 
9 May 1941 
l. The ti• has COM when decisive new s'teps IBUlt be taken along the path to 
world nvolutlon. Th• obstaclu to be overcom an still fonddable and call 
for a new tactical flexibility which must be carefully worked out and boldly 
practised along the followin1 line: 
a. The Comuniat world revolution BUit be pnsented u a series of mea-
1una to achieve • tNe de110cracy , '  and al 1 poll ti cal and al 11 tuy leaden 
of the Comunist Movement 11U1t depict their activity in this llaht. Up to 
30 percent of Party •lllb•n aay come out into the open u • front-line fiahten 
for democracy' in the eyea of the •asse1 . 
b .  The Gov•rn•nt of the Soviet Union aay alto find it necessary to aake 
teaporuy conce11iou in the s- 1ense in OTder to further the nvolutionuy 
cause in those countries where conditions deaand it. 
c. Until the 1ei1un of power, the Colllluniat Party of the country where 
revolution is beina prepared should be careful to uintaln 1ood nlatiou 
with patriotic and religious circles . No discrbdnation should be made against 
the Churches ; each should be treated on the s- footing in the eyes of the 
Ulses. National traditions , too, should be respected. Where necessary , 
and with the authorisation of the Central Comttee of the Party, represonta­
tl v.1 of the Olurchea should be al lowed to take part in preparing and carrying 
throuah the revolution. their nmerical 1tnn1th should dete!'lline the pace at 
which church influence b later to be ell11inated froa State affairs. 
d.  The press should be used for p\j)llcisina the new line uonpt the 
auses. Printed utter intended for the confidential instruction of Party 
•••rs and organizations will conttain the s .. contents as hitherto. Secret 
circulars should continue to keep all active nvolutionaries infonned of the 
real situation. 
•· Once power hu been seized by tho Party , foreign policy will be laid 
down by the diploutic repnsentatives of the �SR, who will receive the neces­
•aJ:Y directives froa the Coaintern . The representatives wi l l  maintain liaisan 
between the Central Coaaittee of the C011111Unist Party of the USSR and those of 
the countries when the Party hu newly usued power. Reports and enquiries 
will be passed to th••· with copies di·rect to the Colld.ntem. 
f. I-diately after seizing power, the Central Coaittee wi l l  set up a 
new aovernment. This body shall be representative of the bTOad aasses of the 
people and preserve every appearance of de110Cracy. 11\e country wi l l  be adlllin­
isterecl throuah the subordinate provincial, reaional. district, and local 
co..tttees . Por internal affairs , the Central Comi ttee wi l l  remain the supreM 
ex.ocutiv• authority, whilst �oreign policy will be controlled by the ExecutlVt.' 
Collllittee of the Colllntern. 
I• Opponents of the new administration, especially those who still  enjoy 
soae prestige amongst the people and those whose participation in the l'evchlUon 
aay have given thea access to the secret ncords of the Comamist Move•nt ,  
should be removed as soon as possible, but in ' de11e>cratic'  fashion ; l1y :1oi1i� 
brought to trial before a re1ular court or a People 's Court. The latter should 
coaprise one known •aber of the Party and two so�ret menbisrs or reliahle :·.;1r< ­
pathiaen . Important trials should be conducted by larger courts of a conespond­
inaly ' democratic' nature . 
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2. The coWltry where the Central Caudttee has recently uswnad power should 
not mpply for inclusion in the Soviet Union unti l the necessary instructions 
to this effect have been received from the Executive Comm! ttee of' the Condntem. 
lo Until the inclusion of the country in the Soviet Union, at least SO per­
cent of the •llbers of the Comuniat Party ..at reuin in underground conspira­
torial work and act u the adlllniatratlon's chief allies in the aovem•nt of 
the country. 
4 .  Traitors to the Party are to be liquidated without trial once a full report 
confindna their treachery has been smmi tted to the Party organization to 
which th.y belon1. Buller instructions are herewith 1upeneded ad the death 
penalty prescribed for treachery of any sort aaainst the interest of the Co-.i­
niat revolution. 
S .  The frontien of countries pogTaphlcally remote from the Soviet Union 
are not to be closed imediately after the revolution. Everythina should 
rather be done to induce all nfugeea, en les , etc. , to retum home under demo­
cratic safepards. Only then shall ahe frontiers be closed. Mnbers of all 
Central C�tteea an reainded that the Collintem was once obliged seriously 
to hold up its plans for the world revolution owina to the large ntlllber of 
Russian ••an• who succeeded in stirring up the democracies against the Coau­
nist Nove•nt. '11le fewer ••ans today, the more assured wi l l  be the succe11 
of the revolution. 
Conslderlble d1 fficultie1 aay be encountered in the 11pprehen1ion and des­
truction of internal opponents and c:lu1 enellles. No ti• should be lost , 
however, in plac1n1 thea wider restraint and placin1 foraal char&•• against 
thea to justify their detention in the eyes of the democ:ratic world .  
6 .  The ten • clus enemy' comprises the follcwina categories : aelllbers of 
ideolopcal move•nta of a nationalist or religious character, priests , 11ea­
ber1 of the police force , officen' corps , diploutic and civil services in 
so far as they have refused to side with the revolutionary forces , all aeabers 
of the rulina dynasties , any individuals known to be actively opposed to the 
preparation or the carrying out of the revolution. 
'nte way these clus enfti•• are to be re11e>ved will be detenined by the 
,eneral situation and the •thods used will be prescribed by the delegate of 
the Bxecutl ve Comi ttee of the Cold.ntem who wl 11 be attached to the Central 
Comittee as soan as the latter hu assmed pcwer and place his rich experi­
ence at their disposal. 
7. After the sei1un of power, the Party shall dispose of dunds , kept separate 
froa State funds , froa the followina sources : property belonginc to class 
enemies who have been liquidated or had their p�sessions confiscated by the 
findlna of a court of l•; property belonpna to hostile 11e>vnents and orgMi­
zations ; property confiscated froa the Churches , fr°"' the rulin1 dynasty , and 
from war profit"n. 
Source : Stephen Cll11old, Whirlwind : An Account of Marshal Ti to' s Rise 
to Power (New York : Philosophical Library , i§so), pp.239-241. 
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DOCUM!NT NUMBER 2 
Decree of the National Ho• Counci 1 ,  July 21,  1944 , appointing the Polish Com-
111 ttee of National Liberation 
'lhe decisive 1tru11l• for the eapulalon of the Gerun invader fro11 Polend 
has started. In face of this historic event the National Hom Counci 1 sets up 
th• Polish Comlttee for National Liberation u a provisional eacutive authority 
to lead the nation ' s  struggle for liberation ,  md to secure its independence 
and the rHstabU1h•nt of the Polish State. 'The fol lowing are the ..t>en of 
the Polish Committee for National Liberation: 
1)  Edward Bole1lw Osobka-Mor•aki, Olairaan and Head of the Department 
far Porei an Affairs .  
2) Andr1ej Wltos, Vlce-Olairaan and Hem of the Depart•nt of Aaticul­
ture and Agrarian Refont. 
3) Wanda Wuilewska, Vice-Olainan. 
4) General Michal Rola-Zyaienki, Head of the Department of National 
Defence. 
S) Lt. Gen. Zypmt Berltng, Deputy Head of the Depart•nt of National 
Defence. 
6) Stanislw Kotek-A1roszew11d , Head of the Department of Public Adadn­
istratlon. 
7) Jan Stefan Haneun, Head of the Department of National Economy and 
Finance. 
8) Jan Czechowski , Head of the Depart•nt of Justice. 
9) Stanisllw Radklewlc1, Head of the Depart•nt of Public Security. 
10) Dr. Boleslaw Drobner, Head of the Depart•nt of Labour, Social 
Welfare and PlJ>Uc Health. 
11) Bnaineer Jan Michal Gni>ecki , Head of the Department of Communi-
cations , Posts and Tele1raphs. 
12) Dr. Emil Sommerstein. Head of the Department of War �eparations . 
13) l>r. StanlsllW Skrzeszevski , Head of the Depart.ent of Education . 
14) Wincenty Rz.ymowskl , Head of the Departll81lt of n.tl ture and Pine Arts . 
lS) Dr. Stefan Jodrychowskl , Head of the Department of Propaganda and 
Inforaation. 
The National Council of tho Ho11eland has directed the Polish Collllli ttee 
for National Liberation to establish its temporary HQ on liberated territoTy, 
and hu appointed u •lll>en of the rolish Cowai ttee of National Liberation 
leaders of the Under1round Move•nt who succeeded in cros1lng the front line . 
and leaden of Poles in the USSR. Ptve Mlllbers of the Polish COlnl'llittee for 
National Liberation reaain in th• terrl tory under occupation. where they lend 
the struagle for liberation and ensure liaison with the NAtional Counci l of 
the Hoae land. 11\e na•s of these five members cannot be revealed for obvf. .,u� 
reasons. 
Chaiman of the National Counci l of the Homeland 
Boles l• Bierut 
Olaiman of the Polish Commi ttee for National Liberation 
Edward Bolesl., Osobka-Mor.,ski 
Source : lnstytut Historyczny illienla rl9nerala Slkorskelgo, Op. cit e ,  
Appendix Number 6 ,  p .  650. 
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